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The investigation on these pages is an attempt to come to grips with 
depoliticization both as a philosophical concept and in terms of Euro-
pean politics. It is informed, in the first place, by my conviction that de-
politicization requires a specific kind of critique in connection to what 
political philosophers have called ‘the political’. Forging this connection 
is accompanied by the introduction of a new conceptual apparatus. In 
the second place, the need to understand depoliticization in these terms 
is not a free-floating, purely theoretical concern. The writing of this doc-
ument was motivated by my own perplexity at the ambiguous presence 
of the European Union (EU) in the lives of people such as myself: Eu-
ropean citizens. In addition to producing a need to reflect on its politics, 
‘Europe’ also serves as a sounding board for the conceptual apparatus 
once it is developed. This is especially meaningful as the political form 
of the EU is as yet open-ended: as we will consider, it is characterized 
by a specific form of becoming that leaves behind some of the familiar 
static elements of nation states.
Moving in this manner from the present state of European politics 
to an account of depoliticization as a philosophical concept, and then 
back to Europe in order to apply its lessons, I confront throughout a 
further element that on my analysis makes this movement itself possi-
ble. Both in my approach to what I call depoliticization critique and in 
Introduction
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my perplexity at ‘Europe’, a crucial role is played by a sense of loss. What 
has been lost in my view, both in the current theorizations of the polit-
ical and in the current practice of European politics, is an engagement 
with ethics. This is not to say that I am advocating a return to a classic 
ethical framework such as deontology or utilitarianism. I do not want 
to argue for ethics as a casuistry of problems and solutions. But it is pre-
cisely ethics that is required, since we have to do more than theorizing 
on the political: we have to affirm it. The urgency of doing so can easily 
be pointed out on many political levels, but it is especially clear in the 
context of the EU, which harbors a tendency to view politics as a tech-
nical affair. Though this technical approach is often enabled by silent 
and silenced moral underpinnings, these are moral in the wrong sense, as 
I hope to show. It should thus be clear that the sense of loss I experience 
at the withdrawal of ethics in philosophical approaches to the political 
and the technical exercise of politics in the European Union is itself 
not only not nostalgic, but fundamentally ambiguous. On a conceptual 
note: this also means that I cannot draw the familiar contrast that vari-
ous authors have made (in different ways) between ‘ethical’, ‘moral’ and 
‘normative’ questions. I have therefore elected to use ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ 
interchangeably.
Depoliticization, (the dismissal of ) ethics and European politics 
stand for concerns that in my view all refer to each other and end up 
intersecting. This is clearly brought out by what can be called the Varou-
fakis episode. In the midst of the Greek debt crisis, Greece’s then- 
finance minister attempted to politicize the discussion on European 
politics by invoking Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: he was 
duly dismissed1. This, again, does not mean that we should advocate 
for a return of deontology in response. But the episode is significant in 
a different sense. In this particular instance, the dismissal of ethics has 
depoliticizing effects. The dismissal of ethics can be a mode of depolit-
icization: in other words, it can be part of the problem rather than part 
of the solution. Therefore we can pose the more general question under 
which conditions the dismissal or admission of ethics into politics is 
(de)politicizing. From the vista offered by the Varoufakis episode, we 
can thus see how matters of European politics intersect with the prob-
lematic status of ethics in light of (de)politicization.
1 Varoufakis 2015
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The present investigation will reflect on exactly this intersection. 
The master problem that I confront is the relation between politics and 
ethics. This problem is contextualized in a double sense by the two focal 
points that I will use to approach ethics and politics: depoliticization 
critique on the other hand, and European politics on the other hand. 
Furthermore, I take a contrarian approach in arguing, in line with the 
sense of loss described above, that ethics is to be seen as part of the 
solution rather than part of the problem. My main question is therefore: 
What role can ethics play in the politicization of European politics?
I address this question in five chapters, all of which shed light on a 
particular aspect of the intersection between depoliticization critique, 
European politics and ethics. The different aspects each correspond to 
a specific element of the intersection. Taken individually, the chapters 
are therefore quite different in terms of the matters discussed and their 
points of orientation. In order to interrelate the different parts of the 
terrain and what is at stake in each of them, I now briefly introduce the 
subject matter of the five chapters in order. Following this section, the 
last part of the introduction is dedicated to reflection on the task I have 
set myself, as a practitioner of political philosophy in this day and age.
In order to begin to see the outlines of the investigation as a whole, 
its first step is to introduce the terminology of what I call depoliticiza-
tion critique. Following and extending upon Carl Schmitt, I show the 
essentially contextualized nature of its terms. I introduce a distinction 
that will prove crucial to all the chapters that follow: that between local-
ized and generalized depoliticization critique. The point of the distinc-
tion is to show how the localized variety of depoliticization critique can 
undercut itself. In order to avoid this, it needs to penetrate the ontolog-
ical dimension: this characterizes generalized depoliticization critique. 
Even ontology needs to become resistible, in Bonnie Honig’s term2.
This notion of resistibility is then investigated in connection to the 
work of Jacques Rancière and Ernesto Laclau, which offer strong con-
temporary accounts of the political. I explicate their accounts centered 
on the concept of populism, which Laclau uses in a highly innovative 
way and which according to him is in certain respects very close to 
Rancière’s approach. This concept of populism will also make a return 
in the final chapter. Finally, the initial survey of Rancière and Laclau 
2 Honig 1991, 108
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allows us to swoop back and begin to consider the different reasons why 
ethics is usually seen as an ally of depoliticization in the work of those 
classed as post-foundational political philosophers. This account of the 
political cases against ethics rounds off Chapter 1: Depoliticization 
and political ontology. Its aim is to introduce the vocabulary of depo-
liticization critique and to acquire a conceptual platform from which to 
start analyzing European politics.
The second step is to set up camp in Europe. I use the conceptu-
al apparatus and critical perspectives on ontology and ethics that were 
laid out in the first chapter in order to point out and analyze aspects 
of depoliticization in European politics. My point of entrance is Fritz 
Scharpf ’s distinction between input and output legitimacy, and his 
analysis of the EU’s dependence on the latter3. The legitimacy of Eu-
rope cannot be sufficiently constructed on the basis of collective acts 
of will of European citizens (input), but must be based on the effective 
solution of communal problems (output). The centrality of output legit-
imacy points the whole institutional structure of European politics in 
a particular direction, namely away from pursuing positive integration 
(through the building of commitment) by political means and towards 
pursuing negative integration (through the removal of obstacles) by ju-
ridical means.
This in turn has consequences for the kind of politics that the EU 
can pursue, and hence for the role and character of its institutions. 
Consistent with this analysis, EU-style politics have been described as 
“policy without politics”4. In terms of European institutions, I focus on 
the historical importance and the political insulation of the European 
Court of Justice, which in light of the aforementioned juridical strate-
gies is of great importance. A further aspect of depoliticization in Euro-
pean politics is represented by what I call Moral Fortress Europe. This 
concept refers to the moralization employed in order to depict the EU 
as a vehicle for the commitment to peace, human rights and the expul-
sion of populism; and what is more, as uniquely suited to fulfill all of 
these commitments. Chapter 2: European politics and aspects of de-
politicization concludes with a consideration of the EU’s narrative and 
self-description in light of the analyses on these fronts. At this point we 
3 Scharpf 1999, 16-22
4 Schmidt 2006, 22-23; 157-162; cf. Habermas 2015, 5
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possess a notion of depoliticization critique, including a critical consid-
eration of ethics vis-à-vis politics, and we have applied this to European 
politics. This enables us to consider the relationship between ethics and 
politics more constructively.
With this construction work in mind, the investigation then pro-
ceeds to its third step, which is to catalogue and analyze direct relations 
between politics and ethics in terms of their (de)politicizing effects. I 
define a direct relation as one that does not require a specific procedure 
through which ethics is transformed into something suitable for polit-
ical reflection. Ethics is brought to politics directly, so to speak: or not 
brought to it directly when ethics and politics are deemed to be wholly 
separate (without considering a specific procedure in a mediating role). 
Modern philosophy is used to develop and illustrate the accounts of 
various direct relations, and to show the salience of depoliticization cri-
tique before Schmitt. After all, references to this earlier tradition make 
the Varoufakis episode possible in the first place.
I introduce four direct relations: fixation, friction, isolation, im-
manence. In tracing the development through modern philosophy, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is introduced as a thinker of both openings 
and closures; the aforementioned Kant advances the narrative, at first 
following Rousseau’s ‘fixating’ account but then allowing for a friction 
between ethics and politics, although on the final analysis the moral 
horizon itself cannot be contested. The incontestability of an absolute 
foundation, which makes the political qua political impossible, is what 
I call fixation: the first direct relation. Friedrich Nietzsche breaks down 
the account of givenness on which fixation depends, and moves on to 
defend an approach based on artistic self-fashioning. Max Weber takes 
on many of the basic schemes of Nietzsche’s thought, and in that sense 
provides an advance on Kant with a consistent application of friction. 
The key idea of friction, the second direct relation, is that values are 
deemed important, but also in conflict with a given political reality into 
which they have to be implemented. Weber’s analysis ends up becom-
ing an account of powerlessness, and he is criticized sharply for this by 
Schmitt. I then consider the question whether ethics and politics should 
be connected to each other at all; the negative answer to this question is 
what I call isolation, the third direct relation. I show that isolation, too, 
has depoliticizing consequences. The fourth and final direct relation is 
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introduced by Schmitt himself: it is characterized by seeing the polit-
ical as immanent to all life domains, in the sense that it is present in 
them as a possibility. I moreover show that Schmitt is committed to an 
affirmation (rather than description) of the political, and this involves 
him in what I call a moral-political circle. While the direct relation of 
immanence is promising in terms of avoiding depoliticization, it does 
not yet link up with a practical politics. Chapter 3: Problema Morale: 
direct relations between politics and ethics thus shows the usefulness 
but also the ultimate incompleteness of direct relations.
In view of this incompleteness, the fourth step is to consider two 
of the most influential accounts of indirect relations, in an attempt to 
either supplement or supplant the direct relations of the third chapter 
with the insights generated by indirect approaches. These are set apart 
through the interjection of a specific procedure in between ethics and 
politics, so that the former is brought to the latter indirectly. I first con-
sider the work of Jürgen Habermas, whose work is explicitly involved 
with an attempt to reform European politics, and then analyze Rawlsian 
political liberalism in an attempt to address some of the shortcomings 
found in Habermas. I focus on the implications of Habermasian dis-
course theory on European politics. The indirect relation I use to sum-
marize my analysis is called anticipation: it postulates not a first but a 
‘final principle’ that all of politics, and in fact every act of communica-
tion in the case of Habermas, necessarily expresses. I argue that such an-
ticipation is a mode of depoliticization. The work of John Rawls, which 
I consider in part through the prism of its updated version in the work 
of Jonathan Quong, complements Habermas in the sense that it does 
not postulate final principles, instead adopting “shallow foundations”5. 
However, this version of political liberalism also falls prey to depolitici-
zation since it asks moral convictions to pass a specific test and neutral-
izes the remainders. The test is one of generalization, and it characterizes 
the second indirect relation I discuss. Chapter 4: Open-endedness and 
justification: indirect relations between politics and ethics concludes 
by noting that both indirect approaches under consideration are prom-
ising in important respects, but also raise the question whether and how 
their corresponding depoliticizing effects can be avoided.
5 Raz 1990, 8; Quong 2011, 225
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Answering that question and journeying back to Europe comprises 
the final step and therefore the capstone of my investigation. We are at 
this point familiar with many depoliticizing traps into which politics 
and accounts of politics may fall. In order to avoid them, we have to 
look into the possibility of affirming the political while also politicizing 
consistently, that is, without falling prey to depoliticization. I develop a 
notion of polemical politics based on Schmitt’s account of the polemical 
nature of political concepts, and show how this must be combined with 
the exclusion of the different forms of depoliticization that have been 
analyzed in previous chapters. This combination adds up to a further, 
and final, indirect relation that I call political engagement.
A paradox looms. In order to politicize consistently we have to shut 
out depoliticization: in other words, give an account of what is admitted 
and what is not admitted into politics. Is this not itself depoliticizing? 
The reason I can respond in the negative is that political engagement 
can have recourse to the direct relation of immanence and its moral- 
political circle. This shows the mutual need immanence and political 
engagement have of each other.
With this theoretical apparatus in hand, we can ask what the prac-
tical entailments of political engagement are for our purposes: in par-
ticular, how its use impacts the present state of European politics and 
possible suggestions for reform. I must emphasize that there is no single 
answer: there is no single form of politics that uniquely ‘passes the test’, 
and such a claim would in fact run headlong into the arguments of pre-
vious chapters. Instead, I pursue one approach that suggests itself from 
the preceding considerations and is moreover highly pertinent in the 
current political environment: Europopulism. I introduce it both as an 
example and a direction. This is the final point of Chapter 5: Politiciz-
ing across the board. Because Europopulism succeeds only under cer-
tain conditions, it rises above a mere indication: it shows in which ways 
politicization finds itself poised against mechanisms of depoliticization 
in European politics, it shows how (de)politicization itself works and 
what is needed to attain the politicization of European politics.
In this manner, the work of this investigation enters into myriad 
arenas of philosophical discourse from the perspective of a particular set 
of intersecting problems. Because they are viewed from this particular 
perspective, the arenas themselves are connected in this regard, however 
-12-  Introduction
different from and even opposed to each other they may at first appear. 
I hope the connections I suggest over the course of the argument will 
encourage others to formulate further perspectives that bring new light 
to the interconnections. 
In terms of the outcome of this investigation, then, I have three 
main goals: addressing depoliticization as a philosophical concept, com-
ing to grips with the phenomenon of European politics and addressing 
the ambiguous sense of loss concerning ethics. The reforming of rigidly 
compartmentalized philosophy ‘from within’ can be said to constitute 
a fourth goal to be attained in terms of our philosophical approach. I 
hope to have made a small contribution in this regard.
I have not yet explained why (de)politicization is so important to 
me. The arguments can stand on their own and in that sense do not 
require further explanation, but I nonetheless believe it is important to 
provide some kind of insight. In writing on the pitfalls of the political, 
I am not only responding to the conceptual materials I explicitly refer-
ence. A further layer of response, that in a literal sense goes beyond the 
letter of the present text, is that what constitutes the political and who 
has access to it are fundamental questions of our time. I am inspired by 
movements such as Black Lives Matter, and troubled by the effective-
ness of interested parties engaged in spinning political issues so that 
what is really at stake in them is obscured. The need to bring out what 
is at stake here becomes the launching platform for a form of critique – 
depoliticization critique – that has been part and parcel of the tradition 
of political philosophy at least since modern times, but has not been 
explicitly and systematically conceptualized and confronted with the 
reality of depoliticization.
One of the immediate reasons for pursuing this investigation, as 
remarked, is a perplexity with the presence of Europe in the lives of 
its citizens. But the need for critique of this kind does not stop at the 
European borders, nor do I mean to suggest this. Because of Europe’s 
open-endedness, the technical approach that tends to prevail in its pres-
ent politics, and its sheer importance, it does provide a crucial impetus 
to and a strong theoretical and practical test for depoliticization cri-
tique. Equally, however, there is more work yet to be done. That is why 
political engagement will continue to call us to action, and why theoret-
ical inquiry into depoliticization (critique) is, in all matters political, an 
urgent matter: one which I now begin to address.
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Chapter 1  
 
Depoliticization and  
political ontology 
As soon as we begin to inquire into depoliticization, we are confronted 
with a puzzle. For it is not clear that depoliticization has a unified or 
even unifiable meaning that can be applied across different contexts. Let 
us briefly consider two examples. First, we may say that an economic 
policy is ‘depoliticized’ when it is motivated by expert counsel rather 
than what we may think of as properly democratic processes. Second, 
we may say that terrorist attacks are ‘depoliticized’ when a politician 
casts them as ‘attacks on our values’ rather than moves and counters 
in a conflict between political groups6. We should first of all note that 
both examples involve taking a critical stance towards depoliticization; 
this is what I will call depoliticization critique, and its contours will 
come more clearly into view by the end of this chapter. For now, let us 
focus on the specifics of the two examples. The first example shows that 
depoliticization critique is centrally concerned with a notion of politics 
or ‘the political’, and that critical usage of the term can quickly lead to 
diagnoses of ‘unpolitical politics’. This will be the case when institution-
al politics is unable to do justice to what we regard as truly political. 
For instance, if real politics requires representative democracy, then a 
democracy that no longer centrally involves representation can be con-
sidered depoliticized in the sense that real politics has been removed 
6 Schinkel 2015
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from it. Politics, then, cannot be conceptually reduced to the realm of 
the state or even institutional politics in general. The example concern-
ing ‘attacks on our values’ shows that depoliticization critique explores 
the historical and philosophical conditions of the situation ‘objectively’ 
confronting us, and more specifically enquires into the role of politics 
past, present, and future in the coming-to-be of the confrontation itself. 
It thus incites us to political action and resists passive spectator attitudes 
toward political reality. Depoliticization critique thus opposes claims 
that would cast terrorism, or economic policy for that matter, as an in-
evitable ‘force of nature’ that could not have been otherwise.
What we can surmise from these brief reflections is, first, the in-
volvement of depoliticization critique with what Oliver Marchart calls 
political difference. Only such a difference at the center of politics allows 
depoliticization critique to keep open the possibility of making things 
political in the most fundamental sense, which I will later introduce 
under the heading of generalized depoliticization critique. Marchart 
defines political difference as the distinction between politics, under-
stood as the attempts to ground society on a positive foundation, and 
the political, conceived as the absent ground of society7. Second, there 
seems to be a notion of engagement at work, or at least a normatively 
charged insistence that politics is not about passively reacting to estab-
lished matters of fact.
But combining these two aspects of depoliticization critique leads 
to a problem. If we consider the field of concepts around political dif-
ference and attempt to combine it with normative attitudes like engage-
ment, it becomes clear that theorists of political difference are uneasy 
with normativity. It is not hard to see why. Said theorists typically con-
trast a notion of politics as ‘derivative’ of other spheres (for instance, the 
social) with a notion of the political as a disruptive event that is neces-
sarily fleeting in nature and impossible to capture in institutional form8. 
If the political is truly to be disruptive, however, then it cannot rely on 
pre-established categories: it must be autonomous, in some sense.
This should make clear that the rabbit-hole called depoliticization 
critique goes quite deep. The tension between politics and the politi-
cal, combined with a deep suspicion of predetermined reality to which 
politics need only ‘respond’, leads to many new questions. For instance, 
7 Marchart 2007, 12
8 E.g. Rancière 2010, 51-55; Wolin 1996, 31
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reflecting on the proper site of politics simultaneously means reflecting 
on institutional politics, and from that will follow an evaluation of pop-
ulism that forms in opposition to it. We could come to see populism as 
the pinnacle of politics in the true sense or as a form of anti-political 
mistrust; we will discuss this later on in the chapter as well as in the 
final chapter. The theoretical angle of depoliticization critique shows 
how such discussions are themselves instances of the master problem 
confronting this kind of thought: how should we conceive of the rela-
tion between ethics and politics? Is ethics a threat to the autonomy of 
politics, or do we need some notion of ethics to make sense of depo-
liticization critique? And how would we make sense of such a notion 
of ethics? Before delving that deeply, we have to do some preliminary 
excavation work.
1.1 Contextualizing depoliticization critique
Both examples of depoliticization critique that we have explored above 
– economic policy and terrorism – involve a notion of politics and what 
it should be able to do. What we mean when we criticize ‘depoliticiza-
tion’ thus seems to depend essentially on the concept of politics or the 
political we employ in the process. Another way of saying this is that 
depoliticization and depoliticization critique are tied to a historical- 
philosophical context. It is perhaps all too easy to take our central con-
cept at face value: depoliticization signifies a process whereby some-
thing is made non-political. This embryonic definition is a good start, 
but it is not clear what follows from it. We have stated that ‘depoliticiza-
tion’ does not refer to political reality in a stable way, since the meaning 
of ‘depoliticization’ depends in no small way on the concept of politics 
or the political employed by the theorist in question. This in turn means 
that depoliticization critique is part of a historical back-and-forth be-
tween different positions on what one should consider politics, or po-
litical. We can thus expect depoliticization itself to display a degree of 
fluidity of its own.
The latter insight – that depoliticization, like all other political con-
cepts, can only be made meaningful by reflecting on the political cir-
cumstances that inform its usage – is relatively recent in philosophical 
terms. One of the central developments in theoretical work on depo-
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liticization is its formulation in the political writings of Carl Schmitt. 
Three aspects of his work are especially important: first, Schmitt’s dis-
tinction between (institutional) politics and ‘the political’, which he 
describes as a potential antagonism that underlies every other sphere. 
Second, the essay in which he criticizes his times as ‘the age of neutral-
ization and depoliticization’. Third, his later work on what he calls ‘the 
tyranny of values’. Since Schmitt’s concept of the political furnishes us 
with the tools to understand his work as it applies to our investigation, 
it is in the political itself that we find the most suitable point of entry.
The concept of the political invoked by Schmitt is one of intense 
antagonism, or at least its possibility (see the later reference to Hobbes). 
It is not bounded by the state, as most modern accounts of politics had 
been. Schmitt himself only carried through the distinction between 
politics and the political in a preface to an Italian translation of his 
work written in 19729. The implication of this late inclusion is that 
Schmitt’s importance is not in introducing political difference, but in 
his conceptualization of the political as such. The concept of the polit-
ical in Schmitt’s work functions as a way of resisting liberalism and in 
particular its notion of the taming of human nature. From Hobbes to 
Montesquieu and beyond, the liberal tendency had been to devise an 
institutional environment in which the insecurities of human life could 
be taken away. The state is there to guarantee basic security for all, and 
the law is there to map out this security. For Schmitt, this is a mistaken 
form of political technology. He insists that human nature is and re-
mains “problematic” and defined by the drive to conflict10.
Schmitt is here motivated by a sense that his time had moved be-
yond eternally secure foundations for human life. Indeed, his essay on 
depoliticization to which I will turn in a moment shows the temporary 
and imperfect nature of any such foundation. What assumes primacy 
amidst the “conflicts, ‘crisis mentality’, and loss of transcendence” in the 
beginning of the twentieth century is the certainty of death: and the 
threat of violent death is for Schmitt the hallmark of the political11. The 
specificity of politics is rooted in the distinction between friend and 
enemy, which for Schmitt constitutes a distinction that is independent 
of the antitheses that define other domains and cannot be derived from 
9 Marchart 2007, 42
10 Schmitt 2007a, 61; Viriasova 2016, 88; Mouffe 1999, 2
11 Viriasova 2016, 89 
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the latter12. Friend, enemy and the confrontation between them acquire 
their final meaning because of the “possibility of physical killing” that is 
present in them13. The centrality of death comes to the fore at precisely 
this point: the possibility of violent death is the fundamental and final 
concern of human life, so that the political is nothing other than “inten-
sive life [intensives Leben]”14.
In consequence, human life and politics are both defined in purely 
existential terms, where this existentialism signifies “human existence, in 
its brute facti[c]ity” as “an end in itself – the only value that remained, as 
it were”15. This signifies the irrelevance of traditional normative frame-
works. The existential aspect of Schmitt’s description of politics stands 
on its own, and has to. This facet of the ‘absent ground’ accounts for 
the decisionism in his own theories, as well as later ones inspired by 
Schmitt’s innovations16. The feature of intensity commits Schmitt to 
defining politics as a ‘total’ concept. When artistic or economic disputes 
gain enough intensity, they are turned into political disputes; and the 
same is true of disputes in any of life’s domains. In that sense, politics 
underlies the totality of the spheres within which human activity un-
folds so that every antithesis that defines these spheres (e.g. beautiful 
and ugly in aesthetics, good and evil in morality) can be politicized.
In summary, the hallmark of a political dispute is the distinction 
between friend and enemy. The enemy constitutes the experience of a 
negation of one’s own position, and for that reason has to be combated. 
This makes politics into a matter of experienced existential opposition 
of the most intense variety. As is the case in Hobbes, the antagonistic 
relation towards an enemy signifies the “ever-present possibility of com-
bat”, rather than an actual state of war17. Still, Schmitt’s account makes 
clear that the stakes are potentially disastrously high.
Against this background we can certainly understand why Europe-
an culture would want to depoliticize. Schmitt’s version of the political 
is a principle of potentially destructive conflict, without any other expla-
nation for this conflict than that it is felt to be necessary. In his essay on 
depoliticization, Schmitt defines a long European history of ‘neutrality’. 
12 Schmitt 2007a, 26-27
13 Schmitt 2007a, 33
14 cited by Viriasova 2016, 92
15 Wolin 1990, 394 (emphasis in original)
16 Ibid.
17 Schmitt 2007a, 32; cf. ibid, 28; cf. Hobbes 1994 [XIII], 74-79.
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Successive generations of intellectuals tried to find neutral domains or 
spheres in order to stifle antagonism. These attempts were continually 
necessary, as the central sphere of one era was quickly turned into the 
latest cultural battleground. Schmitt sees theology, metaphysics, moral 
philosophy, economics and, finally, technology as the successive stages 
or phases of this development. He understands this succession in terms 
of internal dynamism which will necessarily reintroduce conflict18. For 
instance, while religion can function as a strategy for uniting people 
behind common doctrine, this strategy of neutralization seemed less 
promising after the dominating influence of religious warfare in the 
early modern age. A similar principle is at work in moral philosophy, 
which begins as an attempt to derive moral principles that will enable 
everyone to lead a life of virtue, but ends as an intellectual battle of ar-
guments in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century is the prov-
ince of economics: through the politicization of society “from above”19, 
it seemed possible to steer society in a unitary direction. This, too, has 
proved to be an illusion. 
[I]t belongs to the dialectic of such a development that one cre-
ates a new conflict area through the very shift of a central area. 
In this new area first considered to be a neutral area the oppo-
sition of men and interests unfolds itself immediately with new 
intensity (...) European humanity always wanders out of one 
conflict area into a neutral [area], and the neutral area always 
becomes immediately a conflict area again and it becomes neces-
sary to search for a new neutral sphere. (Schmitt 2007b, 138)20
Technology is Schmitt’s final stage because it promises to be “the 
most neutral” of the entire development21. While the process of neu-
tralization as a whole is described in uniform terms as an unsuccessful 
‘suppression’ of the political, it seems clear that the processes of de-
politicization and (re)politicization that define the different historical 
steps are different in each case. Seeking neutral ground in metaphysics 
entails seeking comfort in the deep structure of reality itself; turning 
18 Schmitt 2007b; McCormick 2005, 97-98
19 Greven 1999; see also Habermas 2017, 64-65.
20 Translation my own: the same is true of all quotes from German, French and Dutch 
sources used below.
21 Schmitt 2007b
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to economic science is an unmistakably less secure foundation. I there-
fore propose to interpret Schmitt as implying (rather than stating) the 
view that depoliticization occurs in historical stages, so that the concept 
should be seen as essentially contextualized. This is a promising starting 
point in theoretical terms. Religion, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and 
economics all provide perspectives that aim to transcend the state of un-
mitigated conflict by generating criteria about what is right and wrong, 
or scientifically accurate (depending on the phase). They are all, for a 
time, able to settle ongoing disputes and put out fires before they start; 
until they, themselves become controversial and the cycle repeats itself.
Since we are concerned with the relationship between depolitici-
zation and ethics, let us pause and consider the ways in which Schmitt 
attempts to show the neutralizing and hence depoliticizing effects of 
morality. This is all the more necessary since the connection is some-
what counterintuitive. Is infusing morality into one’s description of a 
situation not a way of raising the political stakes? Neutrality is attained 
through a technocratic management of the social, one might say: from 
that perspective, morality is almost on the other side of the spectrum22. 
We already saw how for Schmitt, the eighteenth century was character-
ized by the dominance of moral principles, which were supposed to lead 
to a life of virtue. This stems the tide of antagonism: in that sense moral 
philosophy amounted to an effective depoliticization. But according to 
Schmitt and others in the field of law, the constitutional state had put 
an end to the usefulness of unitary moral concepts like virtue [Tugend]23. 
We can see this as part of the development of (political) technology as 
the new ‘central area’.
That was not the end of morality, however. In Schmitt’s later work, 
he analyzes the rise of value – a concept that had become increasingly 
popular as a response to what he calls the “crisis of nihilism”24. Following 
Heidegger, Schmitt calls value “a positivist Ersatz of the metaphysical”: 
that is to say, the philosophical reaction to the increasingly all-engulfing 
realm of the “value-free” causal mechanisms of natural science was to 
postulate a contrasting, subjective realm of value on the level of Weltan-
schauung25. In the same way that metaphysics had once provided a fun-
22 This is the conceptual home of the Varoufakis episode: see Varoufakis 2015.
23 Schmitt 2011, 9
24 ibid, 37-38
25 ibid, 38
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damental orientation that secured man’s status as a free and responsible 
being, values and hierarchies of values are formulated by the new ‘phi-
losophy of value’ as a contrast point to the onslaught of natural science. 
According to Schmitt, values are not principles, premises or anything 
of that nature: values are points [[Werte] sind eben Punkte]26. Schmitt’s 
notion of Punktualismus is a sharp formulation of the ‘sociological turn’ 
Max Weber had advocated in his work: values do not function as ab-
stract principles, but as perspectival “points of view” and, what is more, 
“points of attack” or fronts27. While terms like ‘point of view’ suggest a 
benign pacifism, the immanent aggressiveness of the ‘fronts’ is in fact al-
ways in play. The attempt to derive objective values cannot overcome the 
‘punctual’ status of values, so that objectivity is nothing but a new kind 
of Selbstverpanzerung28. Schmitt here seems to be playing with words: 
Selbstverpanzerung signifies self-defense, in the sense of bolstering one’s 
claim to superiority in the battle between competing values, but also 
carries the connotation of Panzer or tank. The tank is Schmitt’s symbol 
for the return of the realm of value to the realm of natural science and 
the destructive technologies it has fostered. The search for objectivity 
in value no longer signifies the initially sought after departure from the 
factual realm; the ‘objective’ values rejoin that realm with terrible force.
According to Schmitt, this rejoining is unavoidable as soon as one 
becomes concrete and serious about implementation and application 
[Durchsetzung und Geltendmachung] of values29. This is not merely be-
cause of the supposedly objective nature of values, but also, and mostly, 
because of the “tyranny” that accompanies this kind of value. This tyr-
anny implies that what is contrary to value has no claim against what 
is right.
The higher value has the right and the duty to conquer [un-
terwerfen] the lower value, and value as such destroys what is 
contrary to value [Unwert]. (…)  Following the logic of value 
[wertlogisch] it always has to follow that for the highest val-
ue [even] the highest price is not too high and must be paid. 
(Schmitt 2011, 48; 50) 
26 ibid, 42
27 ibid, 41-43
28 ibid, 46
29 ibid, 47
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That is why value, which started as a revolt against the onslaught 
of natural science, ends up driving a tank. The ‘ever-present possibility 
of combat’ against one’s enemy that Schmitt describes as the hallmark 
of the political shifts to the point of complete subversion, so that in 
the pursuit of value there are finally only “destroyers and destroyed”30. 
This avoids being political because of the marriage between fact and 
value that is implied by the realization of value, which in fact destroys 
its original meaning and ancestry [Herkunft] as a concept of resistance 
and assimilates value completely to the natural-scientific onslaught it 
initially sought to provide an escape from. This is very close to Jacques 
Rancière’s later description of ethics as an “indistinct point of view” 
that speaks in the voice of George W. Bush. As the latter said in a later 
withdrawn statement, “only infinite justice is appropriate in the fight 
against the axis of evil.31” Because this infinite justice, in its commit-
ment to stomping out terror wherever it may appear, is “identified with 
the simple demand for the security of a factual community”32, infinite 
justice does not refer to antagonism or contestation but rather to both 
the self-destruction of value, in Schmitt’s sense, and the disappearing 
of politics.
Now that we have considered Schmitt’s concepts of the political 
and value as well as his contextualization of the very concept of depolic-
itization, we are in a position to turn away from Schmitt and ask ques-
tions in the present tense. What is depoliticization critique responding 
to right now? Current approaches to depoliticization and depoliticiza-
tion critique can be understood along the lines of his historical analysis. 
Contemporary depoliticization critique centers on the idea that polit-
ical processes are being subordinated to economic ones in such a way 
that they are thereby neutralized. 
My proposal is that an important object of depoliticization critique 
today is the perceived self-withdrawal of politics, which has to be under-
stood as itself a political move. This is a complication that is hard to rec-
oncile with Schmitt’s conception of the political: depoliticization itself 
and the neutralization he associates with it is opposite to politics in an 
ideological sense, but in reality this very neutralization serves a political 
30 ibid, 52; see also Derrida 2005, 103.
31 Rancière 2007, 29
32 ibid, 34
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function33. We need to discuss the self-withdrawal of politics in order to 
make this clear. It has two main aspects: it is a response to a fear of the 
contingency (or in a different vocabulary, the risks) associated with pol-
itics, and it is a response to the global economic context that, according 
to critics like Pierre Bourdieu, itself a political creation. Let us consider 
these two aspects in order. First, when trying to analyze depoliticization 
critique in our current situation, we notice a distinct lack of the existen-
tial themes discussed by Schmitt. However, a striking commonality is 
the equation of politics and danger. Within contemporary institutional 
politics, (democratic) politics itself is regarded as something dangerous, 
given the stakes involved. The existence of objective economic forces 
changes the nature of political action, giving it a novel air of necessity. 
We then have the option of managing the economic forces in a scien-
tifically appropriate way. Any alternative to ‘optimal’ management of 
economic forces requires that we ignore the data in front of us, and/or 
act in suboptimal ways: and we choose such ways at our peril. Gathering 
the relevant data is entrusted to political experts, for instance economic 
advisors. The experts’ predictions continuously confront us with the po-
tentially disastrous consequences of political action. And indeed, in any 
voting situation the electorate is already informed in advance that the 
economy will collapse if a certain candidate is elected, or if we decide 
to issue a ‘No’ to the European Union. The fact that the substance of 
these predictions can be vague and subject to variation does not weaken 
their suggestive power. As a result, any fundamental alternative is only 
conceivable in terms of a collapse of the entire system: an irresponsible 
response to an unbearable risk34.
Second, we need to be aware that the context of this intrusion of 
economics into politics is a globalized economic world. In terms of de-
politicization critique, globalization is described as a “descriptive and 
normative term” created by a paradoxical policy of depoliticization rath-
er than economic inevitability35. Bourdieu describes how such policy 
33 Schmitt comes close to such a conception when he says: “Yet it remains self-evident 
that liberalism’s negation of state and the political, its neutralizations, depoliticiz-
ations, and declarations of freedom have likewise a certain political meaning, and 
in a concrete situation these are polemically directed against a specific state and its 
political power.” (Schmitt 2007, 61) However, Leo Strauss correctly notes that for 
Schmitt, liberalism is “the negation of thepolitical” (Strauss 2007, 99).
34 Michelsen & Walter 2013, 12-15
35 Bourdieu 2002, 38
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measures can appear in the form of appeals to liberty, liberalism, dereg-
ulation, anti-bureaucracy, freedom of movement. In reality they have the 
perhaps unintended consequence of granting “economic determinisms” 
a “fatal stranglehold”36. In other words, the forcing nature of economic 
forces is a political creation. Rancière adds that the political response 
to the “common condition” that was “posited” as global economic ne-
cessity during the nineties was limited to “consensus around solutions” 
that were seen to be imposed on all parties in the political spectrum37. 
According to authors like Wolfgang Streeck, we now find ourselves in a 
de facto situation of post-democracy, since democratic processes are no 
longer able to make a difference. This entails a subjugation of what are 
traditionally considered political aspects of society to economic ones. 
The economic necessities that politics finds itself faced with means that 
the possibility of “discretionary spending” is ever-decreasing: political 
differences cannot be articulated as different budget priorities, because 
those have already been set by economic agendas. Voter turnouts in 
OECD-countries show a consistent downturn as the room for political 
action decreases38. The case has been made that this downturn is caused 
by the perception that institutional politics has become relatively un-
important.
I call this strand of depoliticization critique ‘self-withdrawal’ to cap-
ture the emphasis authors like Bourdieu and Streeck place on the idea 
that depoliticization is a self-inflicted condition. It is not made by mar-
kets, but enacted by states, in the same way that globalization is not an 
unavoidable fate born of purely external circumstances but a result of 
policy. For instance: social policies are actively dismantled in the name 
of austerity39. Conflicts within society are addressed by way of “simu-
lation”, reviving precisely those narratives of the nation-state that have 
been outmoded by policy itself: “placebo politics”40. This creates a shift 
of both the scope of politics and its connection to the affected citizens. 
36 ibid.
37 Rancière 2004, 4
38 Streeck & Schaefer 2013, 11-27
39 Bourdieu 2002, 41; Streeck & Schaefer 2013. I am not committed to an a priori dis-
tinction between markets and states; the root of that distinction in terms of Bour-
dieu and Streeck & Schaefer is aimed at the underlying differentiation between 
‘neutral’ matters of economic fact and political processes.
40 Michelsen & Walter 2013, 11; cf. Bourdieu 2002, 40-41; Schmidt 2006, 2-3; 
Habermas 2015, 81
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The reality of politics (though not the way it presents itself to the elec-
torate) becomes increasingly international – that is, removed from local 
and even national concerns, abstract, and invisible41. If, in Ulrich Beck’s 
term, we speak of institutional politics on the national level as a set of 
“zombie institutions”, which are dead and yet still alive42, we should not 
neglect the self-inflicted aspects of this zombification, both in terms 
of its historical genesis and as an ongoing process. Thus, the reduction 
of the subject matter of politics to managing the economic forces that 
‘objectively’ confront us, and the related processes of ‘liberating’ market 
forces and the enactment of such policies, define the self-withdrawal of 
politics.
We started out by noting that on a general conceptual level, de-
politicization critique has two concerns. First, it involves a notion of 
politics or the political, so that critical usage of the term can quickly lead 
to diagnoses of ‘unpolitical politics’. Second, it resists passive, spectator 
attitudes toward political reality. We notice that in connecting these 
concerns to the current context for depoliticization critique, which is 
rooted in the self-withdrawal of politics, there was no explicit definition 
of a concept of politics or the political, let alone an account of political 
difference or a distinction between institutional politics and politics as 
a force of change. What is being made use of, albeit implicitly, is a set 
of criteria for what counts as properly political. For Bourdieu it is clear 
that policies of depoliticization result in the hollowing out of important 
political tasks. Streeck likewise sees the subordination of institutional 
politics to economic processes as a sign of politics that is no longer able 
to make a difference. It is heavily implied that it should be able to make 
said difference, but the ‘should’ is never made explicit. Rancière decries 
the reduction of politics in the proper sense to consensual politics: this 
was made possible after politics was forced into a corner by the imposi-
tion of supposed economic necessities. On the analysis of these authors, 
this is not what politics should be confined to.
41 Bourdieu 2002, 41
42 Bauman 2000, 6-8
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1.2 The ontological aspect of depoliticization critique
Self-withdrawal as described above depends on the kind of spectator 
attitude that is dismissed by depoliticization critique. The attitude itself 
is informed by a particular ontology, which is seen as objective and fixed. 
As Ernesto Laclau has put it, the political has increasingly been turned 
into a “superstructure, or a regional sector of the social, dominated and 
explained according to the objective laws of the latter”43. For politics to 
make progress in this situation, the priority relations between the social 
and the political have to be inverted. The self-withdrawal of politics is 
informed by an ontology of economic determinism, and the underlying 
logic is both simple and elegant. Its first step is to provide a set of prin-
ciples in the form of economic laws, which are presented as the (hidden) 
essence of politics. Second, it “locates this ground (the economic ‘base’) 
outside of, or beyond, the immediate realm of politics, the latter thus 
being turned into a ‘merely superstructural’ affair”44. Reversing priority 
relations, as Laclau proposes, means politicizing ontology itself. This 
is what I call the ontological aspect of depoliticization critique. It is in 
relation to this aspect that the tension between depoliticization critique 
and normativity comes to the fore: this has consequences for the rela-
tionship between ethics and politics.
In order to address this tension, we first need to distinguish between 
localized and generalized depolicitization critique. This distinction is 
the offspring of Karl Mannheim’s work on ideology critique. Mann-
heim had distinguished between the particular concept of ideology on 
the one hand, and the total concept of ideology on the other hand. The 
former describes a particular kind of deceptive utterance that is inter-
preted as an expression of structural-ideological causes rather than as 
intentional deceit on the part of the one that makes it. The latter, the 
total concept of ideology, goes further: it not only unmasks particular 
utterances as having been produced by structural-ideological causes, but 
also, and more pointedly, reconstructs the underlying Weltanschauung as 
itself such a product45. This in turn means that the particular concept 
of ideology “makes its analysis of ideas purely on a psychological level”, 
whereas the total concept of ideology looks at the ontological factors 
43 Laclau 1990, 160
44 Marchart 2007, 12
45 Mannheim 1979, 50
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that influence such decisions46. A final relevant implication is that the 
particular concept of ideology does not exclude the one who makes the 
deceptive utterance from a common frame of reference; but precisely 
this commonality is shattered when we extend ideology critique to the 
level of Weltanschauung. Once this level is reached, the skepticism that 
accompanies critique is “radical”, “thoroughgoing and devastating”47. It 
signals the disappearance of common ground.
In terms of depoliticization critique, the first option is that it rep-
resents a localized concern, in which case it argues against the closure of 
politics in a particular way, and only in that particular way. This works 
the same way the other way around: if we want to ‘lift’ particular op-
pressive features of a given society, we may start to inquire what legiti-
mizes that particular way of doing things. In some sense, this question 
in itself suggests that the oppressive feature has conditions of possibility 
that can be undone. Making things appear in this light is already a step 
towards making them the subject of political thought and action, since 
they are thereby moved into the realm of opinion48. If the legitimation 
is found lacking, that may in itself constitute a good reason for reform – 
the very question of legitimation, at least if it is a real question, is in that 
sense a politicizing question. But, crucially, it remains perfectly possible 
to address this particular concern in a way that is fully legitimate, and 
indeed that any political question has a definite answer: that politics 
itself can be finally grounded.
The language of grounding immediately suggests a certain kind of 
foundationalism: in the same way that a house requires a foundation, 
the kind of building that can be constructed on a particular site depends 
on the foundation that is present. Political foundations may be hid-
den underground, but digging deep – the equivalent of careful armchair 
reflection – will allow us to discern the constraints it imposes on the 
political superstructure. Given the fact that the foundation is indeed 
constraining, what we build on top of it is no longer able to set its own 
laws. In other words, Laclau’s reversal cannot take place. This is again 
the matter of the autonomy of the political, surfacing together with an 
insistence on contingency. What is more, we may wish that houses stood 
forever so that we would never have to build another. With politics, on 
46 ibid, 51; 57
47 Ibid, 57
48 Arendt 1967, 297
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the other hand, its unfinished quality means that there is always space 
to resist. Suggesting that politics could be closed off to the possibility of 
resistance can be seen as essentially oppressive: it is, at the very least, a 
clear case of depoliticization49. There is, in other words, the potential for 
localized depoliticization critique to become a form of depoliticization 
itself. It asks critical questions of one aspect of society, while leaving 
open the possibility that questions of this nature can have a final answer. 
Localized depoliticization critique is uncritical of ontology and does 
not address the problem of a final closure of political space. Insofar as 
this indeed has depoliticizing effects, localized depoliticization critique 
is akin to what Herbert Marcuse calls protest against a background of 
repressive tolerance: one is allowed to speak up, but on the condition 
that the underlying system is not questioned50. As with Mannheim’s 
distinction between the particular and total concept of ideology, it is 
only with the second term of the distinction – generalized depoliticiza-
tion critique – that we conceive of the ontological question.
The intended sense of generalization can be summarized through 
the concept of resistibility, a notion which has been seen as the key to 
Hannah Arendt’s work51. To put it simply, there must not be a final 
word in politics. Allowing a final word, for instance by allowing truth to 
have a normative pull on ‘action in concert’, would reduce the political 
to a social domain and put everything back into joint. This is exactly the 
opposite of what post-foundationalists, Schmitt and Arendt included, 
mean to achieve. Their goal is not a negative gainsaying of the possibility 
of foundation, but instead a proliferation of political sites and subjectiv-
ities, not only in the interest of freedom but also to do justice to the situ-
ation of mankind after the collapse of absolute foundations. This is com-
bined with the insight that positing an absolute foundation is a political 
move, part of the struggle for hegemony. Hegemony is here understood 
as the process through which a particular set of relationships comes to 
occupy the place of the universal52. In other words, what has historical-
ly been understood as universal or necessary comes to be seen as the 
result of a struggle for discursive power. Universalities and necessities 
 
49 In the third chapter I will refine the standard term ‘foundationalism’ and replace it 
with ‘fixation’.
50 Marcuse 1969
51 Honig 1991, 108
52 Laclau 2005, 115
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only exist in the sense that some particularities and contingencies are 
accepted, for political reasons, as being of a higher order. 
The notion of resistibility thus entails a politicization of ontology 
itself: this is where we enter the level of generalized depoliticization 
critique. Post-foundationalists have to insist that there is no system that 
can do justice to mankind without remainder, because to exist as a hu-
man is in part to exceed system. The basis for this insistence can be 
traced back to Kant, but becomes much more forceful in Nietzsche, 
who sees systematic morality as a self-punishing and self-denying ex-
ercise53. He develops an alternative account of virtù, which “responds 
artistically to the self ’s contingency by disciplining it” not as dictated by 
any systematic morality but “according to the style and taste dictated by 
each particular, individual self ”54. As Bonnie Honig notes, the question 
whether the self as such is contingent and system-exceeding cannot be 
decided at a general level. On a more particular level we can, and she 
does, locate remainders of politics in foundationalist political theories 
that either do not fit the political system or have to be repressed in order 
to fit55. 
Generalized depoliticization critique uses such accounts of human 
subjectivity and political order to expose the foundationalist ontology 
on which the closure of politics relies. Adopting the perspective of virtù 
does, however, commit one to a contrasting ontological attitude, or, in 
Honig’s phrase: an ontological counterwager. In the vocabulary of po-
litical difference, we could say that this wager is informed by the expe-
rience of difference between the multiple contingent grounds proposed 
by foundationalist theories and the absence of the final ground, which 
is present in its absence. This difference motivates the notion of the po-
litical, as opposed to politics, espoused by post-foundational theorists. 
We are now in a position to specify the critical point of depoliticization 
critique in an ontological sense. The critic of depoliticization makes the 
point that politics is not properly or authentically political insofar as 
political conflicts are foreclosed by a posited ontological foundation56.
The underlying distinction between political and unpolitical politics 
absorbs much of the tradition of political philosophy, considered from 
53 Nietzsche 2009, 46-91. Kant’s part in this development will be investigated in the 
third chapter.
54 Honig 1993, 67
55 Ibid, 5-6
56 Vollrath 1995, 48
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the point of view of French and German post-war intellectuals. What 
they add to the tradition is the quest for the conditions of possibility 
of a certain mode of political philosophy – foundationalism – and its 
subversion under the aspect of the Heidegger-inspired perspective of 
‘groundlessness’57. Oliver Marchart demonstrates that the absent ground 
of the social is in fact not a reversal of the orders constructed on a po-
litical foundation. That philosophical strategy is consigned to history, 
together with the bankrupt mode of philosophizing that he associates 
with foundationalism. There are three elements to a political philosophy 
which operates based on the notion of the impossibility of closure: a 
rejection of foundationalism, the development of a post-foundationalist 
politics, and the associated suspicion of ethics. The combination of these 
elements is particularly clear from the perspectives of Jacques Rancière 
and Ernesto Laclau, which is why their political theories offer a prom-
ising start point to explore what it means to deny the possibility of 
political closure. In them, we can find more decidedly political versions 
of what we have termed an insistence on resistibility, and we will have 
occasion to return to their work in later chapters.
1.3 From police to populism
In order to understand in what sense there is space for the political, 
we should understand what defines institutional politics and to what 
extent there is a political difference between that kind of politics and 
a notion of the political that focuses on resistibility. Rancière sees the 
sphere of institutional politics as one where reifications of the social are 
enshrined. It follows that the political, as a non-reified interruption of 
what he calls police, can only be thought of as an event that breaks into 
the prevailing order of society. There is thus in Rancière’s work an in-
sistence on non-finality: every order is resistible. In Laclau, this idea is 
used in an analysis of populism that goes beyond its standard dismissal 
as the ‘evil twin’ of real politics. According to Laclau, politics cannot 
be about merely reproducing existing conditions: rather, it is about the 
formulation of claims that cannot be met by the existing institutional 
order. As we will see, the populist is uniquely equipped to challenge said 
 
57 Marchart 2007, 12-34
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order by forging new connections between the shared meanings that are 
at stake in politics. Thus, populism becomes the name for the rejection 
of police.
In order to better understand how these terms are related, we need 
to consider the circumstances against which Rancière’s political work 
revolted. These circumstances can be framed in terms of two historical- 
contextual aspects58. First, the triumphalist announcement of the end 
of history, where our ideological evolution is said to have culminated 
in liberal democracy – in particular the work of Francis Fukuyama, the 
“conspicuous American”59. In a sense, the ideas of the end of history 
and the end of politics are part of the same impulse: namely to liberate 
politics from its inherently threatening character. Rancière traces the 
legacy of this impulse to classical philosophy, so that philosophy be-
comes a project to eradicate politics. At the far end of this project, the 
knot is tied even more intimately. Now that politics has declared itself 
triumphant in getting rid of its philosophical agitators, philosophy is 
finally successful in saving politics from itself. Strategies that are used 
to get rid of politics focus on reducing the social to the political, or 
vice versa60. The declared success of such strategies provides the second 
context within which Rancière operates. He critiques the substitution 
of political and emancipatory discourse for a political philosophy that 
reflects on the ethical matter of how best to live together.
Rancière’s diagnosis is that the very division between the social and 
the political is continually in the process of disappearing, so that the 
only political task that remains is managing the social in a way that 
maximizes the well-being of the collective body. Rancière here revers-
es the promise of classical Marxism: in particular, the Saint-Simonian 
hope that politics could eventually be abolished, so that only ‘the ad-
ministration of things’ would remain. In the post-Marxism of Rancière, 
the Marxist dream of the ‘withering away of the state’ in classless society 
is now the unofficial motto of everyday (non-)politics; and it does not 
inspire hope, but its opposite. Institutional politics and the order that is 
safeguarded by it is what he calls police, the political form that does away 
with the political by insisting on a stable order that is definitive of soci-
ety. It is composed of elements that are undeniably part of society. This 
58 cf. Davis 2010, 99-100
59 Rancière 1995, 3
60 ibid, 11
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excludes the ‘supplement’ of society, the “part of those who do not take 
part” [la part des sans-parts]61. For Rancière, democracy and therefore 
true politics is only possible as a violent reaction that disrupts the unity 
and order of police. Rancière thus describes the inability of institutional 
politics to ‘capture’ all of society, and the fleeting intrusion (in the mode 
of an “accident”62) of the political into the given order of things. What 
is generally designated as the political sphere thus calls for a “dividing 
line” between police and the political [politique]63.
A historical example is in order here. The women of the French 
Revolution were not regarded by any other group in society as capa-
ble of political speech or action. In Rancière’s description of events, 
Olympe de Gouges challenged this manner of drawing the line between 
the political (men) and the non-political (women) by stating “if women 
were entitled to go the scaffold, then they were also entitled to go to the 
assembly”64. Here we can see the various elements in action. Police logic 
presents society as an unproblematic whole and becomes exclusionary 
through its claim that all of society is ‘countable’; politics here occurs 
from without society, from a point that cannot be located on the current 
political map and for that reason problematizes the political parameter, 
since the women of the French Revolution are after all part of society. 
The claim that is factually put forward by Olympe de Gouges thus shat-
ters the existing order, but it is only a temporary escape from police logic. 
For a society that allows women the right to go to the assembly (i.e. the 
right to vote) and draws the line slightly beyond will find itself in what 
is formally the same position. It again defines itself in a unified fashion, 
albeit a slightly different unity – having recognized past errors – but it 
still encircles itself on the political map, and because of this it is encir-
cled by political others from within itself.
In summary, the basic figure of Rancière’s analysis of politics con-
sists of an oversimplified unit (police) that cannot see how its inter-
nal difference is co-constitutive of the society it aims to describe to 
the exclusion of that difference. It should be clear that the political is 
defined by acting-out of said difference from the paradoxical position 
of being both within and without society. We have already started to 
61 Rancière 2010, 12
62 Rancière 2004, 6
63 ibid
64 Rancière 2010, 69
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consider Rancière’s ideas on depoliticization. Consensus is the modern 
mode of reducing politics to police; and “the extreme limit of the logic 
of consensus” is the “dissolution of all political differences and juridical 
distinctions into the indistinct and totalising domain of ethics (...), an 
effective depoliticization”65. 
For Rancière, “governments and experts” have for a long time prac-
ticed the art of maintaining the balance between the different elements 
within society, thus avoiding the “democratic factuality” of an internally 
divided society that can never be ‘whole’66. But the imbalance has its re-
venge: Rancière cites the rise of parties of the extreme right, who reject 
the “oligarchic consensus”, but also the French and Dutch ‘No’ during 
the referendum about ratification of the proposed constitution for the 
European Union. Rancière’s analysis continues: “a majority of voters 
(…) judged that the question was a real question, not a matter calling 
for the simple adherence of the population, but a matter of popular 
sovereignty and therefore a question to which one could respond no as 
well as yes”; and this surprised the analysts all the more since experts 
had spelled out in advance that adherence would be in everyone’s best 
interests67. These operations of consensus and ‘maintaining the balance’ 
wrongfully assume an “objectivation of the problems and part of the 
community”68.
The deeper problem with consensual politics is that it is centered 
around a fixed set of reference points that is the locus of negotiations and 
compromises by the various parties. Consensual politics thus closes off 
the political space by only allowing the existence of well-defined groups 
that together have to produce an outcome. According to Rancière, poli-
tics should instead be construed as an event characterized by the rupture 
of the existing order. Under a paradoxical description, politics erupts at 
the heart of the social but also from a point outside its bounds. Rancière 
poses a dividing line between the event or moment of politics and the 
reduction of politics to the quest for consensus. The latter process ul-
timately collapses into the management of the social – a securing of 
conditions under which peaceful cohabitation is possible. For Rancière, 
as we have seen, this is precisely what is not at stake in politics.
65 Rancière 2004, 7-8
66 Rancière 2007a, 78; Rancière 1995, 95
67 Rancière 2007b, 79
68 Rancière 2004, 7
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Ernesto Laclau makes a similar point. He claims that there is not 
a distinction between ‘two kinds’ of politics. Rather, there is one kind: 
the antagonistic relationship created by the performative forging of a 
chain of equivalences, animated by a particular demand that cannot be 
fulfilled within the existing institutional system69. This is what he calls 
populism, and he does not use the term with the disdain that is mostly 
attached to it. Rancière prepares the way by analyzing the dismissal of 
populism as a principled rejection of dissent tout court. When a disrup-
tion of consensus occurs – for example, the failure of the referendum 
on the European Constitution – the experts have a ready made expla-
nation: “if science did not impress its legitimacy on the people, it is be-
cause the people is ignorant. If progress does not progress, it is because 
of the backward”70. Through the mediation of the term ‘populism’, any 
kind of dissent is grouped in with the same negative connotation of 
ignorance and backwardness.
More specifically put, according to Rancière the general disdain for 
populism means the concept is both able to hide and demonstrate the 
disparity between expert legitimacy and popular legitimacy. ‘Populism’ 
suggests that although the present mob is not able to constitute a po-
litical actor, there is a people out there in virtue of which the political 
system as a whole is legitimated. Using the term disdainfully is an ex-
ample of localized depoliticization critique. The typical criticism quickly 
points out the ‘emptiness’ of the concepts worn on the populist’s sleeve: 
the ‘freedom’ of a Freedom Party, for example. Imagine a sarcastic un-
dertone: what does this freedom consist in, exactly? Likewise, the pas-
sionate, sometimes frenzied nature of the ‘party mob’ is seen as a threat. 
In both respects, populism appears to be the evil twin of politics, but 
not real politics. However, such a description presupposes an account of 
politics as the primary organization of political energies and demands, 
and sees populism as its subversion. What it actually signifies, Rancière 
would add, is the unmasking of every dissensual people as unworthy and 
so, in the final instance, it stands for the “intense wish of the oligarch” 
to govern without people, without politics71. The line separating politics 
from non-politics is effectively drawn around the prevailing consensus, 
automatically condemning the demand for alternatives as something 
69 Laclau 2005, 155
70 Rancière 2007a, 79
71 ibid, 80
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like Jeroen Dijsselbloem’s ‘ideological tales’. Localized depoliticization 
critique, as we have seen, can have ironically depoliticizing effects.
Laclau adds something to this initial discussion. He shows the his-
torical roots of populism’s dismissal in theories of mass psychology: 
from that field arises the idea that the general people constitute a threat 
to real politics. According to Laclau, it is actually populism itself that 
should be seen as the prime mover of politics. We need to master some 
concepts in order to understand how this works.
First, there is the concept of discourse. Not confined to linguistic 
utterances in the classical sense of the word, this concept describes any-
thing that is essentially relational and concerned with meaning. This 
includes acts such as a populist politician formulating his ideal of the 
people. The reason ‘discourse’ is still an apt name is that discourse has a 
linguistic structure in the sense of De Saussure. Individual terms have 
no positive signification – there is nothing about the word ‘tree’ itself 
that makes it refer to a tree rather than the number three, say; likewise 
for a concept like freedom. Instead, an individual word forms a complex 
whole with all the other words in the language, and the meaning of 
each word is secured through the differential relations binding all the 
words together. Laclau extends this analysis of language to the realm of 
meaning as such72.
Second, whereas discourse enables us to understand in what sense 
politics could be a battle over meanings, we need the concept of hege-
mony to grasp why it would be a battle over meanings. There are some 
complicated steps to follow here. The differential relations that consti-
tute the complex of meaning do not allow us to refer to that complex 
itself, since an internal difference would still be formulated in terms of 
the complex itself without being able to name its limits. In other words, 
what is required is the external difference of something other. This can-
not simply be another difference in the sense of the internal differential 
relations; it has to be an excluded element. It is only this element that 
gives a certain unity to that complex. Vis-à-vis the excluded element, 
all differential relations suddenly take on an equivalential relationship: 
they are equivalent to each other qua rejecting the excluded identity, 
and this jeopardizes their own particular identity. This in turn means 
that the totality of the complex of meaning is a failed totality, but still 
a necessary one. “Impossible, because the tension between equivalence 
72 Laclau 2005, 68
-35- Depoliticization and political ontology
and difference is ultimately insurmountable; necessary, because without 
some kind of closure, however precarious it might be, there would be no 
signification and no identity”73. Hegemony, a concept taken from An-
tonio Gramsci, denotes the political claim that one string of relations 
embodies the totality. It is a particularity occupying the space of univer-
sality, but contingently so74. That is to say, there is no ‘really deserving 
party’ in politics, only the struggle over what being deserving would 
and does consist in. In populist terms, it is a plebs claiming for itself the 
position of populus75.
Because the description of both politics and populism is highly for-
mal, it is possible to draw far-reaching conclusions on the basis of this 
short description. First of all, because the struggle between difference 
and equivalence defines antagonism as such, all antagonism and every 
unfulfilled demand is political. This is a justifiable conclusion since, for 
Laclau, any unfulfilled demand constitutes a break in relation to the 
differential status quo, or what Rancière would call police. Second, the 
nature of such a break is never a singular demand, but one that is over-
determined by equivalential logics76. For instance, when I insist on a pay 
rise to feed my family, my insistence ‘carries with it’ notions of justice 
that affect other domains as well. This equivalence does not pre-exist 
my claiming it as a unity (the unemployed should have benefits, to feed 
their own families). It is in fact ‘named’ and constituted as an equiva-
lential chain by my act of insisting on the pay rise: the equivalence is 
performative. Because this very same dynamic is what defines popu-
lism, Laclau concludes that “political subjects are always, in one way 
or another, popular subjects”: in the very gesture of equivalence, we are 
constructing a people that does not yet exist77.
In the final step of our analysis, Laclau emphasizes that we are not 
dealing with two kinds of politics: populism is the only politics, in the 
sense explained above. Any other supposed kind of politics “simply 
involves the death of politics and its reabsorption by the sedimented 
forms of the social. This distinction coincides, to a large extent, with the 
one proposed by Rancière between la police and le peuple (…)”78.
73 ibid, 70
74 ibid, 115
75 ibid, 94
76 ibid, 230-231
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In more general terms, Laclau’s political thought dances around the 
topic of providing closure for politics once and for all; this kind of clo-
sure, as we saw above, is considered both impossible and necessary. This 
tension is an important historical starting point for political difference 
and can be traced back to post-war France, to a group of theories that 
can be called a ‘Heideggerianism of the Left’79. These theories focus on 
the same double aspect. On the one hand they theorize a weakening 
of the ontological status of ground or foundation, which had been im-
portant in Heidegger’s work, as we have seen. In other words: there is 
no certain first principle that can help us to grasp the world fully and 
in a final sense. This is then politicized as the impossibility of a final 
grounding of politics: there is no one principle or set of principles that 
can finalize politics. Police is not the final word of politics; totality can 
never really be attained. On the other hand, these theories insist on 
the necessity of responding to the “dubious if not despicable” politics 
of Heidegger himself. In other words, totality remains necessary: even 
though it is not possible to get politics right in a definitive sense, we still 
have to try. This should remind us of Carl Schmitt’s essay on historical 
depoliticizations that function through the temporary installation of a 
neutral sphere, and Schmitt’s own insistence on the necessity to move 
on to another sphere once the initial neutrality is compromised. It is, on 
the one hand, impossible to ground politics completely – to assign it to 
a neutral domain where its dangers can be forever contained – and yet 
there is the continued necessity of developing alternatives.
Rancière and Laclau both feel compelled to split politics from with-
in: politics as “a particular social system, a certain form of action” is 
contrasted with the political as “the principle of autonomy of politics, or 
the moment of institution of society”80. The distinction is only solidified 
further by the fact that both Rancière and Laclau deny the predicate 
‘political’ to what is standardly called ‘politics’. Their refusal to grant po-
litical existence to institutional politics does pose the question how that 
kind of (non-)politics relates to the political, if at all.
In theories of political difference, there needs to be an interplay be-
tween politics and the political, yet they never really come into contact. 
How can this be? On the level of concepts, the solution is to see politics 
as the attempt to provide a political ground. It is now established that it 
79 Marchart 2007, 2; Janicaud 2001, 291-300
80 Marchart 2007, 7
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is impossible to get it right in any final sense. On the level of everyday 
politics this implies that no one political party, or coalition of parties, 
can do justice to all aspects of society – for this would presuppose a final 
grounding of politics in terms of which one could get it right. But this 
absent ground is not simply left out: its absence is felt and experienced. 
This results in a tension or play between the different poles of political 
difference. The experience of difference sometimes comes to the fore 
as the political. Precisely because it is impossible to get it right, the po-
litical can only express itself as an event; that is to say, as a moment, as 
something that is necessarily fleeting. What is more, it happens on the 
interior of police, which complicates the tidiness of political difference. 
We will return to this point later. For now, we should note that politics 
is doomed to crystallize itself as another social system, form of action, 
etc. and it will still not have the final answer.
Rather than being depressed by the impossibility of getting it right 
and finally laying politics to rest, these theorists see the spaces that exist 
in between the different attempts to get it right, and the political spaces 
that are untouched by hegemonic politics, as sites of freedom and po-
litical action. If it is not possible to get it right, then resistance of some 
form is not a defect, but a necessity. Rather than the straightjacket of a 
perfectly just system that one simply has to abide by, blaming oneself 
for every misstep in the process, we are set free to address the injustices 
that we see at work in the world. This ties back in with our question 
concerning the problematic status of ethics. Why is it that for Schmitt, 
as we have seen, morality represents a stage in European culture that we 
left behind a long time ago; how does his notion of the political relate 
to ethics? More generally, why do theorists of political difference put so 
little faith in ethics?
1.4 The political cases against ethics
A first spokesperson for the camp of political difference is Chantal 
Mouffe. Her analysis takes as its context the blurring of the left/right 
frontier, for instance in Tony Blair’s Labour Party (in the Netherlands, 
we may recall Wim Kok ‘shaking off his ideological feathers’), and the 
subsequent rise of populist parties. Mouffe combines the first term of 
her analysis, the blurring of the distinction between left and right, with 
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the disappearance of the adversarial mode of politics. The Schmittian 
influence in both Mouffe and Laclau is that they see politics as fun-
damentally agonistic: it necessitates drawing a line between allies and 
adversaries (a softened version of Schmitt’s ‘friends and enemies’)81. 
According to Mouffe, present political discussion is shaped by two fac-
tors: the misguided insistence that the adversarial mode of politics has 
been overcome, and the need to dismiss right-wing populism all the 
same. The latter cannot be engaged politically without contradicting the 
first factor. Right-wing populists can thus not appear as adversaries to 
be fought politically: instead, they are cast as the ‘extreme right’ and 
grouped in with evil. This is where moral categories enter into politics82.
For Mouffe, casting populism in moral terms has a few different 
functions (“added bonuses”): for instance, creating an identity for the 
‘morally upright’ liberal democrats, and mobilizing their passions83. But, 
more importantly, it also constitutes a perversity. It is for Mouffe, fol-
lowing Flahaut, a “puritanism of good feeling” that allows mainstream 
institutional politics to describe itself as essentially moral, while cast-
ing evil outside themselves and rediscovering some form of heroism84: 
where really there is none, we might add.
The problem here is not that politics is being replaced by moral-
ity. For, as we have seen, there is still an adversarial relationship, even 
though it is immediately disavowed. This adversarial characteristic is, for 
Mouffe and others, the hallmark of politics. Instead, we see that poli-
tics is being played out “in the moral register”85. This means that politi-
cal distinctions are expressed using the vocabulary of morality. Mouffe 
notes that “no agonistic debate is possible” with a moral enemy: such 
enemies can only be eradicated. One strategy is to classify one’s adver-
saries as a “moral disease”, which means that “one should not even try 
to provide an explanation for their emergence and success”86. Recall, at 
this point, the framing of terrorism as an ‘attack on our values’ that we 
have already considered. In that depoliticized account, the terrorists are 
‘just there’ as objective nuisances to the system – jealous of our freedom 
81  Mouffe 1999
82 Mouffe 2005, 72-74
83 ibid, 73
84 ibid, 74-75
85 ibid, 75
86 ibid, 76. Compare Nietzsche 2009, 38: “What they [moralists] hate, that is not the 
enemy, no! they call it “injustice” and “godlessness”.
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perhaps, but never as part of a system of exchange that involves our 
own political actions as well. This is where Mouffe’s analysis becomes 
relevant for our purposes: the moralization of the adversary means that 
our relationship with them is depoliticized. Mouffe likens this dynamic 
to the building of a “cordon sanitaire”87, which correctly describes the 
simultaneity of two processes. First, the shutting out of the adversary, 
which is no longer granted the dignity of even being an adversary, but is 
evil and as such irredeemably other – compare Schmitt’s notion of the 
tyranny of values, which we have already discussed. Second, the unifica-
tion and justification of the disparate field of allies. Both are processes 
of reification.
What does this analysis show about the relationship between mo-
rality and politics? To be sure, it brings out a potentially dangerous 
implication of bringing morality too close to politics. But the argu-
ment for politics itself, for restoring the adversarial mode of politics to 
prominence, still needs to be addressed. So far we have only considered 
Mouffe’s account, but hers is not the final word on political difference 
vis-à-vis morality. She argues, in a nutshell, that morality potentially 
stifles the kind of antagonism she values in politics. But what if ethics 
is part of contemporary politics in a more fundamental sense, in such a 
way that it is in fact detrimental to politics?
We now return to Rancière’s notion of consensus and the way he 
connects it to ethics. We know that Rancière’s conception of politics is a 
break-in from the outside, although in reality society’s supplement was 
already within society. This paradox is informed by the fact that those 
who claim political subjectivity are both part of society and not part of 
society. Affirming the paradoxical nature of politics means insisting that 
society is in the final instance countable: that all elements of society can 
be represented. It is this denial of the internal difference of society to 
itself that Rancière calls police.
For Rancière, most of what is presently called politics is not deserv-
ing of that name, because it is in the final instance part of police logic. 
It is a status quo that only gives voice to some. To reduce politics to 
the management of the social is to destroy politics itself, and the most 
popular method of reduction is consensus. The problem with consensu-
al politics is that it is centrally concerned with a fixed set of reference 
points that is the locus of negotiations and compromises by the various 
87 ibid
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parties. Consensual politics thus closes off political space by only allow-
ing the existence of well-defined groups that together have to produce 
an outcome. Recall that for Rancière there is a connection to ethics 
here: “the extreme limit of the logic of consensus” is the “dissolution of 
all political differences and juridical distinctions into the indistinct and 
totalizing domain of ethics”88.
The best way to flesh out this connection is to consider Rancière’s 
dismissal of what he calls the ethical turn of politics. Like Mouffe, 
Rancière does not think that political categories are being swapped out 
for moral ones. Indeed, Rancière differentiates between the ethical and 
the moral, stating that morality reflected a “distinction between fact and 
[moral] law, what is and what ought to be”. Ethics, on the other hand, is 
“an indistinct sphere” where not only that distinction between fact and 
law is dissolved, but also the specificity of political practices89. This is the 
same as the kind of value that drives a tank, as described by Schmitt. 
In Rancière’s conception, ethics stands for the non-separation of fact 
and law that reduces the possible scope of justice to what is already the 
case, which amounts to a strategy of complete depoliticization. Ethics 
is therefore the polar opposite of politics. Ethics pulls together and sti-
fles what politics takes apart and sets in motion. Rancière underscores 
this by claiming: “(...) “[I]t is not their ethos, their “way of being,” that 
disposes individuals to democracy [i.e. politics] but a break with this 
ethos (...)”90.
But this leads to a further question: how is morality different from 
ethics, as Rancière defines the two? Rancière maps the concept out in 
quite a specific way. “The division of violence, morality, and right has a 
name. It is called politics. Politics is not, as is often said, the opposite of 
morals. It is its division”91. For Rancière, ‘morality’ or ‘morals’ already im-
plies a “separation of law and fact”, but in a specific way that is opposed 
to other ways of opposing right to fact.
Politics is in a sense the name of generation of these distinctions or 
divisions, but referring back to our earlier example it is important to add 
that politics necessarily involves an element of performance. It was not 
 
88 Rancière 2004, 7-8
89 Rancière 2007b, 28
90 Rancière 1999, 101
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Olympe de Gouges’ abstract right to vote that makes her an example of 
politics, but her performative claim to have the rights she did not have92.
What we have seen thus far is that Rancière’s counter to the ‘eth-
ical turn’ and the indistinction it represents is an insistence on keep-
ing things separate. This is true in a more general sense of his work 
on the relationships between politics and concepts belonging to other 
domains. Rancière offers a rather sweeping account of philosophy in the 
post-utopian age (i.e. after the official collapse of Marxism).
From this point on, a philosophy and a practice of harmonious 
agreement between fact and law were established. Philosophi-
cally, the loudly proclaimed return to Kant and to the primacy 
of law as the basis for morality was mirrored by a more or less 
diffuse, if not rampant, Aristotelianism: an idea of distributive 
justice, or the fair distribution of the shares proper to each, tends 
toward a state of equilibrium that makes the legal subject and 
the empirical subject one and the same. (Rancière 1992, 252)
Here we once again see how the ‘moral’ distinction between fact 
and norm collapses into an ‘ethical’ perspective of indistinctness. For 
Rancière, this is not only the fault that characterizes contemporary po-
litical philosophy – it is not hard to recognize Rawls in the quote above 
– but also of its modern and even classical predecessors. It is of course 
true that political philosophy has often been phrased in terms of an 
“anthropological invariant” such as the unique logos of man, from which 
we can then deduce the shape that our life in common, our politics, 
should take93. This is also true of theory-building premises like socia-
bility, which postulates a “political virtue native to the human animal” 
from which everything political straightforwardly follows94. In those 
cases, ontology takes precedence over politics and forces it to comply. 
Rancière insists that to be human is always to exceed system: and this 
92 [I call] this transformation of the interpretive schemes of our experience (...)the 
ethical turn. The essential aspect in this process is certainly not the virtuous return 
to the norms of morality. It is, on the contrary, the abolition of the division that the 
very word ‘morals’ used to imply. Morality implied the separation of law and fact. 
(…) The abolition of this division has one privileged name: it is called consensus. 
(Rancière 2007b, 31)
93 Rancière 2004, 4
94 ibid, 6
-42-  Chapter 1
includes ontological schemes of the Aristotelian/Rawlsian kind. His 
strategy, which is a central feature of post-foundationalism in general, is 
to reverse the priority relations between the ontology of the social and 
the political by politicizing that ontology itself. As Rancière himself 
puts it: “politics is possible because no social order is based on nature”95.
As it stands, we have advanced towards a more complete formula-
tion of depoliticization critique as a philosophical concept. We are aware 
of its ontological aspects and the tensions with ethics these potential-
ly produce. Let us recapitulate, starting off with the tensions between 
ethics and politics. First, we have to resist the moralization of politics, 
which according to Mouffe is the process of establishing a cordon sani-
taire that gives identity to the moralizing group and projects their ene-
mies as a moral disease, thus depoliticizing the relationship between ‘in-
group’ and ‘out-group’. In other words, moralization entails a reification 
of self-other relationships. Second, Rancière urges us to resist ethics 
conceived as a domain of indistinction, that assimilates norm to fact 
and reduces politics to police as the final limit of consensual non-poli-
tics. Assimilation of this kind entails a reification of part of the political 
community, and also of ethics itself, which is completely reduced to 
empirical fact. Third and finally, we have to resist a moral grounding or 
moral finality of politics, which consists in a circle drawn between fea-
tures of the human condition and the ends that are deduced from these 
features: for instance, a drive towards sociability as the grounding and 
peaceful co-existence as the finality of politics. This tension between the 
ontological aspect of depoliticization critique and ethics entails a reifi-
cation of the connection between human nature and politics, and finally 
of politics itself. It is also derived from Rancière’s work.
We are also in a position to answer the question that has provid-
ed our first point of orientation. What is depoliticization critique? We 
need to start off by distinguishing between its localized and general-
ized varieties. In its localized variety, depoliticization critique is unable 
to invert the priority relation between ontology and politics, and can 
for that reason have depoliticizing effects. In its generalized variety, it 
politicizes ontology itself, drawing on the distinction between politics 
and the political and insisting that politics is beyond foundation in any 
final sense. This is the ontological aspect of depoliticization critique. 
Politics requires a foundation and attempts to provide one, but doing so 
95 Rancière 2010, 16; cf. Laclau 1990, 160
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in any final sense is ontologically impossible, and that is precisely what 
accounts for the possibility of the political. As we have seen, ‘authentic’ 
politics is redefined in adversarial terms. The impossibility of closure 
means that we are called to fill the gaps politically. It also means that 
depoliticization never succeeds in a final sense: ontologically speaking, 
it never occurs. Yet this does not mean that it is not efficacious on the 
level of claims. I will expand on this point in the chapters that follow.
In order to answer the question what role (if any) ethics can play in 
the re-politicization of Europe we need to shift focus from the formu-
lation of depoliticization as a philosophical concept to that concept’s 
context of application. The aim of the next chapter will be to explore 
how depoliticization functions in the present institutional expression of 
European politics: the European Union.
-44-
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The European Union (henceforth: EU) is quite clear about its identity. 
On its own website, we find that it is a “unique economic and political 
union” between its member states. The fact that economic union is men-
tioned first reflects the fact that it grew out of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which was established in 1958. The rationale be-
hind the EEC is presented as follows: the first cooperative steps after 
the Second World War were to “foster economic cooperation: the idea 
being that countries that trade with one another become economically 
interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict”96. Since the days 
of the EEC, a “huge single market has been created”, which “continues 
to develop towards its full potential”97. In the section that begins im-
mediately after this slightly ominous description of an ever-expanding 
single market, we find that “what began as a purely economic union has 
evolved into an organization spanning policy areas”98. This is why the 
name was changed to EU.
The language that is used in these short self-descriptions tells us 
something about the development the EU sees itself as having under-
went. There are roughly two steps. First, the creation of a single mar-
96 Goals and Values of the EU (n.d.)
97 ibid
98 ibid
Chapter 2  
 
European politics and aspects  
of depoliticization
 Chapter 2-46-
ket, which is described actively and can only be understood in political 
terms, since it was European policy to ‘foster economic cooperation’. 
(This refers to the initial cooperation between ‘the Six’: Belgium, Ger-
many, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.) Second, the 
evolution of the original, purely economic union (that is: a web of poli-
cies designed to impact specifically economic relations between Euro-
pean states) into a political union. The implication being that a process 
was set in motion shortly after the Second World War that, without 
further active intervention, culminated in an ‘organization spanning 
policy areas’ by virtue of its own internal logic. No reasons for this shift 
are presented: it reads like a contingent development of iterative stages, 
which may well have been otherwise. 
Of course, the political union is not just a neutral presence: it has 
two principles of government and a list of accomplishments. The EU’s 
principles of government are: first, that it is “based on the rule of law” 
in the sense that “everything it does is founded on treaties, voluntarily 
and democratically agreed [sic] by its member states”; second, that it is 
“governed by the principle of representative democracy, with citizens 
represented directly at Union level in the European Parliament and 
member states represented in the European Council and the Council 
of the EU”99. Note the importance of the EU’s commitment to democ-
racy: it is held to be important to the EU’s being ‘based on’ the rule of 
law, and ‘the principle of representative democracy’ is held to be equally 
important. Democracy even makes a third appearance in a section enti-
tled ‘Transparent and democratic institutions’. We are there assured that 
“[t]he enlarged EU remains focused on making its governing institu-
tions more transparent and democratic”. Examples of concrete action 
are presented: “More powers have been given to the directly elected 
European Parliament, while national parliaments play a greater role, 
working alongside the European institutions. In turn, European citi-
zens have an ever-increasing number of channels for taking part in the 
political process”100. We will look into this final claim later on.
What does the EU see as its accomplishments? We can again divide 
this into economic and political successes: politically speaking, “the EU 
has delivered more than half a century of peace [and] stability (...)”. 
It is noted that “in 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for 
99 ibid
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advancing the causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human 
rights in Europe101”. Economically speaking, the EU “helped raise living 
standards and launched a single European currency”, while “[t]hanks 
to the abolition of border controls between EU countries, people can 
live freely throughout most of the continent” and it “has become much 
easier to “live, work and travel abroad in Europe”102.
This self-description is thus structured narratively as a historical 
process that moves seamlessly from the establishment of the common 
market to the Nobel Peace Prize: from the economic achievements of 
the EU, which in turn are made possible by its ‘peace-delivering’ func-
tion, to the politics of peace and free movement. This natural, or, more 
precisely, naturalized movement is presented with such swiftness that 
it manages to encompass three main elements of depoliticization that 
we discussed in the first chapter. The mantra ‘peace and prosperity’ rep-
resents the conjoinment of the EU’s self-description, as a created market 
which continues to evolve into an ever closer political Union, with a se-
lection of policies that are presented as providing the best possible out-
comes. This conjoinment marks the first element of depoliticization: the 
moral finality of politics. Both peace and prosperity are understood in 
terms of the output of the political process, and we are asked to accept 
its legitimacy on these terms103. The institutional structure of the EU as 
such has the features of a decentred polity, which does not have the in-
ternal consistency required to produce legitimacy by any other means104. 
This leads many critics to diagnose a democratic deficit, which signals 
a disconnect between the legitimacy requirements of a nation-state and 
the way in which the EU both impacts those requirements and stands 
in need of legitimation itself105.
Second, European politics depoliticizes insofar as it is involved in 
moralization. One sure sign of the latter is the EU’s commitment to 
what economists since Jan Tinbergen have called negative integration. 
The concept refers to the removal (hence ‘negative’) of barriers to the 
expansion of economic space across national borders106. This commit-
ment is so fundamental that it has become an issue of identity – “only 
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he who gives in to the determinism of negative integration is a good 
European”107. In the wake of declining faith in Europe’s institutional 
arrangement, European Council president Donald Tusk urges Europe-
an heads of state to “renew [their] declaration of faith” in this project 
of integration108. In a further step, the European identity that is thus 
established turns out to be fully exclusionary: the peaceful interior of 
Europe is violently closed off and likewise enclosed by and through 
violence, both from a spatial-territorial and a historical perspective109. 
Repressing the violence at its borders and its limits allows the EU to 
maintain Mouffe’s ‘puritanism of good feeling’ for itself in a cordon 
sanitaire of ‘peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights’110 – and, 
as Tusk insists, this excludes “submission to populist arguments”111. In 
my term, this is Moral Fortress Europe.
Lastly, seeking the moral grounding of European politics means 
asking what is presupposed by the moral finality of peace and prosperi-
ty and the means by which the EU claims to strive for their perfection. 
Since, as we have seen, democracy and the rule of law are the official 
means, it follows that European citizens or public and the European 
treaties are the ‘official inputs’ to which one has to remain faithful. Both 
in terms of the EU’s management of interest groups and in terms of its 
official focus on consensus, these elements represent the reduction of 
politics to police that defines ethics in Rancière’s sense. 
Before any of those matters can be addressed, however, we have to 
ask a crucial question. What is the EU? Its self-description as a political 
and economic union between its member states already suggests that 
the EU is not a state in the sense that its member states are. But if that 
is the case, what is implied by the ‘political’ nature of its union? 
In order to answer that question, I turn to Vivian A. Schmidt, an 
international relations scholar who holds Boston’s Jean Monnet Chair 
of European Integration. Her work combines the virtues of empirical 
work with a focus on ‘polity’: in particular, she offers “theoretical in-
sights into the democratic implications of the EU’s international orga-
nizational form, the interactions between EU and national institutions, 
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and the role of ideas and discourse in democratic adjustment”112. This 
framework suits our investigation, since we are interested in depoliti-
cization both in terms of the EU’s own institutional framework and in 
terms of the EU’s effectiveness on the politics of its member-states – 
this interest is theoretically driven in both cases.
According to Schmidt, the oft-cited democratic deficit is not simply 
a matter of the EU falling short of political ideals. “[T]he real problem 
for member-states is not so much that their democratic practices have 
changed [as a result of the EU’s influence] as that their national ideas 
and discourse about democracy have not”113. In other words: that the 
EU does not function as if it were just another national polity is not in 
itself a problem. What is experienced as the democratic deficit is, rather, 
the result of what we might call a failure of expectation management 
in the context of national politics. This may seem like an outlandish 
thesis, but it is close to what we have examined under the header of self- 
withdrawal and, in particular, the decreasing importance of nationally 
based political institutions. Schmidt also sees that, in part as a result of 
political developments connected to the EU, national politics has in-
creasingly failed to deliver on its promises. On Schmidt’s analysis, this is 
not so much due to a ‘construction fault’ of the EU, but in the first place 
the result of the content of the promises made by national politicians.
The first part of this argument is a redefinition of the EU itself. 
Schmidt calls it a “regional state” to emphasize both the ‘state-like’ char-
acter of the EU and to introduce a discursive alternative to the notion 
of the nation-state114. There are two characteristics that differentiate the 
regional state from the nation-state. First, a nation-state has a certain 
finality, as she puts it:
[nation-states are] characterized in principle by indivisible 
sovereignty, fixed boundaries, coherent identity, established 
government, and cohesive democracy. By contrast, the EU has 
no such finality but, rather, is better conceptualized as in a con-
stant process of becoming. What it is becoming, moreover, is not 
a nation-state but, rather, a regional state, given shared sov-
ereignty, variable boundaries, composite identity, highly com-
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pound governance, and fragmented democracy split between 
government by and of the people at the national level, and 
governance, for and with the people at the EU level. Legit-
imacy, in this context, is naturally in question when the EU 
is compared to the nation-state. It need not be if we rethink 
legitimacy in terms of a regional state. (Schmidt 2006, 9)
Schmidt adds that legitimacy problems persist in the national con-
text, and that the national and European political levels can be charac-
terized as ‘politics without policy’ on the national and ‘policy without 
politics’ on the European level. Differently put: the EU is of an entirely 
different nature than the nation-state and is thus not necessarily subject 
to the same legitimacy concerns that would be valid at the national level. 
However, “EU-related changes in national governance practices, chal-
lenges to national ideas about democracy, and the lack of discourses that 
sufficiently legitimate the changes” lead to a relatively powerless nation-
al politics that is afraid to admit its powerlessness to its constituency115. 
This fear in turn explains the lack of legitimizing discourse.
This contrast between nation-state and EU presupposes a certain 
conceptual flexibility. For instance, we cannot assume that sovereignty 
is by its nature rigid, indivisible, and beholden to the nation-state, as 
most ‘realists’ in international relations theory would define it. It ‘does 
sovereignty differently’. In terms of democratic theory, it is also clear 
that there is a difference between the nation-state model and the EU, 
but it is not necessarily clear what follows from this.
If democratic legitimacy in a nation-state is predicated on a 
country’s indivisible sovereignty within a fixed set of boundar-
ies with a coherent national identity enabling the expression of 
a collective will, then the EU is clearly very far from achieving 
nation-state legitimacy. But this does not mean that the EU 
lacks democratic legitimacy. (Schmidt 2006, 20)
In what follows, we will focus on the EU’s “different ways with dif-
ferent emphases”116. One crucial distinction in the literature on legitima-
cy is that between input and output legitimacy; or, to put it in Abraham 
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Lincoln’s phrase, democratic government is government “by the people, 
of the people [input] and for the people [output]”. In the EU context, 
we can add government with the people in the form of interest groups 
and NGOs117. The institutional make-up of the EU, which is geared 
toward output legitimacy, has the additional effect of pursuing integra-
tion through negative means – e.g. taking away barriers to free trade 
– rather than positive ones – e.g. extending political competences. This 
tendency is only further ingrained by the historically strong position of 
the European Court of Justice. The EU’s institutional mechanisms thus 
produce two effects that are characteristic of European politics: first, 
the effect of securing output legitimacy rather than input legitimacy; 
second, the effect of pursuing negative integration by juridical means 
rather than positive integration by political means. Underlying these 
considerations, as we will also show, is depoliticization through the pos-
tulation of a moral finality of politics (defined in terms of peace and 
prosperity) based, in the final analysis, on what Giandomenico Majone 
calls fait accompli politics. 
2.1 The primacy of output legitimacy
It is often claimed that EU policy lacks legitimacy. For instance, the un-
derlying concern associated with its so-called democratic deficit is that 
only democracy confers the kind of legitimacy that is required in order 
to justify the exercise of power by a political actor. We have seen that 
Vivien A. Schmidt accepts the idea that the EU, on conventional ideas of 
how legitimacy should be understood, lacks the legitimacy of a nation- 
state. But, she argues, this does not mean that the EU lacks democratic 
legitimacy118. An important part of her argument is relinquishing nation- 
state requirements. Since we are operating with a notion of the political 
in the tradition of Carl Schmitt (no relation), which likewise divorces 
political concepts from their usual state context, this kind of approach 
is important to our purposes. But this is not simply a matter of internal 
coherence. Contemporary EU research has to come to terms with the 
reality of ‘governance’ in a way that does not reduce the concept to the 
national level, since decision-making that ‘binds’ or compels citizens has 
117 ibid, 25-31
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extended beyond national borders119. Schmidt’s point is that it is all too 
easy to argue that the EU falls short of nation-state requirements; as a 
regional state, it should be evaluated by different criteria. This means, 
for one thing, that the concept of legitimacy has to be considered from 
a conceptual angle that does not automatically place it within the fixed 
borders of a nation-state. How should we then conceive of it? The work 
of Fritz Scharpf gives us the conceptual tools to evaluate the EU’s legit-
imacy by making a highly general distinction between input and output 
legitimacy. Scharpf goes on to describe the EU’s legitimacy in terms of 
that distinction.
In order for an exercise of power to be legitimated, it needs to be 
interpreted as an expression of collective self-determination. What is 
required for such self-determination is in itself a complex, controver-
sial and value-laden [wertbehaftet] matter120. In the history of normative 
political theory, two “different, but complementary perspectives” have 
been formulated: the input-oriented and the output-oriented perspec-
tive. This roughly reflects Lincoln’s famous triplet: government needs 
to be of the people, by the people (input) and for the people (output). 
If we adopt the input-oriented perspective, political decisions are le-
gitimate when they reflect the will of the people: that is, if they can be 
derived from the authentic preferences of members of the community. 
On the other hand, if we adopt the output-oriented perspective, polit-
ical decisions are legitimate when they promote the common good of 
the community. The two perspectives are mostly used in complementary 
fashion. However, they can be analytically distinguished and, what is 
more, they rest on highly different conditions. Even more importantly, 
they are different in that they imply different diagnoses of the demo-
cratic legitimacy of power in Europe121.
As Scharpf notes, in traditional accounts of legitimacy, the emphasis 
on input legitimacy is often traced back to Rousseau, and output legiti-
macy to the Federalist papers or, as Schmidt claims, Montesquieu122. In 
Rousseau, as we will consider in the next chapter, the general will func-
tions simultaneously as the full agreement of all with all, in the sense 
of the authentic preferences of members of the community, and as the 
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securing of the common good [bien publique]. However, it is clear that 
the general will qua will indeed has a legitimizing function that is based 
on what is willed by the community itself. The problem of consequent 
authors on legitimacy has been that Rousseau’s strategy of postulating 
a universal will of the community, that stands over and above particu-
lar wills, was no longer available. In contemporary democratic theory, 
a consensus between particular wills has to be achieved. Because this 
cannot always be achieved when interests diverge, the justification of 
majority rule has to be viewed as the central problem of input-oriented 
theories of democratic legitimacy123. We have to justify the fact that in-
dividual wills are overridden124. This requires an additional, non-formal 
condition: the trust of the minority in the majority, which presupposes 
that the community is perceived as a unity125. That presupposes a pro-
cess through which a community is constituted and shaped on various 
levels: communication, memory and experience126. On the level of the 
nation-state, where collective identities are more or less secure, such 
considerations are purely ‘academic’. For the EU, however, this is com-
pletely different: the EU, being “far removed from a strong collective 
identity” as a result of the “historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and in-
stitutional differences between the member states”, cannot assume the 
‘perceived unity’ of the community – in Max Weber’s terms, there is no 
Gemeinsamkeitsglauben127.
This means that there is no democratic justification of majority rule 
in European politics. The ‘binding’ nature of majority decisions in the 
Council of the EU, where national heads of government convene on the 
European level, therefore cannot be said to constitute a legitimate de-
cision from the point of view of member states that are in the majority. 
Assuming that perspective, there is no fundamental distinction between 
the majority’s right to decide and the imposed rule of external parties128. 
European input legitimacy can only be secured to the extent that a 
Europe-wide political process of communication and opinion-formation 
can be established. Currently, that process does not exist129. If we can-
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not bring about such a European ‘public space’, legitimate European 
decision-making would require the unanimous agreement of democrat-
ically legitimated national governments in the Council of the EU130. 
Under present conditions, this seems an almost impossible threshold. 
For that reason, Scharpf urges us to turn to output legitimacy as the 
more promising avenue for the discovery of ‘European legitimacy’. This 
means looking for legitimacy in terms of an “efficient but not very dem-
ocratic Europe”131.
By its nature, input legitimacy is quite unitary in force: there is one 
kind of self-determination that is legitimate, namely that which cor-
responds to the authentic preferences of members of the community. 
By contrast, output legitimacy allows a higher number of legitimizing 
mechanisms. This also means that output legitimacy requires more con-
ditions to be in place and is more limited in its scope132; namely, it pro-
vides legitimacy only to the extent that a precise set of conditions is 
being met.
Legitimacy in this sense is derived from the capacity of solving 
problems that are in need of collective solutions. Such problems cannot 
be solved by either individual action or the market, or even on the level 
of civil society. Output legitimacy is attained when there is a sizable and 
durable inventory [Bestand] of public interests in this sense133. Output 
legitimacy has no recourse to notions of solidarity or duty derived from 
the practice of living together.
Instead, this kind of legitimacy is founded on two potentially con-
tradictory goals: first, preventing abuse of public power and second, fa-
cilitating effective solutions to problems134.
Legitimacy is thus within reach for political units, whose weak 
identity would not allow any ‘organismic’ interpretation. What 
is more, those political units are no longer reliant exclusively, 
or even primarily, on the loyalty of their members. In principle, 
output-oriented legitimacy allows for the unproblematic coex-
istence of multiple, hierarchically ordered or overlapping, col-
lective identities, the scope of which is defined through certain 
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categories of problems, and the organisation of which cannot 
lay claim to either territorial or functional criteria. (Scharpf 
1999, 20)
This means that the EU can be defined, without conceptual scru-
ples, as a political unit that is suitable to address collective solving of 
problems plaguing the community as such. As Scharpf says: “So far, 
so good”135. He then prepares the way for Schmidt by saying that the 
EU is mostly evaluated with reference to the input- and output-orient-
ed legitimacy of the nation-state. In the democratic nation-state, they 
exist side by side and “mutually strengthen, supplement and replace 
each other”136. Because of the EU’s difficulties with input legitimacy, 
the fact that it is compared to nation-states results in its beings rejected 
as insufficiently legitimate. The fact is that the EU is for the most part 
confined to output legitimacy. This “allows a relatively high tolerance 
for weak collective identities, while also demanding higher institutional 
requirements” and putting limits on what can be legitimated137. We have 
already touched upon the fact that the finer points on input legitimacy 
remain a purely ‘academic’ concern in the context of the nation-state, 
where collective identities are sufficiently fixed for this kind of legit-
imacy to be attained as a matter of course. In the context of the EU, 
the supposedly fundamental democratic deficit remains an ‘academic’ 
concern so long as “European politics takes its course as if legitimacy 
did not matter”138.
This can seem like an overly one-sided statement when we con-
sider the fact that there are European elections. Does their existence 
not demonstrate some concern with legitimacy? We can only answer in 
the affirmative, but immediately have need of the distinction between 
input and output legitimacy. In a general sense, output legitimacy is 
secured through general, free and equal elections that are not so much 
involved with representing the people (input), but rather with secur-
ing institutional and pragmatic concerns (output), in two main ways139. 
First, elections secure the orientation of government agents with respect 
to the public interest. Second, elections are the only available way to 
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approach the ideal of national citizens’ equality. Next to the elections 
themselves, this presupposes that they are embedded in societal and 
political structures and practices: for instance, ‘checks and balances’, 
competitive political parties, and credible mass media140. Elections thus 
do not function as a tool to evaluate policy in terms of the will of the 
people: it appears that they do not have to.
In a way, this is a privilege Europe has inherited from its postwar 
period of foundation, when it was still an elite project that took place 
outside of the public eye. The removed status of this project was justified 
by ‘Europhoric’ national discourses that presented European integration 
as having “little negative effects on national sovereignty”, and “with lit-
tle mention of any deep-seated challenges to traditional democracy”141. 
This resulted in a description of European integration as a matter of “a 
political-moral dignity, that made it nearly immune to objections”142. 
Even today, some analysts describe a “toxic pressure to conform” to the 
historically prevalent direction of European politics, which means that 
only those who give in to “the determinism of negative integration” are 
good Europeans143. In terms of citizens’ willingness to let European pol-
itics go about its way outside of the public eye, however, the so-called 
permissive consensus that characterized earlier phases of European in-
tegration has been transformed into a constraining dissensus144.
Arguably, this transformation is due to the effects of European in-
tegration itself. Simply put, because of the lack of European Gemeins-
amkeitsglauben, there are no theoretical grounds to legitimate majority 
decisions on the European level. Further integration also implies an ex-
tension of the competencies of the EU. This increases the likelihood of 
measures that are experienced by citizens as impositions on the part of 
‘Brussels’, especially in conditions where individual member states’ ca-
pacity to act is ever-decreasing145. Such conditions likewise result from 
the integration process.
Factors that are not strictly tied to integration also have an import-
ant role to play in the shift from permissive consensus to the present 
mood of Euroscepticism: an example is economic growth. So long as 
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Europe could be perceived as a “community of winners” in an economic 
sense, the project of European integration, which was seen as an im-
portant contributor to economic success, was less likely to come under 
question than in the period since the economic crisis146. However, this 
should not be taken to suggest that European prosperity was on the up 
and up before that period. Compared to the United States of America, 
“after the phase of very rapid catch-up (...) in the immediate post-war 
period, convergence in the levels of per capita income stopped at the be-
ginning of the 1980s and has remained unchanged since”; “and during 
the 1990s growth of EU [GDP] was disappointing both in absolute 
terms and by comparison with the US147”. 
Notwithstanding such relatively disappointing economic perfor-
mances, one could mount an argument to the effect that external fac-
tors like crises are more directly important to understanding the shift 
away from permissive consensus than European integration itself. For 
instance, one commentator has claimed that the EU has remained rel-
atively invisible to most citizens, since the application of law is left to 
the member states148. However, especially in terms of the decreasing 
capacity to act on the part of member states, it seems that citizens are 
quite aware of and in fact distraught at, for instance, the primacy of EU 
law over national law and the effects of this primacy. In that sense, as is 
emphasized in the academic literature, the shift to constraining dissen-
sus amounts to a politicization of European integration149.
Let us summarize our present findings. A common assumption of 
authors on depoliticization, whether in theoretical terms or applied to 
the EU, is that democracy is a strong requirement for anything to be 
rightly called ‘political’. We do not share this assumption. As we saw 
in the first chapter, authors like Rancière dispute the equivocation of 
democracy with politics, at least if democracy is defined in terms of 
a political system150. After all, political difference requires the non- 
identity of the ‘ontic’ political institutions and the ‘ontological’ notion 
of the political, which can only occur as a disruption of the order rep-
resented by police. Another way of saying this is that society can never 
finally be grounded. As a result, the claim that democracy conceived as 
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a political system could secure the political has to be contradicted, since 
it is itself a form of depoliticization. European politics is plagued by an 
alternative depoliticization, which is likewise motivated by the belief 
that the correct political system could ground politics once and for all. 
European politics is pulled away from democracy, whether conceived as 
a form of disruption or as a political system, by three main factors. First, 
as we have discussed, there does not seem to be a unified will that could 
be represented by democratic means (recall the difficulties surrounding 
input legitimacy in Europe). Second, while European elections serve 
a function within the EU, that function is not to represent the will of 
the people but to secure favourable circumstances to reach its goals, i.e. 
formulating answers to communal problems and avoiding power abuses. 
Third, these goals themselves tend to lead away from democracy, since 
output legitimacy favours an alternative style of policy-making; even 
the far-removed political structure of an independent expertocracy, giv-
en certain conditions. This is where we re-encounter the self-withdraw-
al of politics. In order to make this clear, we will now consider the way 
politics is situated within the European framework.
2.2 European policy without politics
One way of expressing the contrast between national politics and pol-
itics at the European level is via symmetry. Vivien A. Schmidt says of 
the national level that it is home to “politics without policy”, whereas 
the European level displays “policy without politics”151. This is a philo-
sophically rich contrast, especially from the perspective of our interest 
in depoliticization – an interest Schmidt does not particularly share. 
The contrast as she perceives it revolves around the ‘agonistic’ shaping of 
political decisions one the one hand (politics), and the ability to exercise 
practical effects on the other hand (policy). On her analysis national 
politics offers a kind of simulation, which we have already referred to as 
placebo politics. In the European context, this means a lack of discourse 
on the lessened capacities of individual states as a direct result of EU 
influence – we will have more to say on this later – and an unwillingness 
or inability to admit to this fact. The system of party politics that re-
mains in place is thus ‘political’ in Schmidt’s sense, but can barely result 
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in an alteration of practice; politics without policy. On the other side of 
the symmetry, the EU is able to exercise practical influence, by which 
means it is able to constrain its member states. But this influence is not 
the result of the democratic legitimacy that is proper to nation-states. 
That is hardly surprising, since the EU is a regional state; but with this 
democratic component the ‘agonistic’ part of the equation has likewise 
dropped out entirely.
In order to explore what this means, we should start by observing 
that the European Treaties function in similar ways as a constitution 
would in nation-states152. It lays out the terms on which government is 
to be conducted and constrains the actions of both the member states 
and the EU as such. The execution of the terms that are laid down in the 
treaties is mostly the prerogative of the member states themselves153, but 
the decisions as to what kind of policy is to be employed ‘in the spirit of 
the Treaties’ takes place on a different level. In legal terms, the Treaties 
are necessarily incomplete contracts: this means that the parties to the 
contracts cannot foresee in advance all the contingencies that could im-
pact their contractual performance, and are unable or unwilling to oblige 
themselves to a particular course of action154. “The founding fathers of 
the EU” responded to this essential incompleteness by delegating the 
task of filling in “the gaps in the Rome Treaty” to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission155. With the addition 
of the European Central Bank, we have a trio of central supranational 
EU institutions. Because of the great historical importance of the ECJ, 
which will become clear in what follows, I will focus on its role when 
describing the EU’s ‘policy without politics’.
As a first step, let us consider the ways in which decisions by the 
above-mentioned institutions can be corrected. Provided that such de-
cisions are supported by the Treaties, there is only one procedure in 
place that could overturn such a decision externally (of course, the ECJ 
itself can in a sense ‘correct’ earlier verdicts: I ignore this since it does 
not address the political role of the ECJ as such). What is required is a 
change to the treaties themselves, which would require the unanimous 
consent of and ratification by all member states: an almost impossibly 
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high hurdle156. Because there is no majoritarian corrective in the usual 
sense, the formal independence of the supranational European insti-
tutions is much more secure than would be possible in any national 
constitution. The ECJ proved able to integrate conflict both function-
ally and normatively, unlocking considerable emancipatory potential, 
such as union-wide anti-discrimination laws. Integration of this kind 
was possible because a new position had been created from which to 
legislate, increasingly independent from national conventions and or-
thodoxies as the justice system stabilizes itself on a transnational level. 
However, this also means that the juridical system gradually becomes 
shut off from societal and democratic legitimacy precisely to the extent 
that it has become transnational157. Jürgen Habermas, speaking more 
generally of tendencies plaguing European policy, calls this uncoupling 
of momentous political orientations and will-formation on the part of 
the citizens a “trend towards self-immunization”, by which European 
policy makes itself “increasingly unassailable”158.
European politics and output legitimacy are thus even more tight-
ly woven together than we have considered so far. We have previously 
studied the fact that there is no Gemeinsamkeitsglauben (common feel-
ing of community) in Europe as such to grant input legitimacy to Eu-
ropean politics. But, starting from the other end of the political chain, 
EU institutions – we have considered the ECJ as an example – have 
also positioned themselves in such a way that they are removed from 
any democratic public, whether non-existent European public or per-
fectly extant national publics. To make things worse, these publics are 
simultaneously directed away from European politics by their national 
leaders, so that the cleavage between Europe and its peoples is mutually 
reinforced159. The combination of these factors amply demonstrates that 
the legitimacy of European political decision-making is fully dependent 
on the effectiveness with which it achieves agreed-upon goals. It fol-
lows that European politics risks its legitimacy when it tries to resolve 
controversial questions. It simply does not have the mandate to enter 
into conflictual spheres: as we have already discussed, output legitimacy 
can draw on a wider variety of legitimizing mechanisms than input le-
156 Scharpf 1999, 30
157 Brunkhorst 2014, 101-105; cf. Scharpf 1999, 30
158 Habermas 2015, 100
159 ibid, 101; Schmidt 2006, 9
 European politics and aspects of depoliticization -61-
gitimacy, but is by the same token dependent on more factors being in 
place, so that its scope is limited.
Adding the general concern of diminished scope to what we know 
about the EU’s avenues for procuring legitimacy yields a far-reaching 
conclusion. By its nature, European politics can process [bearbeiten] a 
smaller bandwidth of problems, and can only invoke a smaller selec-
tion of political options in order to solve said problems in comparison 
to the nation-state160. To put it even more critically, in the words of 
Scharpf: the effectiveness and hence the legitimacy of European politics 
“depends on its ability to avoid political opposition, by either remain-
ing under the threshold of political perceptibility or limiting itself to 
conflict-minimizing solutions”161. Where strategies of this kind are not 
available because political decisions of one kind or another are unavoid-
able, there is no opportunity for European legitimacy to establish itself. 
In such cases, European politics has to rely for its legitimacy on the 
collaboration of national governments and their means of securing le-
gitimacy162. It already seems clear that the ‘forces’ emanating from these 
institutional conditions could have a decisive influence on the kinds of 
decisions that are taken in the EU.
Let us briefly recapitulate. We have pursued a series of arguments 
that showed the tight connection between European politics and output 
legitimacy. There is no unified European public that could constitute a 
basis for input legitimacy; and supranational European institutions like 
the ECJ have positioned themselves over and above the kind of control 
mechanism that we are familiar with in the context of national politics. 
Creating output legitimacy is thus the only available route. In the past, 
when integration was not yet seen as a political process, there was no 
potential for political problems to make themselves felt. As we have 
seen, this was associated with both the moral-political dignity of the 
project of European integration itself and the status of the European 
community as a community of winners, mostly in an economic sense. 
Ironically, it was mostly the result of European integration and its con-
sequences that the permissive consensus that initially surrounded the 
project became politicized and turned into what is today called a con-
straining dissensus.
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But we are not yet in a position to oversee the present situation in 
its entirety. The legitimacy of European politics is not dependent on 
the input of a European or national public, but rather on its effective-
ness in attaining agreed-upon goals. Simply put: peace and prosperity. 
This limitation means that European politics risks its legitimacy when it 
tries to resolve controversial questions163. In turn, this has consequences 
for ‘Europe’s’ capacity to address particular kinds of problems. It has to 
steer clear of controversy and avoid political opposition. Opposition can 
be avoided via two routes: either by remaining under the threshold of 
political perceptibility or by limiting itself on conflict-minimizing solu-
tions. Both routes give additional impetus to the importance of juridical 
decisions relative to political ones, since juridical decisions only affect 
the case at hand – at least for the time being. However, because of the 
supremacy of European law and the doctrine of direct effect, to which 
we will return at a later point, the jurisprudential effect of individual 
ECJ-decisions is of a general nature and in that sense wide in scope and 
far-reaching in its consequences164. The politically almost invisible pow-
er of the ECJ perhaps also explains the high degree to which European 
politics, in comparison to national politics, is result of judicial Rechts-
fortbildung165. Fritz Scharpf claims that this near-invisibility “has so far 
primarily been used to expand the prohibitions stemming from negative 
integration against measures of national politics that could hinder free 
trade166.
The distinction between positive and negative integration refers to 
two ways in which integration can be accomplished: respectively, the 
(positive) establishment of new, common rules and procedures and the 
(negative) removal of pre-established, particular rules and procedures. 
Because of the institutional pressures we have described thus far, there is 
a fundamental asymmetry between positive and negative integration in 
European politics. This results in a one-sided tendency to pursue nega-
tive integration, which has important consequences.
Approached from the perspective of positive integration, European 
politics is a near impossibility because of the complexity of institutional 
actors involved. The capacities of political actors are undermined by ex-
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tremely high consensus barriers: a legislative act of positive integration 
requires the unanimous consent of the European Council as well as 
the consent of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament167. 
Instigating political action is thus practically unfeasible. On the oth-
er hand, the ‘merely reactive’ ECJ can take direct action against any 
national regulation that potentially affects ‘competitiveness’ or is in vi-
olation of the Treaties168. Historically, ECJ verdicts have often had a 
normative [normsetzende] function which was made possible by, and has 
in turn strengthened, Europe’s lasting commitment to the priority of 
community law over national law169.
The pressure to integrate, seeking the point of least resistance, thus 
naturally exercised itself on the ECJ, while there was no counterbal-
ancing possibility to achieve integration through positive means. Recall 
that negative integration is concerned with the abolition of national 
regulation, working against perceived treaty violations and in favour 
of economic competition. The absence of feasible alternative routes to 
integration has meant that “interventionist politics and the interests 
they serve” are systematically put at a disadvantage170. This asymmetry 
in feasibility is due to the underlying institutional asymmetry between 
supranational European justice and intergovernmental European poli-
tics171. Taken together, we can conclude that the institutional-processual 
elements of European politics have a clear tendency to favour liberal-
ization.
How should we explain this tendency? It should now be clear that 
European integration is not a neutral phenomenon, but pushes us in a 
certain political direction. In a sense, this political element is present in 
the very foundation of the EU, so that its practice is a faithful reflection 
of its political mandates. In that spirit, Scharpf mentions the disparity 
in the kind of language used in the Treaties to describe negative inte-
gration: it is described in much clearer terms compared to its positive 
counterpart and is subject to fewer exceptions172. However, this disparity 
appears to reflect rather than explain the dynamics we have described in 
the last few sections. One important factor that we have so far described 
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on a surface level is the role of European law and the ECJ, in particular 
the ‘supremacy’ of EU law: let us go into such matters further.
From our surface description, we have been able to see the ‘under-
handed’ way in which the ECJ is able to push through negative inte-
gration from a position that is above and beyond the level of national 
politics. This minimizes the political risk and opposition that has to be 
confronted by the EU at large, precisely because of the unique posi-
tion of the ECJ (both with respect to its being removed from demo-
cratic publics and with respect to its extensive practical capacities). The 
evasion of political risk and opposition by conducting politics through 
‘non-political’ means173 allows the EU to safeguard its sole basis of le-
gitimacy, namely the output legitimacy that is secured by addressing 
(only) agreed-upon community priorities along the lines of peace and 
prosperity. It is forced into this position by its inability to rely on other 
channels of legitimacy; roughly put, because of the lack of a European 
public sphere that would be able to generate a community that remem-
bers, experiences and communicates at the European level174.
Once we accept these constraining conditions on the contents of 
European politics, there are two abstract choices: strive for European 
integration only insofar as this process can be supported by means of 
input legitimacy (for instance, by democratic means), or put all of Eu-
rope’s cards on the route of output legitimacy; and, as we have seen, 
the latter must result in the prevalence of ‘non-political’ supranational 
institutions like the ECJ and a one-sided tendency towards negative in-
tegration. We find ourselves in a regional state that has clearly made the 
second choice. Integration is better than leaving the countries of Europe 
to their own devices. But why? We will have to delve into what Giando-
menico Majone has called ‘fait accompli politics’ as the foundation of the 
initial permissive consensus with which Europe was regarded. ‘More 
Europe’ was and is often still seen as a political necessity; an idea that is 
increasingly the topic of politicized debate. But in order to understand 
that debate fully, we have to go more deeply into the relationship be-
tween EU law, national constitutions and politics.
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2.3 Establishing the status of European law
During the period of the EU’s foundation, no decisions were made on 
how to adjudicate between contradictory commitments between EU 
law and national law. Which set of rules should be prioritized? Usually, 
the state itself decides how to accord with international law: if other 
state parties find it to be in violation, it can be tried before an inter-
national court (indirect effect). This would have been the role of the 
European Commission and the member states in the EU (then EEC) 
anno 1960175. There were disadvantages to this ‘classical’ way of settling 
affairs, notably the time and resources required for the Commission’s 
pronouncements176. But without clear political directives, it was diffi-
cult to envisage an alternative solution. In 1963, one such solution did 
emerge: it was an ECJ verdict on a private firm’s case against the Dutch 
taxation agency, a couple of pages long.
Legal and political analyses of the European Union have tended to 
diverge. For instance, general moods concerning the fate of European 
unification during the rule of De Gaulle in France are not at all in ac-
cordance with the huge legal steps towards integration that were made 
during the same period – not even “the framers of the Treaties” could 
have envisaged the supranational nature of these steps177. According to 
Joseph Weiler, this divergence tracks a perceived distinction between, on 
the one hand, the input-oriented interactions between political actors in 
terms of policy decision-making, and, on the other hand, the output of 
that process in terms of policy, norms, and law178. Weiler was among the 
first to point out that this distinction rests on a misunderstanding of the 
role of law in the EU’s political processes.
The first clue that legal and political processes in Europe intertwine 
to a high degree was to be found in “self-executing measures”, at first 
limited to the steel and coal sectors179. Greatly extending this principle 
in the above-mentioned court case, the firm Van Gend & Loos claimed 
that its having to pay more Dutch taxes for its imports of plastics as a 
result of national political decisions was a violation of the Treaty, direct-
ly invoking article 12 of the EEC Treaty. This article reads:
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Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and with-
out prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 
(Treaty Establishing the European Union 2002)
In its verdict, the ECJ judged that Van Gend & Loos was being dis-
criminated against on the grounds of its being a Dutch firm. The impli-
cation, which was the subject of legal elaboration during the decade after 
the verdict, was that European citizens held rights qua European citi-
zens, and that these rights could be invoked against the member states 
themselves and against other European citizens [inter se]180. Because of 
this implication, Van Gend & Loos is often seen as a ‘ground-breaking 
decision’ in European law; simultaneously, however, analysts emphasize 
that there was nothing in the verdict that was not an inference from the 
Treaty itself. It seems paradoxical that an application of a rule is also a 
reinvention of the fundamental text; but “this paradox touches the heart 
of the matter”181. Let us look further into this.
For the member states who had obliged themselves to act in accor-
dance with the Treaty, it was highly unattractive to allow their citizens 
to be able to meet them in court, invoking a higher authority182. There 
were two factors that ended up pushing the ESJ in the opposite direc-
tion. First, the fact that the Treaty had been ratified by the legislative 
powers of the member states. Given that the Treaty itself assumed direct 
effect within the member states themselves, it was clear that the clauses 
of the Treaty should take precedence over the earlier national acts of 
legislation183. Second, the highly general logic of the Treaty text itself, as 
evidenced by Article 12 above, allowed the ECJ to interpret the “spirit, 
the general scheme and the wording of these provisions”184. Directly 
after this invocation, it is stated that:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Com-
mon Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to 
interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty 
is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
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obligations between the contracting states. This view is 
confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only 
to governments but to peoples. (...) In addition the task 
assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object 
of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by 
national courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have ac-
knowledged that Community law has an authority which can 
be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Commu-
nity law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals 
but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become 
part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where 
they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of 
obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way 
upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon 
the institutions of the Community. (European Court of Justice 
1964, emphases added)
Thus, in a few sentences, the ECJ creates a new legal order185. The 
conclusion that is mostly attached to Van Gend & Loos is the doc-
trine of direct effect, which is of course an important legal development, 
creating a direct link between international law and national citizens. 
Apart from that, the equivalence of national citizens and nationally 
based companies was established in one fell swoop. Arguably, however, 
the real importance of the legal order now called into existence is the 
diminished role of the states that results from it. In the verdict, the 
implicit will of the states (which, as discussed, would not have wanted 
to be held to account by a higher authority) and even their explicit will, 
given the protest by three of the founders during the court case, was 
contrasted with the spirit of the Treaty. “Almost in passing, the [ECJ] 
became the spokesperson for the spirit of the foundation”186. Although 
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this practically establishes the supremacy of EU law at the same time as 
its direct effect, the ECJ left the former to be resolved later.
For the sake of clarity, we should add that the ECJ actively ascribed 
the role of spokesperson to itself, in retroactive and performative fash-
ion. Recall the way in which Jacques Rancière described French rev-
olutionary Olympe de Gouges: she laid claim to a right she did not 
have187. While hers was a political claim since it extended the assembly 
so that it would include women, the ECJ presents a more complicated 
case. Van Gend & Loos presents the dawn of a new legal subject, the 
European citizen-company, that could not have been heard before: this 
is similar to the role of women in De Gouges’ times. However, this is 
a decision taken by ‘activist judges’ rather than the European citizens 
themselves188. In that sense, the implications of the court case are not 
so much a performative claim of citizenship rights, but the abstract as-
cription of the same rights to a diffuse group that has not yet appeared 
sufficiently unified to stake such a claim in its own right. To the extent 
that the implications of the ECJ’s verdict have placed the really existing 
(national) peoples of Europe at a further remove, this verdict must con-
stitute an extension of police logic. After all, does the removed status of 
the ECJ not, in Rancière’s strong phrase, reflect the “oligarch’s intense 
wish”: to rule without the people, without politics189?
So far, we are aware that the EU is characterized by a fundamental 
asymmetry between the institutional conditions of positive integration 
and those of negative integration, in a way that strongly favors the lat-
ter. We have also seen that the Dutch private firm Van Gend & Loos, 
through a case brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
1963, provided an important impetus to the ECJ’s own ability to inter-
pret the law and hence to determine the political direction of the EU 
as a whole. In the Van Gend & Loos case, the ECJ’s verdict established 
that the EU Treaties enjoyed direct effect in all member states and that 
this meant that a supranational European legal order had been created 
as part of the ‘spirit’ of the Treaties. As Luuk van Middelaar notes, the 
ECJ could have moved on to establish the related matter of the su-
premacy of European law over national law in one fell swoop, but since 
the Dutch constitution already established that international law held 
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priority over national law, this was not deemed to be necessary190. A 
little over a year later, the case Costa/ENEL, this time pitting an Italian 
consumer against the Italian national electricity company, created the 
additional performative effect in relation to the European legal order 
required to ascertain its supremacy over national law. The key sentence is:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its 
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity 
and capacity of representation on the international plane and, 
more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of 
sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Com-
munity, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law 
which binds both their nationals and themselves. (European 
Court of Justice, Judgment of 15.7.1964 — Case 6/64)
Stemming from the nature of Article 12, which we cited above, Eu-
ropean law pertaining to competitiveness gained a new constitutional 
status. This created practical problems on the level of national com-
petitive law. After all, how could treaties that were ratified by national 
parliaments take precedence over constitutions, which in most cases 
could not be changed by the parliaments in the same fashion? (Owing 
to perpetuity clauses, for instance191.) The response from national courts 
was to accept this precedence as the new practice192. The political signif-
icance of this shift is clear: the ECJ enjoys a de facto monopoly when 
it comes to the interpretation of EU law, and it has the competency to 
reject national law that is at odds with the laws of the community [ge-
meinschafswidrig]193.
190 Van Middelaar 2009, 52
191 Scharpf 1999, 52-56; Majone 2014, 100
192 Weiler 1982, 44-45; Weiler 1992; Burley & Mattli 1993
193 Scharpf 1999, 57. Scharpf mentions a further case, Cassis de Dijon, which 
makes clear that the ECJ decides whether a national product description 
is ‘reasonable’ and that national decrees on product quality are to be seen as 
inferior to communal ones: every product that is legally allowed in one of its mem-
ber states, should be importable without further complications. “Thus, through the 
juridical order, the freedom to buy and sell had gained constitutional precedence 
over the political discretion of a democratically legitimated legislative” (ibid, 58).
 Chapter 2-70-
Because the ECJ has thus given itself the interpretative competence 
to define and enact the spirit of the Treaties in a way that is not sub-
ject to direct democratic control, either on the European or the na-
tional level, the process of European integration attained a high degree 
of autonomy and, consequently, a lot of momentum. Given the wish 
to push integration forward and the fundamental asymmetry between 
positive and negative integration, it is no surprise that negative integra-
tion has been the main beneficiary of supranational European justice194. 
The Treaty of Rome already contained the explicit obligation to reduce 
and finally abolish internal tolls and restrictions on internal trade, so 
that negative integration could be implemented without great political 
upheaval and was backed up by the European Commission and ECJ’s 
joint effort to uphold the Treaty195.
In effect, the pressure to integrate through the ECJ has meant a ‘dec-
laration of war’ on mixed economic orders. Like the effect of European 
politics on national citizens, it was European integration itself that has 
fleshed out the full implications of the autonomous position of the ECJ 
and the EU’s commitment to negative integration. The member states 
are each involved in national regulation designed to provide relief from 
competition for certain goods, services, and infrastructural functions in 
the name of common interest, service public, or Daseinsvorsorge196. The 
scope of this domain greatly varies between the different countries, but 
education, basic research, health care, pensions and agricultural poli-
cy are examples of domains that have historically been felt to belong 
outside of the competitive sphere. But this competition-free domain 
provides an exception from the norm of a single, competitiveness- 
oriented internal market, so that the scope of competitive law has been 
expanded to areas that “could influence global competitiveness”; and 
this includes the core domains of national parliaments, like “social pol-
icy” and “education”197.
It seems plausible to say, with Scharpf, that the privileged status of 
these domains could never have been successfully assailed within the 
national politics of any member state198. But through the near invisibil-
ity of individual decisions of the ECJ, which we have touched upon in 
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a previous post, a certain logic has been established that pushes the EU 
and its member states in the direction of seeing these exceptions as little 
more than obstacles standing in the way of further European integra-
tion. This logic has its roots in the ‘constitutionalized’ status of negative 
integration, which has expanded from Article 12 of the Treaty to the 
ECJ’s performatively produced interpretative monopoly of the Treaty. 
Any institutional difference between member states can be argued to 
constitute a competitive imbalance199; hence, an almost limitless liberal-
ization becomes possible. Because of the pressure to pursue integration 
and the impossibility of doing this via positive means, there is a real 
pressure on national governments to treat all domains as equal, in the 
sense of being equally suitable for competition.
We have now encountered the pressure to further European inte-
gration a number of times. It is because of this pressure that the ECJ, 
being the point of least (political) resistance, is caught up in the logic of 
negative integration. Without this driving force, the whole process that 
we have described has little meaning. This should lead us to ask: why is 
integration so important?
2.4 Fait accompli politics
We have reflected at some length on the way politics is situated with-
in the EU, focusing on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its 
‘underhanded’ way of furthering negative integration from a position 
that is above and beyond the reach of national politics and publics. This 
minimizes the political risk and opposition that has to be confronted 
by the EU at large, precisely because of the unique position of the ECJ 
(both with respect to its being removed from democratic publics and 
with respect to its extensive practical capacities). The evasion of polit-
ical risk and opposition by conducting politics through ‘non-political’ 
means200 allows the EU to safeguard its sole basis of legitimacy, namely 
the output legitimacy that is secured by addressing (only) agreed-upon 
community problems. It is forced into this position by its inability to 
rely on other channels of legitimacy; roughly put, it does not have access 
to input legitimacy because of the lack of a European public sphere that 
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is able to generate a community that remembers, experiences and com-
municates at the European level201. The alternative, as we have already 
analyzed at length, is a one-sided tendency towards negative integration 
made possible by and reflected in the prevalence of ‘non-political’ su-
pranational institutions like the ECJ. But, given the lack of legitimating 
resources in terms of input, why pursue integration at all, especially giv-
en the reservations we may currently have about the EU’s achievements 
when it comes to prosperity? In order to begin to understand this, let us 
delve into what Giandomenico Majone has called ‘fait accompli politics’ 
as the foundation of the initial permissive consensus with which Europe 
was regarded. ‘More Europe’ was and is often still seen as a political 
necessity, as we have said, but let us ask how this has worked historically.
From the very start of the European project, it has been character-
ized by the pushing forward of ambitious goals without much concern 
for either feasibility or popular support202. Pascal Lamy, former Euro-
pean Commissioner and erstwhile lieutenant of Commission President 
Jacques Delors puts it in no uncertain terms:
Europe was built in a Saint-Simonian way from the begin-
ning, this was Monnet’s approach: The people weren’t ready to 
agree about integration, so you had to get on without telling 
them too much about what was happening. (cited in Majone 
2014, 49)
In our first chapter, we referred to Saint-Simon in the context of 
Jacques Rancière’s diagnosis of contemporary political culture, which 
the latter sees as ever at risk of absorbing the political into the realm of 
the social. Saint-Simon had affirmed this kind of absorption and made 
it into an expression of hope. Saint-Simon strives for an age where pol-
itics is no longer necessary: in an ideal state, only the ‘administration of 
things’ would remain. As evidenced by Lamy’s quote, the political end-
goal is made immune from politics itself; and by the same token the 
European project is reduced to striving towards a horizon that is firmly 
fixed in place. In today’s context, the felt necessity to move towards ‘an 
ever closer Union’ can be captured in terms of the so-called ‘bicycle the-
ory’ of European integration: “integration must keep moving forward, 
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especially in times of crisis, for the bicycle (that the EU is seen to be) 
not to fall”203. We already know which direction European politics is 
headed into: more integration is always the answer, which cannot itself 
be put up for discussion. In this sense, it is an already established fact 
(fait accompli) and will necessarily develop itself in a particular direction. 
From the perspective of the EU’s development, this necessity has been 
produced by a political culture of “total optimism”; the latter being a 
historical term. Majone takes it from Geoffrey Parker’s description of 
the Spanish King Philip II, who was so convinced that providence was 
on his side that he refused to account for the possibility of failure204. In 
similar fashion, Europe has never wished to consider the idea of a ‘fail-
ure state’, ignoring concerns of feasibility when it came to its policies 
and not providing an ‘exit strategy’ for member states until as late as 
2009, in the Lisbon Treaty 205.
Majone correctly analyzes that this approach to European integra-
tion implies that “the success of a collective decision is determined by 
the decision-makers themselves; by the fact that they agreed on the 
decision” rather than on actual results, so that the possibility of failure is 
excluded a priori206. In this sense, the EU is anything but technocratic, 
since a technical approach to politics would work in the exactly opposite 
direction, focusing on analyses of (conditions of ) feasibility and let-
ting policy flow directly from them207. Pace Majone, however, we should 
be equally careful to avoid saying that we have described a European 
“emphasis on the process of decision-making rather than the actual re-
sults”208. The input-oriented perspective of the process by which certain 
policies are agreed upon does not make a dramatic return, as is suggest-
ed by the idea that the process of decision-making is emphasized: far 
from it, in fact. Instead, emphasis is put on the perceived need for any 
decision that will show that decisions are being made – ‘problems are 
being solved!’ – which is precisely output-oriented in nature. 
In the third chapter we will see that Jean-Jacques Rousseau revolu-
tionized traditional belief in providence by making it about mankind’s 
ability to perfect itself over historical time. Parker’s Philip II was still a 
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believer in a more straightforwardly divine guarantee that the world is, 
on the final analysis, good. Both of these beliefs about the direction that 
politics (and the world more generally) is headed into are ontologically 
motivated. This is also the case for Europe’s political culture of total op-
timism, but there is an additional, more opportunistic-political motive 
in play.
We have discussed at length how institutions like the ECJ stand 
in a position over and above the conventional control mechanisms that 
would attach to them in the context of a nation-state. This in fact pro-
vides politicians with an incentive to pay lip-service to optimism, since 
their interests can be furthered without the pressure from opposition 
parties that would arise ‘at home’; and, what is more, with superior legal 
status209. Such optimism about Europe can thus be cynically exploited 
in ways that are far removed from the peoples of Europe, and this is in 
itself an argument against what Jürgen Habermas calls the “self-im-
munization” of the European institutions210. Such self-interested 
lip-service, while difficult to trace, would to some degree explain the 
moralistic fervour with which the “determinism of negative integration” 
is, as already referred to above, made into a matter of principle and 
(European) identity211. We can here recall Bourdieu’s critique of Euro-
pean institutions, claiming that they practice a policy of depolicitization 
using the vocabularies of freedom, liberty and liberalism. Rather than 
liberating Europe, such policies grants “economic determinisms a fatal 
stranglehold” by revoking national regulations: in other words, by pur-
suing integration by negative means. What is worse, the idea of a “truly 
European Europe” ends up functioning as a decoy that enshrines this 
depoliticization rather than counteracting it212.
As if to confirm this suspicion, there is a glaring example of ex-
ploitation on the level of national politics, namely in the context of fiscal 
policies, where the EU has not managed to gain relevant competencies 
– or, to the extent that it has managed, its competencies are being negat-
ed by stalling tactics. A Special Committee was set up by the European 
Parliament, partially in response to leaked data of financial misconduct 
(e.g. LuxLeaks and the so-called Panama Papers). In its report, the 
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Committee notes a “pattern of systematic obstruction” on the part of 
certain member states when it comes to combating tax evasion213. Ac-
cording to Ewald Engelen, this “shows love for the European Union in 
a new light”: the idea of a Union that would protect us from the power 
of the markets is “either extremely naive or very cunning”214. According 
to Engelen, this exactly is what the EU was designed for: backroom 
‘politics’ far removed from the view of “press, public and parliament”215. 
More in keeping with Philip II, there is an ontological component 
to the belief in ‘European perfectibility’, which unlike the dark dealings 
around tax evasion can be addressed as an argument. The ontology I have 
in mind involves the idea that the nation-state is no longer viable216; a 
position that has been defended in many different contexts by the very 
same Habermas we mentioned above. But, while Habermas may count 
as an optimist in some senses and we will have occasion to disagree 
with him in later chapters, he is not among those who uncritically use 
the idea of the deceased nation-state to give carte blanche to European 
politics. Where that argument does occur, it can be found either implicit 
in academic sources or loudly proclaimed in official EU-documents. An 
example of the latter is the following, which was part of a Declaration 
issued by the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Commission:
Unity is both a necessity and our free choice. Taken individ-
ually, we would be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing 
together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our 
common interests and values. We will act together, (...) while 
moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in 
line with the Treaties (...). Our Union is undivided and indi-
visible. (Rome Declaration 2017)
It is clear that ‘unity’, ‘standing together’ and ‘act[ing] together’ 
function as the opposite of being ‘side-lined’ by global dynamics in the 
event that member states (one presumes that this is the ‘we’ that would 
be sidelined) are ‘taken individually’, and that unity entails ‘moving in 
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the same direction, as we have done in the past’. This is only reinforced 
when the leaders state that “Europe’s future lies in our own hands” and 
that “the European Union is the best instrument to achieve our objec-
tives”217.
Apparently in the same spirit, Habermas states that “[o]ur era is 
marked by a growing mismatch between a world society that is becom-
ing increasingly interdependent at the systemic level and a world of 
states that remains fragmented”. Said states are the sole agents capable 
of “taking effective action based on democratic decisions”, but they are 
overruled by the “accelerated digital communication” characteristic of 
globalized markets, so that “there is a need for steering that single nation- 
states are increasingly unable to meet”218. Similar phrases appear in 
many places where Habermas has commented on the present and fu-
ture of the European project. In order to meet this challenge, Habermas 
continues, we need a legal innovation: and its contours have already 
emerged. In the European project, international (i.e. European) law has 
become constitutionalized. Not only the composition of the medium of 
law changes, claims Habermas, but even more importantly, the element 
of decisionism that was an element of the exercise of power and political 
authority becomes rationalized, domesticated219. No longer is it possible 
to wage war as a sovereign nation at one’s own discretion. Habermas 
mentions that Carl Schmitt correctly considered this change to be “a sea 
change in international law”220.
Habermas proceeds to make an important distinction, however: one 
that is not present in official EU-documents like the one cited above. 
“[T]he improvement in the organizational functions that is being 
achieved” by and in European politics “could be described as a trend to-
wards the rationalization of the exercise of political power in the inter-
national arena (...)”221. But this does not by itself present the full picture:
[W]e cannot qualify this trend as a civilizing process as long as 
international organizations only exercise their mandate on the 
basis of international treaties, hence in forms of law, but not  
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yet in accordance with democratically generated law – that is, 
legitimately. (Habermas 2015, 56, emphases in the original)
Habermas emphasizes that increasingly global market forces cannot 
be resisted by a “world society fragmented along national lines” and 
that the only response that seems feasible – failing a truly cosmopolitan 
perspective – is a “democratic version of the European Union”222. This is 
presented as an express alternative to the mode of “further integration 
on the model of executive federalism” that has been pursued223. This 
once again refers to the distance of European institutional decisions 
taking place at a distance from any publics, real or imagined. With our 
analysis of the institutional pressures that characterizes the EU in mind, 
we have supplied an explanation for this distance and the perceived ne-
cessity of integration, which is justified by referring to the output le-
gitimacy provided by peace and prosperity. One needs to emphasize 
the one-sided dependence of European politics on output legitimacy 
in order to understand why Habermas is trying to bring about a new 
kind of solidarity between the peoples of Europe224. We will discuss his 
proposal in the fourth chapter.
We can now take preliminary stock of the ways in which aspects of 
depoliticization are characteristic of European politics. We have cov-
ered the moral finality of peace and prosperity; since these can only be 
achieved via the route of European integration, as the self-description 
of the EU and its ensuing narrative shows, further integration is the 
conditio sine qua non of European politics. Lacking the resources to pur-
sue this end via conventional democratic means, it has used the permis-
sive consensus enabled by the initial moral and political dignity that 
was attached to the European project in the immediate post-war pe-
riod to extend its competences based on criteria of output legitimacy, 
which has resulted in an institutional asymmetry between measures of 
positive and negative integration, to the near exclusion of the former. 
The European extension of competences happened in a gradual process 
of self-immunization partaken in by key European institutions, among 
which we have discussed the ECJ. In a reversal of Olympe de Gouges’ 
performative claim to have the rights she did not have, as portrayed by 
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Jacques Rancière, the ECJ performatively and retro-actively provided 
itself with the monopoly on the interpretation of the European Trea-
ties, which it subsequently declared had to be considered supreme in 
comparison to national law. Like the initial Treaties themselves, this 
status was ratified by the national courts. In this way, a perfect circle was 
formed between the text of the Treaty and the ECJ: the spirit of the 
Treaties, as the founding principle of the EU itself, found its voice and 
spoke with authority.
In its newly acquired position of power, the ECJ then proved to fa-
vor negative integration, further strengthening the existing imbalances. 
This is symptomatic of the ways in which supranational European gov-
ernance has been systematically removed from the reach of democratic 
publics, whether ‘European’ or strictly national in nature. In that dy-
namic, political success is the brute fact of continued decision-making 
rather than the involvement of citizens or the successful furthering of 
their interests. Because there are no control mechanisms of the kind 
one is accustomed to finding in nation-states, there are incentives for 
national politicians to use ‘Europe’ as a foil for unity against the force 
of the markets, while secretly striking deals behind closed doors and 
withholding information. We should thus not be uncritical of the fa-
miliar narrative that the age of the nation-state has come and gone. 
Whether that narrative can succeed as part of an argument for ‘ever 
closer political union’ depends on the ways in which today’s European 
politics can be reformed as more than a rationalization: we will later 
take Habermas up on his insistence that a democratic version of the EU 
is in fact possible.
But perhaps we have not yet touched on the most important 
achievement of European politics to date. Is the achievement of peace 
on a war-torn continent not a significant moral achievement? In the 
sections that follow, we will zoom in on the figure of moralization and 
the uses it is put to in European politics. 
2.5 Moral Fortress Europe
We have briefly considered how the initial permissive consensus was 
ended in part because the self-perception of the European Union as a 
‘community of winners’ became increasingly less tenable. This is espe-
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cially true in times of economic crisis, but we saw Majone claim that 
after rapid catch-up with the United States in the immediate postwar 
period Europe was unable to keep up225. However, in the parlance of 
European politics itself, the EU has surely ‘delivered’ a half-century 
of peace and stability. We have to make the counterpoint that the in-
creasing irrelevance of Europe’s internal borders has been offset by the 
arguably equal and assuredly opposite reaction of shutting out those 
who do not belong. Morocco’s request to become a member state was 
rebuked (Morocco isn’t Europe), while Spain’s holdings in North Africa 
were recognised without second thought (Spain is Europe)226. There is 
no map of the EU that features the Dutch municipalities [gemeenten] 
in the Caribbean, and France showed that while Algeria was French 
whether the Algerians liked it or not, a horrible war could be fought 
on ‘French’ soil with many ‘French’ victims without blemishing the 
European record227. The Algerian war ended in 1962, one year before 
the Van Gend & Loos case. That this part of European history can be 
unproblematically ignored shows that “not even a sizeable war fought 
inside the community itself has been able to impinge on the notion of 
European integration as a symbol of peace, and that its promotion of 
European identity has served as an antidote to war”228.
But even if we limit ourselves to continental Europe, the causal ele-
ment that is implied by the idea of the ‘deliverance’ of peace is problem-
atic. Majone denounces it as a “cryptofederalist myth”229. A first element 
of this mythological element is the historical frame of the postwar pe-
riod itself:
[T]he European Community arrived a bit late in history for 
its widely proclaimed mission, which was to avert further wars 
between the major Western European nations; even without 
the Community the time for such wars was past after the two 
exhausting world wars of the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry. (Hirschman 1981, cited in Majone 2009, 87 and Majone 
2014, 82)
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According to Majone’s analysis, European society itself carried a 
strong anti-war orientation, which allows us to explain Winston Chur-
chill’s defeat at the 1945 election because of his reputation as a ‘man 
of war’230. There is a general reluctance of European nations to engage 
in war, even in Europe’s own backyard: both the Yugoslav crisis, which 
began with an assertion of European ‘problem ownership’ (“This is the 
hour of the Europeans, not the hour of the Americans!”), and the Koso-
vo crisis displayed the EU’s “inability to ensure peace and respect for 
basic human rights even in areas of clear European interest”231. Though 
Hirschman presents the “ironic conjecture” that perhaps the true func-
tion of the European community has been to give voice to suppressed 
minorities within states on the European continent, these examples 
show how difficult it is to make even this case.
We cannot mention human rights in this context without remind-
ing ourselves that they are part of the EU’s self-description. It is all 
the more grueling that some if its actions can be described under the 
heading of “state hypocrisy”232. During the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a committee of ‘sages’ was 
convened as part of an initiative to create a ‘Human Rights Agenda for 
the New Millennium’. After an early draft was presented in 1997, Eu-
ropean Commission representatives “strongly objected”, although the 
eventual report would be based on “official, published and widely avail-
able materials”233. It was clearly not the intention to come clean about 
areas of improvement in European human rights practice. The purpose 
behind the human rights agenda at the time was to “present a rosy Eu-
ropean picture, to link aid and trade to Western human rights priorities” 
and to provide European representatives in international bodies with 
ammunition when they were criticized for applying double standards to 
human rights abuses in China and the Soviet Union (which were loudly 
decried, though in the case of China trade relations were usually not at 
issue) on the one hand, and human rights abuses ‘at home’ on the other 
hand234. The eventual report was cleansed of the names of individual 
offending member states, instead offering the general criticism that “the 
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strong rhetoric of the European Union [concerning its core values and 
human rights] is not matched by the reality”235.
The above shows the EU’s track record when it comes to matters of 
war, peace and human rights. The Cold War was a decor in which exist-
ing antagonisms between East and West could give rise to the extreme 
kind of depoliticization that allows one to present oneself and one’s 
history in terms of a striving for peace, while at the same time engaging 
in (post)colonial warfare on a large scale. The current non-engagement 
with this same history shows the necessity of questioning simplifying 
and depoliticizing narratives of peace and prosperity, which present Eu-
rope as occupying, almost as a matter of necessity, a moral high ground. 
The rhetoric of human rights has served the EU well in this regard. 
Let us therefore concern ourselves in more detail with the EU’s current 
human rights practice and inquire into the reality of Moral Fortress 
Europe, bastion of human rights.
The year 2016 provided a graphic demarcation point when it comes 
to the EU’s border and immigration policies, sealing itself tight in the 
face of a potential influx of refugees as a result of, most notably, the 
Syrian civil war. The EU’s response has been described as a “politics 
of death”236. The Human Rights Watch report classifies the so-called 
refugee crisis as one of the “significant strategic challenges” faced by the 
EU, alongside the Brexit vote, terrorist attacks and “rising support for 
populist anti-immigration parties”237. It notes that “EU governments 
and institutions responded (...) in ways that often undercut or set aside 
core values and rights protections rather than working consistently to-
gether to defend them”238. Populism constitutes a challenge of its own, 
and we will discuss it in the terms set out in the first chapter. Let us 
first briefly go into the challenges concerned more directly with human 
rights. When it came to the refugee crisis, the concern reflected by EU 
policy was national security and cultural identity, which was reflected 
in partial border closure in the Eastern parts of Europe and height-
ened border controls by Austria, France and Switzerland239. 2016 was 
the deadliest year on record for crossing the Mediterranean Sea, with 
estimates putting the number of victims over five thousand. In June of 
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2016, the EU signed a “problematic” deal with Turkey, offering payment 
for every refugee Turkey would take in from Greece240. This involves the 
EU not only with a questionable deal offering money to a party willing 
to ‘import’ refugees, but also makes the complaints about populism less 
credible. The most recent innovation in terms of immigration policy 
does little to dispel the idea of Moral Fortress Europe:
Turning back to migration: the Commission is today proposing 
to further strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to 
better protect our external borders with an additional 10,000 
European border guards by 2020. ( Juncker, 2018)
Europe is thus closed off from its own history and has reinstated its 
internal borders externally. But it also attempts to consolidate a certain 
political ethos, while expelling its evil twin in the same gesture. Or, 
if as we have seen European Council president Donald Tusk put it, 
we must not submit to populist arguments241. In Laclau’s affirmative 
analysis, populism becomes the name for the rejection of police: it is the 
forging of a chain of equivalences that cannot be absorbed by existing 
institutions. But the usual view of populism casts it as a simplistic or 
cynical distortion of ‘real’ politics. As we have discussed, this usual view 
is a form of localized depoliticization critique, which itself produces 
depoliticizing effects: while viewing part of the political landscape as 
improperly political, it does not question the underlying ontology and 
leaves open the possibility of foundationalism. For Rancière, dismissing 
populism on principle suggests that there is still a people out there that 
has concerns worth taking seriously (just not this people), in reality the 
dismissal simultaneously masks and reveals complete and unwavering 
allegiance to the status quo242.
This is certainly reflected in the White paper on the future of Eu-
rope. In its discussion of the drivers of European future, right after a 
picture of people celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall and a graphic 
showing the twenty-five most peaceful countries in the world by ‘state 
of peace’ (Europe: high to very high), we are introduced to what is called 
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the ‘questioning of trust and legitimacy’. Exceedingly dark language is 
employed there. 
The various changes affecting the world and the real sense of 
insecurity felt by many have given rise to a growing disaffec-
tion with mainstream politics and institutions at all levels. 
This often manifests itself through indifference and mistrust 
towards the action of public authorities. And it also creates a 
vacuum too easily filled by populist and nationalist rhetoric. 
(European Commission 2017, 27)
This is the only mention of populism in the White paper. Immedi-
ately following this paragraph, there are references to “blaming Brussels”, 
“lack of ownership for joined decisions” and “the habit of finger-pointing 
at others”: we are informed that these strategies have already “proved 
damaging” and that “Europeans are not immune to these stark images 
of disunity”243. The implications are clear: the fait accompli politics of 
European integration and ‘unity’ are reinforced, and populism is a form 
of rhetoric that fills a ‘vacuum’ left behind by a growing disaffection of 
citizens with ‘mainstream’ (non-populist) politics and institutions.
Having considered institutional pressures and blockages in the 
previous sections, we are now in a position to add a further element 
to our preliminary analysis of aspects of depoliticization in European 
politics. By moralizing its commitment to peace, human rights and the 
expulsion of populism, the EU has created a version of Mouffe’s cordon 
sanitaire. Within it, the European project alone counts as providing a 
well-intentioned and morally upright future for the continent. We may 
speculate that populism has displaced the ‘threat from the East’ as a 
countervailing danger that requires the EU to remain committed to 
its goals. What is clearly visible, though, is the simultaneity of the two 
moments that characterize the cordon sanitaire: the shutting out of the 
populist, warlike, anti-human rights adversary, which does not need to 
be argued against, but is obviously heinous and unwanted. We need 
only remind ourselves of this from time to time. Second, the unification 
and justification of the disparate field of allies: the EU needs to exist 
to counteract them and to lead by example. It should be clear that this 
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completely depoliticizes the identity of the other (as ‘evil’), as well as 
one’s own identity (as ‘good’), and the relation between the two.
But there is a further option still. Perhaps the EU has managed 
to develop an alternative to submitting to populist arguments, which 
simultaneously takes the people into account in a serious way, thus ad-
dressing the concerns of input legitimacy with which we started our 
investigation. This would then come in the form of what Vivien A. 
Schmidt has termed, in an extension of the already invoked ‘of the peo-
ple, by the people, for the people’, government with the people.
2.6 Governance with the people
The European Commission’s White paper on governance is considered 
to be an important part of the legitimizing strategy favoured by the 
commission: as a first preparatory step before the constitutional negoti-
ations, it outlines the Commission’s outlook on the normative principles 
that should guide European governance in the years to come – what is 
more, a version of that outlook that has not yet been affected by com-
promise and negotiation, as in the later stages of the constitutional pro-
cess244.
The White paper starts out by listing five principles that are taken 
to represent the basis of good governance: openness, participation, ac-
countability, effectiveness and coherence. The first two stand out. Open-
ness is understood as the requirement that “the European institutions 
should attach more importance to transparency and communication in 
their decision-making”, while participation means that “citizens must 
be more systematically involved in the drafting and implementation 
of policies”245. The changes proposed in light of these principles have a 
strong ring to them. For instance: “Policies should no longer be decided 
at the top. The legitimacy of the EU now lies with the participation 
of its citizens.246” This reads like an implicit criticism of what we have 
described as the ‘Saint-Simonian’ aspects of European integration. We 
saw Lamy describe these same aspects under the heading of ‘Monnet’s 
approach’, and Myrto Tsakatika likewise describe attempts to secure 
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legitimacy by bringing about peace and prosperity through European 
integration as “the Monnet plan”247. She sees the White paper as wa-
vering between Monnet and Maastricht, where the latter represents the 
moment at which the societal criticisms facing this mode of legitimacy 
began to have European repercussions248. It seems questionable, how-
ever, if such a shift occurs in the White paper. For it conceives of cit-
izen participation along the lines of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and civil society. In other words, increased participation does 
not concern individual citizens: instead, it entails an invitation to NGOs 
to ‘think about’ specific problem definitions that have been determined 
in advance249. Said NGOs, and the executives that select them, “mostly 
account for their status as representing a section of the population by 
reference to a notion of the common good defined in essentialist terms” 
or by reference to a large number of donors and members250. The invited 
groups are “well-equipped” [gut augestatteter] and large organizations251. 
This seems closer to an extension of the self-immunizing trends we have 
described in previous sections than an alleviation of them. I offer two 
reasons in support of this claim. First, the notion of the common good 
that enters into this specific participatory practice is not the result of 
will-formation by the full relevant community of citizens, so that ‘the 
participation of European citizens’ is not only not secured, but feigned 
in a posture of compromise. It is the same old output legitimacy trying 
on the clothes of its input-oriented brother: “optimizing output through 
the mediation” of carefully selected networks and expert groups252. Once 
again, the underlying mechanisms are not being put up for discussion. 
Second, because the problem definitions have been determined in ad-
vance, Rancière’s worst fears are confirmed. The mode of consensus, in 
his sense of the term, can do no more than reduce politics to police, as we 
have seen, thus accounting for “an effective depoliticization”253.
In these two ways, European participatory governance constitutes a 
disappearance of the demos from the political process. Participation in 
this restricted sense optimizes output and facilitates implementation, 
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since ‘civil society’ is already on board. The chosen representatives will 
in turn internalize a form of good, uncontroversial behaviour that will 
allow them to maintain their insider position and the associated com-
petitive advantages254. Contingency and agonism are thus forced out 
of politics: “A suppression [Ausblendung] of conflicting opinions and 
interests”, the substitution of “administrative modes of operation” and 
their dialogical embellishments instead of political action255. 
Theda Skocpol describes such depoliticization of civil society, al-
beit in an American context, as the most important symptom of the 
transformation of membership society to management society. Institu-
tions along the lines of active government for her is crucial to building 
the conditions for a public sphere that allows for the construction of 
collective identities: if we recall, this was the initial problem that con-
fronted European attempts to attain input legitimacy. Skocpol describes 
the withdrawal of voluntary federations with many members, tightly 
integrated in their respective communities: they have been supersed-
ed by professionally managed NGOs256. This professional management 
and the shift from membership to management more broadly means 
that activists no longer learn the political handiwork involved with try-
ing to gain followers regionally for one’s position: the “organizational 
skills” and “capacities for representative majoritarian leadership, as well 
as politically relevant personal political capacities”257. The voluntary as-
sociation is, in Schlesinger’s phrase, a “school for democracy258”. As Mi-
chelsen and Walter comment, only by involving oneself in this kind of 
political work does it become apparent that the pragmatic procedures 
of everyday politics are not the result of a dark conspiracy by a circle of 
elites: an insight that, according to them, has been forgotten by today’s 
morally inspired but insipid ‘slacktivists’259. 
This analysis adds another feature to the double bind of Europe’s 
non-existing European public sphere: in the very attempt to involve citi-
zens, it ‘involves’ them in a way that continues to steer towards output rath-
er than input legitimacy. By so doing, European politics only exacerbates 
the distance between civil society as a whole and political institutions. It 
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thus represents continually re-emphasizes the replacement of politics by 
administration, which leaves behind at most a “diminished democracy”260. 
 This provides the last puzzle piece in our search for aspects of de-
politicization in European politics. The strategy of the European Com-
mission as summarized in the White paper on governance only feigns 
participation. It puts the demos at a further remove in two ways: first, by 
forming it in its own image – well-equipped NGOs that claim to de-
fend the public good or simply enjoy great (financial) backing – and sec-
ond, by restricting its access to pre-defined problem definitions in the 
mode of what Rancière calls consensus. Because this consensus effects a 
certain kind of discipline, which is interiorized by the participants, civil 
society insofar as it is allowed to have a semblance of political activity 
becomes depoliticized: politics is turned into administration and police. 
This serves to deepen the disconnect between citizens and political in-
stitutions, since there are no channels through which to approach said 
institutions in a political manner. This in turn means that citizens are 
left without avenues to acquire crucial political skills and see politics as 
the ‘distant other’ to which they have no access. Since there is more than 
a kernel of truth in that description of affairs, the necessity of opting 
for output-oriented means of acquiring legitimacy continually reinforc-
es itself by actively impeding alternative means. This allows us to fully 
appreciate the extent to which European politics is characterized by 
depoliticization. In the following section, I reformulate said aspects in 
order to bring out the internal logic that is common to them.
2.7 European politics: aspects of depoliticization
The most fundamental kind of depoliticization affecting European pol-
itics is provided by Europe’s historical momentum. From Monnet on-
wards, the goal of European unity itself was thought to legitimate the 
process of integration. At the time, promises were made that national 
sovereignty would not be impacted. Given the historical frame of the 
immediate postwar period, what could be better than a European proj-
ect striving for unification? This continues to be an important ‘driver’ of 
the European present and into its future. The fact of peace, which is of 
course of enormous importance, is taken to justify the present course. 
260 Skocpol 2004
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But as we have seen, this does not even qualify as a post hoc-fallacy: the 
budding European community can itself be regarded as the product of 
the spirit of peace or rather the exhaustion with war that was sweeping 
the continent. And even its peacemaking qualities, however motivated, 
cannot be taken for granted in view of the wars conducted both within 
and by the community itself, as in the Algerian war, and in its backyard, 
as in the Yugoslav and Kosovo crises.
That is the initial two-step of European integration: from being 
worthy of pursuing almost for its own sake (without much regard for 
results) to being officially justified by reference to peace, and then pros-
perity. As we have seen, prosperity, too, is increasingly becoming prob-
lematic as a legitimating resource in the wake of the economic crises, 
though there are arguments to show that the EU was unable to keep 
track with global economic progress already from the eighties onwards. 
But on the process of European integration went, inspired by the lofty 
goals of peace and prosperity, or perhaps other ones. As it progressed, 
it increasingly stood in need of legitimation. Once it began relating to 
national constitutions and affecting the lives of citizens, it could no 
longer be carried by a central group of elites alone, without needing 
to justify what was happening. We have discussed the options open to 
the community as a dilemma: input legitimacy versus output legitimacy. 
Because input legitimacy requires a sufficiently unified underlying will 
of the people (Gemeinsamkeitsglauben) and this was and remains alto-
gether absent on the European level, the alternative path was chosen. 
Output legitimacy is about effective problem solving and so the Eu-
ropean community set about creating institutions that could meet this 
challenge. Because the problems concerned need to be agreed upon by 
the community as a whole, however, there is a limitation on the scope 
of what can be discussed. Notably, as Fritz Scharpf has shown, pur-
suing conflict-minimizing solutions or avoiding political perceptibility 
becomes an important strategy to avoid putting too much strain on the 
EU’s legitimizing resources. This strategy has in turn shaped the polit-
ical direction of the EU itself. Decisions of positive integration would 
have to be taken via political channels, and this has proven to be a very 
difficult matter because of the ‘consensus barriers’ involved. However, 
decisions of negative integration could be pursued via juridical means. 
Together with the European Commission, the ECJ’s task has been to 
‘fill in the gaps’ that were left in the Treaty. The ECJ pursued integration 
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by removing national regulation that was thought to hinder a competi-
tive single market – and since individual juridical decisions were nearly 
invisible, it could do so without much political upheaval.
In so doing, the ECJ had to clear up the relationship between EU 
law and national constitutions. A year after the end of the Algerian war, 
it concluded that it was possible for individuals (and corporations-as- 
individuals) to bring member states before the European court on the 
grounds that the latter had violated EU law. In treating the claimant’s 
case at all, the ECJ made it the case that one could sue sovereign states 
based on EU law. In its verdict, the ECJ accordingly stated that based 
on the spirit of the Treaties, a new legal order had been created at the 
time of founding: thus making itself the spokesperson for the spirit of 
the Treaties and making it the case that foundation had in fact entailed 
the subsumption of national legal orders under the new, European one. 
This was later clarified to entail the supremacy of European law over 
national law. The vantage point thus created was almost completely im-
munized from the influence of national and European citizens alike. 
This meant that the ECJ itself and the policies of negative integration 
that it favoured were, as Jürgen Habermas expresses it, increasingly un-
assailable. We may here trace a displacement of the initial political- 
moral dignity of the project of European integration to the institutional- 
juridical level: democratic publics cannot be involved in this kind of 
technical matter, after all.
This dignity can today be reinforced by three concrete arguments, 
all of which are effective depoliticizations: ontological, rights-based 
and moral-political. First, the ontological argument is that in global-
ized times, nation-states cannot accomplish much on their own. Alone, 
they even risk becoming soulless puppets dancing to the tune of global 
market forces. Unification is thus necessary. Applying this argument to 
the present state of the EU is questionable, as the European Parliament 
found when its Special Committee reported that some member states 
displayed a pattern of systematic obstruction on the matter of combat-
ing tax evasion. Its concrete policies of negative integration would seem 
to be a ‘policy of depoliticization’ rather than a way of taking matters 
into one’s own hands. From an even more general perspective, it seems 
that choosing the form of law and using this form to rationalize inter-
national politics, as the EU is attempting to do, does not yet mean that 
the substance of concrete laws is legitimate. This is again a variation on 
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a Habermasian theme. Second, the rights-based argument is that the 
EU is a force for good through its championing of human rights. As 
we have seen, historically speaking the community’s rhetoric has not 
matched its practice, which was a hard point to accept in the context of 
the Cold War. In the present, too, European practice has shown a will-
ingness to let refugees drown and to respond to their arrival mostly with 
concern for national consequences: for instance by attempting to bar-
ter with Turkey. This leads to the third and final argument: the moral- 
political argument. Europe is thought to provide a safeguard for politi-
cal dignity, which is already problematic in view of the deal with Turkey, 
as well as a safeguard against populist arguments: European Council 
president Donald Tusk insists that we should not submit to them, and 
populism in general is presented as a danger. This dismissive view of 
populism is a form of localized depoliticization critique, which itself has 
depoliticizing effects. Europe’s alternative has been to initiate the right 
kind of participation (populism being the wrong kind). The practice of 
European governance, following this proposed alternative to the letter, 
has involved NGOs that are thought to represent the general popula-
tion based on a notion of the common good, or based on high num-
bers of donors and members. These parties are invited to ‘think about’ 
pre-defined problem definitions. This mode of participation depoliticiz-
es the political process because only a select few, i.e. those selected by 
the executives, gain access, and representation is taken for granted and 
reified. Further, it depoliticizes politics itself by reducing it to consensus 
around pre-established parameters. Finally, it depoliticizes civil society 
by transforming membership society into management society.
The simple narrative and self-description of European politics as 
delivering peace and prosperity while striving for a containment of 
market forces, a championing of human rights and a politics of par-
ticipation without populism thus proves to be impossible to sustain in 
this form. The background assumption of unproblematic European in-
tegration either as an end in itself or to further the elements of this 
narrative is likewise to be rejected. This leaves us with the question how 
the elements of depoliticization that characterize European politics are 
to be combated. In the first chapter, we showed that there is a potential 
tension between the ontological aspect of depoliticization critique and 
ethics or normativity. At the same time, depoliticization critique itself 
has to be conceived not only as the withdrawal of ontological ground on 
 European politics and aspects of depoliticization -91-
which to found the political without remainder, but also as the appeal 
to fill the resulting gap by other means. In my attempt to provide an 
answer to the overall problematic of depoliticization and to its presence 
in European politics in particular, my overall strategy will be to make 
the tense relations between ontology, ethics and politics productive. The 
first step in this strategy is to ask why ethics has gradually been turned 
into a target for depoliticization critique, and whether this move was 
itself unproblematic. Answering that question will be the objective of 
the next chapter.
-92-
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In the two previous chapters we have explored depoliticization as a 
philosophical concept and the ways in which European politics can be 
meaningfully described in its terms. We know that depoliticization cri-
tique, taken to its limits, is an ontological category – we have called this 
generalized depoliticization critique. That perspective allows us to view 
the relationship between ethics and politics as problematic. Politics is 
‘closed off ’ by what Jacques Rancière terms police logic, or made deriv-
ative of an ontological foundation. Ethical concepts can serve both of 
these functions: by formulating universal norms that subordinate par-
ticular differences to higher-level principles (police logic), and by in-
tervening in political decisions by imposing criteria that forcibly bring 
about a certain outcome, thereby nullifying the element of decision. 
We can already begin to see that these depoliticizing effects are in 
fact related: both postulate an underlying reality that constrains poli-
tics by determining which directions are open to it and which are not. 
But it is currently unclear whether ethics necessarily has such effects 
or whether there are specific conditions that determine whether ethics 
depoliticizes or politicizes. In this chapter, I develop an account of the 
interrelations between ethics and politics seen through the frame of de-
politicization critique. This extends to a consideration of the particular 
historical (con)texts in which the formation of those relationships has 
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taken place261. With that in view, I will survey a development with-
in modern political philosophy that illustrates the interrelations and 
places them in relation to each other. The aim of the account and the 
philosophical-historical illustrations I provide is to glance beyond the 
automatic assumption that ethics is a completely depoliticizing domain, 
so that we open ourselves up to the possibility of a more constructively 
developed interrelation. The first step in this construction work is to 
ask critical questions of the hostility that ethics is subject to from the 
point of view of contemporary depolicitization critique. Such hostility 
is itself a form of depoliticization critique: it declares that only politics 
that has been purged of ethics can be considered truly political. As we 
know from our first chapter, however, depoliticization critique can itself 
have depoliticizing effects; for instance when the critique is localized 
and does not question the underlying ontology of what is being crit-
icized. The Varoufakis episode introduced in the Introduction suffices 
to illustrate this point. To recall: Greece’s finance minister attempted to 
politicize the discussion on European politics precisely by invoking Im-
manuel Kant’s categorical imperative, perhaps the finest achievement 
of modern ethics, and was duly dismissed262. Since that particular dis-
missal has depoliticizing effects, we can pose the more general question 
whether some account of ethics should be readmitted. The dismissal of 
ethics can be a mode of depoliticization: in other words, it can be part 
of the problem rather than part of the solution. I want to bring out 
four different interrelations between politics and ethics: fixation, fric-
tion, isolation and immanence. These four have in common that they are 
what I call direct relations: that is to say that they bring ethics to politics 
in unmediated form. The next chapter will consider indirect relations, 
which focus on the mediating role of procedure.
We will begin by analyzing fixation. I use this concept to capture the 
complete vanishing point of the political qua political, which is mostly 
denoted by the critical use of terms like foundationalism or a lack of 
autonomy. What fixation can add to such terms is an account of the 
specific relationship between what is taken as given and the imputed 
political. This relationship shows itself in three main ways, all of which 
are interrelated. First, the given is taken as logically prior to politics: in 
fact, it is directly available. Second, the given is deemed to be a legit-
261  cf. Tully 2008, 17; 34-35
262  Varoufakis 2015
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imate determinant of politics (and not the other way around). Finally, 
third, the given is understood to place an absolute constraint on politics.
The political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau serves as an illustra-
tion of the pitfalls of fixation, but simultaneously shows us ways to over-
come it. This is all the more pertinent since Rousseau in many respects 
has the aforementioned Kant on his heels. In terms of his worth as the 
starting point of our investigation, Rousseau represents a break within 
an earlier tradition. He operates both as part of and at a distance from 
the social contract tradition. The social contract itself already suggests 
a form of withdrawing ontology: rather than metaphysical criteria that 
preempt all politics, like Plato’s vision of the soul-city, the social con-
tract invokes consent. This is political to the extent that such consent 
can be withheld and contested263. However, in the social contract tradi-
tion before Rousseau this is typically not the case. Earlier social contract 
theorists offer a way to derive political system from empirical human 
nature. Rousseau’s version of the social contract is important for our 
purposes since it is instead a political wager: he makes no claim about a 
definitive human nature from which politics need only be derived.
I will also show that Rousseau is not only a citizen of Geneva but a 
true European – and today’s European Union echoes Rousseau in sever-
al ways, as we will consider. In the end, Rousseau relapses and invokes a 
form of universality that closes off political space. This happens through 
the intervention of the universal common good under the name of the 
general will, at least on the reading I will offer in this chapter.
From Rousseau we move to Kant. In my analysis, the contemporary 
front against ethics ironically stems from a tradition of latent depolitici-
zation critique which begins not with a dismissal of ethics, but with an 
insistence on its importance to politics. Kant makes a crucial move in 
this direction by distinguishing between a depoliticized politics of tech-
nical problems (Staatsklugheit) and the Staatsweisheit of the true states-
man, the moral politician264. The terms of this distinction allow us to de-
scribe the process of development that occurred between Kant and Carl 
Schmitt, the usual starting point for those interested in depoliticization, 
in a continuous manner. Kant himself is prone to fixation in some of 
his writings: here he echoes Rousseau, himself invoking a general will 
that closes off politics. In the first appendix to On Perpetual Peace, Kant 
263  cf. Habermas 2017, 63-64
264  Kant 2010, 44-45
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develops a more ambiguous approach that provides the means to escape 
depoliticization to a large extent, as we will see. However, the overall 
horizon of the moral law is still taken as an immediate given.
The writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber provide the 
instances of transformation that connect the moral philosophy of Kant 
to its near opposite in Schmitt. Nietzsche unmasks the mythical giv-
ens of Kant as bloodied illusions, while also, on my reading, bringing a 
new kind of ethics into play, which in fact animates his thought on the 
subject of Europe. However, the ethics that Nietzsche affirms is purely 
individual. In later authors, this means that subjectively held values are 
opposed to an objective world in a dualist fashion. Weber is both subject 
to this dualism himself, as Schmitt later notes, and a keen analyst of the 
resulting condition. He shows that a figure like Kant’s moral politician 
involves himself with “diabolical forces”265 and presents an advance on 
the ambiguities of Kant’s later work. For Weber, it is not possible to 
overcome the paradoxes of politics definitively: what is required is a 
hero to address what we will call, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the 
curse of politics266. This will be the appropriate time to analyze friction, 
the second of my four direct relations between politics and ethics.
Fixation gives us the image of a one-way relation between the ab-
solute force of what is ‘given’ and a thereby impossible politics. Friction 
puts in its place an image of tension and mutual negotiation processes 
that are moreover permanent in character. For instance, technical and 
moral considerations will continually suggest different political direc-
tions, but no such consideration can ever be declared the winner in a 
final sense.
When friction expresses a direct relation between politics and ethics 
and a hero is needed to overcome it, this can seem like rather a loose 
bond. After all, what is heroic is in a sense impossible, so that powerless-
ness and hence depoliticization must result. It thus becomes necessary 
to ask whether politics and ethics should be thought of as (potentially) 
interconnected in the first place. The negative answer to this question 
is expressed by isolation, the third direct relation between politics and 
ethics. I will argue that isolation, in two of its varieties, has depoliticiz-
ing effects.
265 Weber 2012, 78
266 Merleau-Ponty 1969, xxxiv-xxxv
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The fourth and final direct relation between politics and ethics, im-
manence, once again sees a shift in the account of the ‘distance’ between 
morality and politics. In fixation there is no such distance whatsoever; 
in isolation it is infinitely wide; in friction it is there to be bridged, but 
only a hero can expect to make it to the other side. Immanence could 
be described as a removal of this gap by political means. Compared to 
fixation, immanence moves in exactly the opposite direction. Whereas 
fixation starts off from a given external to politics and sees the former 
completely engulfing the latter, immanence starts out from politics and 
selects its commitments from other domains on a political basis.
Schmitt is the author who illustrates immanence, and the help of 
Rancière and Mouffe is enlisted to provide a fuller account. My discus-
sion of Schmitt in this context is limited to his Concept of the Political267, 
where he provides an account of the political as an intensified form of a 
domain of life. Another way of putting this is that the political infuses 
itself with the concerns belonging to various domains (e.g. aesthetics, 
economics, morality), transforming those very concerns in the process. 
It is always present within said domains as the possibility of antago-
nism. This wards off depoliticization.
Direct rel. politics-ethics Definition
Fixation Politics is derived from an ontological/normative 
domain; there is no political
Friction Politics needs ethics, but political reality resists 
ethics; a hero is needed 
Isolation Politics is completely separate from ethics
Immanence The political exists within ethics and other life 
domains as (the possibility of) antagonism 
As we explore the four direct relations, the conditions that allowed 
the reversal that occurred between Kant and Schmitt to take place will 
gradually come into view. That will in turn shed light on the question 
whether ethics itself has something to contribute to both depoliticiza-
tion critique as such and the problems posed by depoliticization more 
generally. Certainly, ethics can only make this contribution if and when 
267 There are many different sides to Schmitt. See Arditi (2008) for an account of 
‘Schmitt contra Schmitt’ and the choices to be made in privileging one of his sides.
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it avoids making politics reducible to moral first principles268. In my 
terms, such a reduction would amount to fixation, which as stated is a 
mode of depoliticization. There is thus no room for any theoretical ex-
ercise in which the political is straightforwardly derived from universal 
morality. Ethics, if it is to be useful for our purposes, should instead 
provide a way to resist the ontologizing force of first principles. The aim 
of this chapter is to explore various attempts to achieve such resistance.
3.1 Fixation
As we saw in the first chapter, the term foundationalism is often criti-
cally invoked to describe a situation in which politics in the true sense is 
not possible. Yet in the face of the complete vanishing point of the au-
tonomy of the political that fixation represents, foundationalism is still 
too neutral a concept. Foundationalism implies a duality: a foundation 
and something that stands on top of it (a ‘superstructure’), which implies 
a strong form of dependence but still at least a semblance of autonomy. 
However, as we will see, the force of ontological and material normative 
givens269 completely obliterates any autonomy. Politics is affixed to an 
external domain – ontology or normativity – and is asphyxiated by it. I 
take fixation to be identifiable by three criteria. The first is the invoca-
tion of a ‘given’ that is directly available and therefore necessarily logi-
cally prior to politics. Second, what is given is taken to be immediately 
relevant to politics. Third, this directly available and immediately rele-
vant given places an absolute constraint upon politics, so that the lat-
ter in effect ceases to have any existence of its own. This non-existence 
of the political qua political is what we will take fixation to mean.
In the first chapter I described the problem which was then still 
called foundationalism. The example used was that economic determin-
ism promises to form a foundational structure in comparison to which 
politics can at most be a superstructure. Moral factors can equally be 
invoked to institute first principles from which politics can directly be 
derived. Moral principles here play the role of a fixating ontology. Pol-
itics can be put in its ‘proper place’ either by the invocation of factual 
268 cf. Fagan 2016, 7
269 Schedler 1997; as opposed to procedural normative givens. We will consider two 
forms of proceduralism in the next chapter.
 Problema Morale -99-
constraints, as in the case of economic determinism, or by the invoca-
tion of absolute normative constraints, or both.
In cases where fixating constraints are ontological in nature, they 
describe an underlying structure of reality that conditions with absolute 
force what can be allowed to follow from it. That means that politics 
is put in its place in an absolute sense, lacking any resources to deviate 
from the deep patterns of reality. When fixating constraints are norma-
tive in nature, the specificity of politics is made subservient to moral 
concerns, so that material normative givens function in much the same 
way as the factual constraints invoked by ontological concerns. In par-
allel to the case of economic determinism, if we assume the validity of a 
set of ethical first principles and an adequate philosophical insight into 
these principles, any policy can be tested against the principles of such 
insight.
The force of both ontological and normative constraints upon poli-
tics is absolute, since neither allows for any form of legitimate deviation 
or contestation within the domain over which they range. Again, given 
sufficient knowledge of reality and a case that is directly relevant to the 
domain of reality that is sufficiently known, there is in a quite literal 
sense no “space-against” from which to deviate or contest270. The same 
applies to insight into moral first principles271. This absence of space is 
the result of the vertical orientation of what is ontologically or norma-
tively given vis-à-vis politics and the absolutely forcing nature of this 
given. The weight of this given is so infinitely large that it seems diffi-
cult to find a justification for distinguishing politics from ontology and 
morality, respectively. Its gravitational pull completely dominates the 
politics that supposedly orbits it, but actually has been incorporated into 
it and can no longer claim a reality of its own. It is completely affixed to 
and fixated by what is given.
270 Abensour 2011, 94
271 There is perhaps even more force to such first principles than to causal laws. 
Deviation from or contestation of causal laws is unwise in the sense that it is foun-
ded on a mistaken view of reality, but deviation from or contestation of true first 
principles is immoral. This can be seen as a more fundamental error as there is 
potentially less scope for other factors to come into play. Even given an identical 
understanding of factual reality, it is possible to disagree on what is to be done, for 
instance based on differing moral norms. Conversely, some, though not all, forms of 
morality are insensitive to considerations of fact.
 Chapter 3-100-
In order to illustrate the inner workings of fixation, I here discuss 
Rousseau’s general will, which blends absolute factual and normative 
constraints. While it is not properly speaking a moral concept, the fac-
tuality and direct availability of the general will has an absolute mor-
al force to it. In later authors, from Kant onwards, the relevant moral 
concepts are more straightforwardly moral272. Their function remains 
the same as in Rousseau, however: a factual presence that is directly 
available to every reasonable person, at least in principle, and founds and 
constrains politics in an absolute sense.
3.1.1 Rousseau’s openings and closures
The philosophical giants Rousseau, Kant and Nietzsche, all of whom 
we will discuss here, are double-edged theorists from the perspective 
of depoliticization critique. In particular, Rousseau can serve both as 
the first modern example of depoliticization critique and as a notorious 
exponent of fixation. It can seem as if Rousseau tried to free up onto-
logical space by making human nature subject to historical change and 
placing the possibility of human action, and indeed its centrality, at the 
forefront of his philosophy273, only to clamp down on the ensuing open-
ing once and for all. In particular, Rousseau deprives the figure of the 
‘natural man’, which had been central to social contract theory before 
him, of its factual nature.
Let not then my readers imagine that I dare flatter my-
self with having seen what I think is so difficult to discover. 
I have opened some arguments; I have risked some conjec-
tures; but not so much from any hopes of being able to solve 
the question, as with a view of throwing upon it some light, 
and giving a true statement of it. (...) For it is no such easy task 
to distinguish between what is natural and what is artificial 
in the present constitution of man, and to make oneself well 
acquainted with a state which, if ever it did, does not now,  
 
272 Utility, for instance, serves a similar purpose: it is a combined fact/norm that 
directly determines political decisions.
273 Neiman 2002, 44-46; Marquard 2007, 101; Wokler 2001, 56-69.
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and in all probability never will exist, and of which, notwith-
standing, it is absolutely necessary to have just notions to judge 
properly of our present state. (Rousseau 2002, 82)
The effect of this ‘retreat of nature’ and its replacement by conjecture 
is that politics is freed from the necessity of complying with an absolute 
moral or ontological foundation. Rousseau goes further than this, by 
setting in motion his own account of human nature. This is the work 
of his notion of perfectibility, which refers to the capacity for contin-
gent human self-improvement but equally the ability for imperfection, 
as evidenced by societal corruption according to Rousseau274. Finally, 
Rousseau unmasks the likes of Thomas Hobbes as spinning a false (in a 
later vocabulary: ideological) philosophical tale in the service of specific 
societal interests, keeping everything in its current place275. This act of 
unmasking is of course a form of depoliticization critique.
Rousseau’s European writings can be said to represent a middle 
stage in the development of his views on the relation between politics 
and ethics. Rousseau, responding to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Proj-
ect for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe [Projet pour rendre la paix 
perpétuelle en Europe] of 1712, sympathizes with the ideal of European 
federalization but cautions that bringing it about would require “vio-
lent means from which humanity must needs shrink276”. That being said, 
Rousseau believes the constant (threat of ) war between European “na-
tions politically divided” is offset by certain formal confederations – var-
ious leagues within and between nations that have a place in European 
history – and in other confederations,
“less visible but none the less real, which are silently cemented 
by community of interests, by conformity of habits and customs, 
by the acceptance of common principles [;] (...) Thus the Pow-
ers of Europe constitute a kind of whole, united by identity of 
religion, of moral standard, of international law; by letters, by 
commerce, and finally by a species of balance which is the in-
evitable result of all these ties (...); [the] concert of Europe (...). 
(Rousseau 1917, 40) 
274 Rousseau 2002, 96-98; Wokler 2001, 58
275 Wokler 2001, 52
276 Rousseau 1917, 111-112
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There is thus a kind of directly available unity that is counteracted 
by existing interests. One assumes that these interests in turn motivate 
the wars that Rousseau thinks of as ceaseless. It is clear that they coun-
teract the would-be cosmopolitan direction of Saint-Pierre’s project, 
and that is Rousseau’s reason for finally rejecting that project as wise in 
principle, but ill-considered in practice. In the end, too many particular 
wills would have to be overridden by revolution, and uprooting society 
in this way is a price Rousseau thinks we should not be willing to pay.
In Du Contrat Social, Rousseau formulates his concept of the gen-
eral will, which signifies Rousseau’s closure of politics. He had written 
in favor of a federal Europe six years earlier, but his ‘mature’ political 
thought appears much more hardened than this quite cautious Euro-
pean plea. Referring back to our own analysis of European politics in 
the second chapter, Rousseau is often seen an archetypical proponent 
of input legitimacy277. This is precisely because of the concept of the 
general will, which is a will shared by all and in that sense reflective of 
the will of the people, as input legitimacy requires. However, this very 
same concept makes clear that appeals to the will of the people are per-
ilous in nature; both in its claim to represent the people as a unitary and 
self-enclosed entity and in the implications that can be drawn from the 
people’s support, which is supposed to provide a strong basis for legiti-
macy. Rousseau uses the general will as the fait accompli that allows him 
to forget about the respect he once had for the difficulties of European 
federalization. 
The crucial factor in terms of fixation is that the general will iden-
tifies the common good and is the real will of all, in the sense of their 
well-considered interest. In some situations this must mean that we 
move beyond the realm of empirical wills and real consent: a conclu-
sion explicitly drawn by Rousseau. He moves into the threatening ideal 
space of authoritarian imposition of rule on others for the supposed 
good of those very others.
So that the social pact not be a pointless device, it tacitly includes 
this engagement, which can alone give force to the others—that 
whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to 
do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he 
shall be forced to be free; for such is the condition which, uniting 
277 Scharpf 1999, 16n; Schmidt 2006, 21
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every citizen to the fatherland, protects him from all personal 
dependency, a condition that ensures the control and  work-
ing of the political machine, and alone renders legitimate civil 
engagements, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, 
and subject to the most enormous abuses. (Rousseau 2002, 166)
There are good internal reasons for this authoritarian intervention 
at the heart of Rousseau’s philosophy. Rousseau claimed that doctrines 
like natural law and natural rule functioned in contemporary society 
as tools of abuse and sought an alternative that would carry with it 
the guarantee that sovereignty would not be imposed by one group on 
another, but would instead represent the rule of all by all. This is why 
Rousseau centers on the human will shared by all, the general will, as 
the solution to his problems278. But in making this move from particular 
wills and even the sum of particular wills, which he calls the will of all 
and explicitly differentiates from the general will279, Rousseau marks 
the danger involved in postulating a notion of the common good as 
the finality of politics, in terms of our political cases against ethics. The 
notion that the deviant will be “forced to be free” gives expression to 
the violence inherent in an order that has to suppress a particular kind 
of subjectivity; and not only that, but all of politics. The general will is 
already known to all, and directly available at all times: it is indestruc-
tible, so that even under conditions of complete corruption everyone 
will know was is to be done, even though they will perhaps “elude” this 
insight280. Using the name of the common good, we presuppose the 
existence of the common as something that is readily available and thus 
able to ground the social without remainder281.
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The language of compulsion Rousseau employs in the context of 
discussing the general will suggests that if politics is to be anything 
other than ‘absurd’ and ‘tyrannical’ any deviations from the public good 
need to be forcefully corrected. This means that any concern for partic-
ular wills or private interests as such immediately vanishes as soon as a 
conflict with the general will occurs. The general will is thus posed as 
a moral finality of politics, which depoliticizes the whole political edi-
fice by putting it in its proper place. This is all the more stunning since 
Rousseau's earlier work had set it into motion in a way that will find 
echoes in Carl Schmitt: Rousseau and Schmitt both offer a speculative 
account of human nature rather than an independent derivation. Later 
in the chapter we will see that this is an important strategy for avoiding 
the perils of fixation and depoliticization more generally. In addition, in 
the fifth chapter we will engage an alternative reading of Du Contrat So-
cial by Bonnie Honig that points in almost the opposite direction. Still, 
our present reading has been most influential in terms of the effective 
history of Rousseau’s political thought in general and the concept of the 
general will in particular. 
Kant begins as a straightforward follower of Rousseau, subordinat-
ing politics under universal principle. But whereas Rousseau grew hard-
ened in his later years and fixated politics by employing the concept of 
the general will, Kant’s later work shows an ambiguity that begins to 
move away from fixation. We will therefore consider Kant as a sort of 
halfway house between fixation and friction. Kant’s loosening of fixa-
tion occurs in his work on perpetual peace, where he aspires to a true 
cosmopolitanism beyond the bounds of Europe. 
3.1.2 Kantian moral politics
Nothing could be more natural than to assign Immanuel Kant to the 
category of fixation. His ethics is infamous for being uncompromising, 
with the categorical imperative providing an absolute measure for the 
morality of any action, directing our empirical drives in a direction that 
we should unconditionally follow282. Morality is in turn defined as the 
supreme principle of action, so that there is never a legitimate reason to 
deviate. In most of Kant’s writings, the application of such unwavering 
282 Kant 2010a, 99
 Problema Morale -105-
principles to politics seems rather straightforward. Like Rousseau, Kant 
favors a contractualist theory; like Rousseau, Kant sees the terms of the 
social contract as following from a “general (unified) will”283. His argu-
ment runs very swiftly here: legitimate right [Recht] is tied to law, and 
since a public law that conditions the legitimacy and illegitimacy of the 
acts of all persons is valid for everyone, it is necessarily the will of the 
people in its entirety, so that everyone in fact decides for themselves. For 
“only to oneself can one not commit an injustice”284. Legitimate right 
thus presupposes the form of a public law, which in turn presupposes a 
general will.
Interestingly enough, Kant goes even further than Rousseau in 
making politics independent from any empirical starting point. As we 
have seen in the preceding section, Rousseau politicized human na-
ture by severing the relationship between ‘natural man’ and the ends 
to be achieved in politics: in fact, the nature of man is something to 
be achieved by political means. Rousseau later closes off this space by 
superimposing the general will onto it. Kant likewise abstracts from 
empirical conditions, but already begins to close his fist at the exact 
moment at which he opens it. The difference is that in Kant the general 
will itself directs the contract in completely ahistorical fashion. On his 
analysis, there is no handwritten contract that has been passed down to 
our present age and in that sense obligates us to honor its terms285. This 
is a potentially politicizing move: the absence of a handwritten contract 
means that politics cannot be restricted by any such document. How-
ever, for Kant, this absence is offset by the idea that the contract exists 
in another way and remains binding on all citizens. It exists as a “mere 
idea of reason [bloße Idee der Vernunft]”, which at the same time has 
its practical reality, since as the general will of the people, any political 
principle can be evaluated in terms of its possible correspondence to the 
will of the people286.
We have to take stock of the multiple depoliticizing effects that are 
occurring at the same time. First, we here see the reverse side of the 
abolishment of handwritten contracts, namely the return of enforceable 
terms as ideas of reason. Second, we see that any political principle that 
283 Kant 1977, 143 
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possibly corresponds to the will of the people is thereby deemed legit-
imate, so that a broad spectrum of principles is immediately set at a 
distance from political contestation. We have to add to this that, third, 
Kant specifies that the judgment about possible correspondence is only 
the ruler’s to make287. There is no room for the people to contest any 
decision based on their own happiness or any other motive, since it is 
only legitimate right that has the potential to secure these conditions, 
so that obeying the law remains their duty288. Politics is thus circum-
scribed by principles that constrain it, which provide a broad basis of 
legitimation: and the decision about legitimacy is moreover restricted 
to the ruler alone.
So far, I have explored the extent to which Kant remains rooted in 
Rousseauian schemas. For both Rousseau and Kant, there is a higher- 
level principle which imposes itself on all and in that sense forecloses 
the possibility of politics. This is reflective of Kant’s will to totalizing 
system, or, in another vocabulary, his enthusiasm289. In his writing on 
perpetual peace, however, Kant used an altogether different approach: 
that of irony, which opens a new register not only from the point of view 
of his own philosophy, but for depoliticization critique as a whole.
The first appendix to Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden concerns our mas-
ter problem, one that has the propensity to both feel like an antique 
puzzle and a pressing concern of the present: the supposed tension be-
tween morality and politics. Surprisingly enough, the strength of Kant’s 
foray into this subject is the ambivalent fashion in which the appendix, 
and in fact the whole essay, is constructed. This does not only concern 
its textual contents. Kant makes clear that the title references a Dutch 
inn where ‘Perpetual Peace’ is painted above a graveyard. It is unclear, 
says Kant, whether this concerns the people in general, who never seem 
to tire of wars, or only the philosophers who dream sweet dreams of 
peace290. This sets the tone for the rest of the essay: Kant plays with the 
ambiguity of death being the only perpetual peace available to man, 
and philosophical attempts at establishing such peace leading directly 
to graveyards. Kant is invoking Leibniz, who had commented on Saint-
Pierre’s earlier proposal for perpetual peace, to be achieved through a 
287 ibid, 153
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federalized Europe, by sarcastically remarking that he know of a grave-
yard with Ewige Friede written at the entry gate. Leibniz sarcastically 
proposes an alternative scheme to Saint-Pierre’s: if every sovereign is 
required to deposit an enormous amount of money to be forfeited in 
case of war, peace will be guaranteed for all eternity. Leibniz’s intended 
point is that this is as feasible as Saint-Pierre’s proposal291.
Kant uses the same ironic style in his attempt to vindicate an even 
bolder proposal than that of Saint-Pierre. In order to continue the iro-
nists’ game, Kant deviates from his usual analytic style that is charac-
terized by a “marvelous dryness [glaenzende Trokkenheit]”292. The change 
in writing style is connected to a fundamentally different philosophical 
attitude, which enables Kant to describe the relationship between poli-
tics and morality in a non-reductive way293.
Kant presents us with two approaches to this problem: the way of 
the self-stated ‘practical man’, whom Kant calls the political moralist, 
and the way of the moral politician. These two ‘roles’ are differentiated by 
the approach to politics they favor294. According to the political moral-
ist, politics is a matter of prudential statesmanship [Staatsklugheit], that 
is to say a technical problem [problema technicum] that mostly requires 
knowledge of natural mechanisms295. From this perspective, Kant’s ideal 
of peace is without substance [sachleer] since it is completely impracti-
cable: for one, empirically existing mankind will never be able to con-
strain itself to its demanding terms296. On the contrary, for the moral 
politician politics is a matter of wisdom of state [Staatsweisheit], that 
is to say a moral problem [problema morale]297. Throughout Kant’s cor-
pus, he insists on the distinction between the causal determinism of the 
(‘merely’) empirical world and the domain of freedom and morality. In 
moral-political terms this means: either we force “a morality [ein Moral, 
291 Stråth 2015, 265. Voltaire resorted to a similar reaction to Saint-Pierre:
 “Fortunately we only see a dumb portrait
 Of the abbot [Saint-Pierre] in this room.
 Because, if we had had the original
 We would certainly have heard something foolish.” (cited in ibid.)
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as opposed to die Moral]” into the straightjacket of already established 
political goals, or we make those same goals subservient to morality. 
According to Kant, political moralism entails a reduction of politics to 
technical-prudent statesmanship, which for him entails the denial that 
morality exists at all298.
If we follow Kant’s conceptualization, the political moralist is mir-
rored in the moral politician. Does this suggest that, according to Kant 
and those who like him argue for moral politics, politics as such does 
not exist either, at least as something that is somehow separate from 
the moral domain? For Kant, the problem with the political moralist 
and his technical-prudent statesmanship is that he operates from the 
assumption that only empirical factors are available. If politics is the 
manipulation of causal mechanisms, and ideals are dismissed in advance 
as lacking substance, the way the world really works will impress itself 
on politics and force the latter’s hand completely, leaving no room for 
deviation from what is given. This is of course a species of fixation. If 
starting out from the moral politician were to yield the same results, but 
in reverse, with the categorical nature of moral obligation completely 
determining the course of politics, we would be operating in the very 
same way. It would be a mode of fixation that is not rooted in what is 
given, but in the moral procedures that dominate the realm of empirical 
politics, thereby eliminating what could be regarded as specifically po-
litical. Yet Kant manages to avoid this result, at least to a large extent, by 
insisting on ambivalence.
It would be “absurd” [ungereimt], Kant claims, to “immediately” and 
“impetuously” [mit Ungestüm] make changes to a morally defective con-
stitution before the new one is ready to take its place299. To require this 
kind of immediate shift would be to act contrary to the kind of politics 
that is in accordance [einhellig] with morality: what matters is that the 
maxim of approaching the perfectly moral constitution remains “most 
intimately attended to” by those in power [innigst beiwohne]300. For those 
intent on unmasking Kant as a moral absolutist and an advocate for fix-
ation, this stance on politics is difficult to understand. Should morality 
not rise above empirical matters? Not necessarily: Kant says in general 
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terms that it must be “permitted” [erlaubt] to “delay” [Verzögerung] until 
a “more fitting opportunity” arises301.
Kant consistently allows for such deference to factual circumstanc-
es. This in fact becomes part of the reason why Staatsklugheit has to 
be rejected as a fitting principle of politics: we do not know enough 
to determine whether peaceable conditions would be better served by 
repressing or by liberating the people, and history provides us with con-
tradictory examples302. The principle favored by Kant, Staatsweisheit, is 
far more direct in this sense.
[T]he solution of the second problem, that of political wisdom 
presses itself upon us, as it were; it is clear to everyone and puts 
to shame all affectation. It leads directly to the end, but, remem-
bering prudence [doch mit Erinnerung der Klugheit], it does 
not precipitately hasten to do so by force; rather, it continuously 
approaches it under the conditions offered by favorable circum-
stances. (Kant 2010, 45)
Kant’s ‘moral politics’ is thus not fixated on either of the two do-
mains. It cannot be reduced to empirically directed politics, but at the 
same time it distances itself from purely moral considerations. The sym-
metry between prudential-technical statesmanship and moral wisdom 
of state appears to be broken here. Staatsweisheit properly so called 
comprises both morality and something else, which we could call poli-
tics. On the other hand, the self-avowed ‘man of practice’ is completely 
beholden to empirical politics. However, this difference is itself gener-
ated by a deeper symmetry, which exists between conceiving of politics 
in purely technical terms and conceiving of it as a problema morale. The 
possibilities of the political moralist are in other words only limited 
because he himself had first imposed those limits on politics.
By insisting on the primacy of morality and subsequently relating 
the latter to political reality, Kant shows that to be moral politicians we 
must continually oscillate between morality and politics. But for Kant, 
this is only possible when we take morality as our point of departure. If 
we start out our journey as political moralists, we will never reach the 
shores of morality. Through this oscillation, the necessary and forcing 
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nature of the moral law is put at a distance, in the same way that the 
causal determinism of the empirical domain is not taken to be the final 
word of politics. In this sense, Kant’s first appendix can be read as one 
of the first examples of depoliticization critique of modern times: ‘au-
thentic’ politics cannot be reduced to the implementation of prior laws, 
whether these are causal or moral in nature. Instead, we must always 
chart our course in between the directives and values provided by both 
domains: Kant allows for a literal ambivalence on the intersection of 
morality and politics. Kant’s playful use of his own conceptual appara-
tus (political moralist and moral politician) is ambivalent in the same 
fashion. More precisely put: at the same moment when, in the first ap-
pendix, he turns to matters than cannot be reduced to a single principle, 
Kant’s philosophical prose changes from ‘marvelously dry’ to ambivalent 
and playful.
As we have already considered, depoliticization critique can itself have 
depoliticizing effects when it does not concern itself with ontology. From 
this perspective, Kant is perhaps still too deferential to pre-established 
moral necessities. This is notably the case on a point that Kant has in 
common with Rousseau: his complicated belief in providence. Kant 
cites the “somewhat boastful, but true” phrase fiat iustitia, pereat mundus 
[let there be justice, even if the world should perish]. Kant claims that 
the correct interpretation of this phrase is not “the permission to use 
one’s right with extreme rigor (which would conflict with ethical du-
ty)”303. Such rigor would indeed threaten a complete reduction of poli-
tics to ethics. The phrase should instead be interpreted as “the obligation 
of those in power not to limit or to extend anyone’s right through sym-
pathy or disfavor”304. That is, legal relations conforming to the principle 
of right must be established both within the state and between states; 
and this must be done regardless of what the physical consequences 
will be. Kant adds force to this last claim by saying: “the world will 
by no means perish by a diminution in the number of evil men”. This 
surprising addition runs parallel to Kant’s own preferred translation of 
pereat mundus: “let justice reign, even if all the rascals [Schelme] in the 
world should perish from it”305. The idea that instituting the principle of 
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right has negative consequences for ‘evil men’ and ‘rascals’ is premised on 
Kant’s formulation of providence:
Moral evil has the essential [von seine Natur unabtrennliche] 
property of being opposed to and destructive of its own purposes 
(especially in the relationships between evil men); thus it gives 
place to the moral principle of the good, though only through a 
slow progress. (Kant 2010, 47)
There are thus some fundamental issues that cannot be addressed 
within the Kantian framework: the moral finality of politics points in 
a particular direction, and although a certain leeway is possible, as we 
have seen, politics can only arise on the level of implementation. On 
the conceptual level of the principle of perpetual peace itself, and the 
other principles that Kant derives, such as the importance of individual 
freedom and its compatibility with the freedoms of others, the force 
of reason cannot be resisted and moves with the inexorable force of 
providence306. That element of Kant’s political work makes him into a 
double-edged theorist: because of the very vantage point from which 
he criticizes the depoliticization of his time, he himself becomes guilty 
of a form of depoliticization. This should not take away, however, from 
Kant’s lasting importance in showing that morality need not one-sidedly 
result in depoliticization. Kant’s first appendix shows that morality can 
point us in the other direction, since it can function as part of a politics 
that distances itself from purely technical ‘problem management’. And 
he shows the playfulness and the willingness to oscillate between differ-
ent domains that such distancing requires.
Both Rousseau and Kant take for granted a certain moral horizon; 
whether the general will or the categorical imperative is invoked, that 
horizon itself can never itself be questioned and is accepted as given. In 
Kant’s phrase, it presses itself upon us. After Nietzsche, such givenness 
would no longer be an option. This in turn, and crucially, entails that 
306 compare ibid, 48: “Providence in the course of the world is hereby justified (...) [Die 
Vorsehung im Laufe der Welt ist hiebei gerechtfertigt]”. Kant puts this assertion in the 
mouth of the political moralist, but his problem with the statement seems to be 
mostly that the creation of the world cannot be justified in the same fashion, which 
makes the whole pattern of reasoning appear as a “questionable inference” (ibid). 
But the providential status of the world itself is entirely consistent with Kant’s view 
of slow moral progress in human history.
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there can be no more fixation. We turn to his Genealogy of Morals to see 
what this entails and what Nietzsche puts in its place.
3.1.3 Nietzsche against givenness
Nietzsche’s analysis reveals man as a being that has gradually immersed 
himself in a history of self-transformation; and this history is simulta-
neously the history of responsibility307. In order to become trustworthy 
and own up to promises – in order “to be allowed the making of prom-
ises” – he needs to be able to speak well of himself, to ensure the conti-
nuity of will between present and future. This is considered as a right to 
responsibility by those who have earned it because of the pain involved 
in earning the privilege. Man has to become “calculable, regular [re-
gelmässig], necessary; also to himself ”. This goes against the nature of 
man, which includes an essential forgetfulness. Nietzsche understands 
this as an active capacity of mankind, as it enables one to move forward 
into the future308. In order to become responsible, something has to be 
opposed to this forgetfulness: to put it briefly, pain and torture. “With 
the help of this kind of memory device, one finally came ‘to reason’!”309 
This is specifically connected to Kant’s moral philosophy. 
The whole sphere of obligations and rights (...) has been wa-
tered, like the beginning of everything that is great upon the 
earth, thoroughly and for a long time, with blood. And might 
one add, that this world has fundamentally never really shed 
a certain smell of blood and torture? (even not with the old 
Kant; the categorical imperative reeks of cruelty [Grausam-
keit])” (Nietzsche 2009, 55)
Bad conscience is the malady that results from the fundamental 
change in the history of man: his becoming beholden to society and 
peace. There is now no external enemy or resistance, no possibility for 
action in the sense of the lords of old, whose virtue lay in externaliz-
ing qualities. The old drives, which can no longer discharge themselves 
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towards the outside, turn inward: Nietzsche calls this the interioriza-
tion of man310. “The terrible strongholds, with which stately organisa-
tion has protected itself from the old instincts of freedom – especially 
punishments belong to these strongholds – bring about that all said 
instincts of wild, free, roaming people have turned inward, against the 
man himself.” Nietzsche uses the image of man “pushed into a press-
ing narrowness and regularity of morals”, pursuing himself, gnawing at 
himself like a wild animal in a cage: in short, suffering from himself311. 
Then, unannounced, the undercurrent that has been present throughout 
Nietzsche’s genealogy comes to the fore. Having repeatedly expressed 
his admiration for the artistic creativity and organizing capacity of the 
lords, he now likens the moralists to them, saying that they have the 
same “active power” as the lords, only turned inward: this power express-
es the instinct of freedom or the will to power, it is “rich in future” and 
represents the “great promise” of mankind312.
This affirmation of the moral position is present in part as antic-
ipation of what is to come. Future man, for Nietzsche, is beyond bad 
conscience not only in the sense that, like the lords of old, he does not 
hear a restrictive and self-chastising inner voice, but also because, in 
this respect rather unlike the lords, he is not susceptible to the cunning 
and subtle workings of slave morality. But we can already take action 
and leave ressentiment behind in the present: Nietzsche even produces 
a mock-categorical imperative in order to ‘filter out’ resentment. The 
thought of eternal recurrence provides this filter by providing an “ethical 
perspective” on life313. What does the idea of reliving one’s life have to 
do with ressentiment? If we consider the way Nietzsche ‘thinks’ eternal 
recurrence in The Gay Science, as “the greatest weight” as he puts it, we 
are able to see the point. We are asked to imagine ourselves in the com-
pany of a demonic visitor, who tells us:
“This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have 
to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will 
be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy (...), all in 
the same succession and sequence (...), even this moment and I 
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myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down 
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!” (Nietzsche 
2010, par 341)
The key to understanding the relevance of this scenario is in our re-
sponse to it. “Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth 
and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced 
a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘you are a 
God and I have never heard anything more divine.’”314 These two ways 
of responding correspond to two ways of relating to one’s past: “venge-
ful rage” in the mode of ressentiment, and affirmation315. Nietzsche is 
suggesting that only the tremendous moment would enable us to af-
firm ourselves and our pasts truly. Even if we have never known such a 
moment, eternal recurrence functions as a test and helps us to identify 
whether ressentiment is chaining us to our past and making us its venge-
ful slaves. But this is not all: Bonnie Honig emphasizes the transforma-
tive nature of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche indeed notes that “the ques-
tion in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this again and innumerable 
times again?’ would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight!”316. This 
addresses the function of eternal recurrence as a hypothetical situation 
we can confront ourselves with at all times, but particularly when con-
sidering an action. This is what an ethicist would call the ‘action-guiding’ 
character of eternal recurrence. Again, even if we have never known a 
tremendous moment of the kind Nietzsche has in mind, we can think of 
ourselves as having already performed a certain action and ‘run the test’ 
to see if we should perform it. If the action’s effect would leave us more 
resentful than we are now, we should abstain; if they would help us to 
affirm ourselves and the world, or bring about the elusive tremendous 
moment we should commit to it. Honig sums up the account as follows:
[Eternal recurrence] is a new kind of responsibility, the old one 
wrested from the hands of those who wielded it as a weapon, 
re-covered and turned into an expression of man’s affirmation  
of the world and himself as they are, as pieces of contingency  
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(...) that sometimes become splendid, if momentary, testaments 
to human creativity and power. (Honig 1993, 60-61)
The reference to human creativity signifies the place of eternal re-
currence within a project that is diametrically opposed to the wish to 
make ourselves responsible subjects in the old sense (making ourselves 
calculable, regular, necessary). The moralist is concerned with an image 
of universal man as he should be. That is the realm of the general will 
and the categorical imperative; of universality that dreams of leaving 
the particular behind for good. Responsibility in that sense is the hard-
won, painful achievement of being able to speak well of oneself as a 
moral subject. In the creative sense, however, responsibility signals the 
self-discipline required to “survey all the strengths and weaknesses that 
their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan until 
each appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye”317. 
Responsibility now appears as a process of self-discipline serving in a 
creative project of individual self-fashioning.
For Nietzsche, this idea of responsibility is connected to a ‘Europe-
an’ perspective. Instead of speaking of a federal Europe (Saint-Pierre) or 
a European Volkenbund (Kant), however, Nietzsche focuses on persons: 
good Europeans. In one sense, the good European is a full rejection 
of the “nationalism and race hatred” that Nietzsche sees around him, 
where ‘German’ has come to mean “to be able to take pleasure in the 
scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of 
Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against one another as if it 
were a matter of quarantine (...)[;] petty politics, (...) petty states”318. For 
Nietzsche, this nationalism is ultimately rooted in Christian ideas that 
affect all nations of Europe: the value judgments that have defined the 
various traditions of the continent. But if we truly apply the strictness 
that these values teach us, we can become “good Europeans and heirs to 
Europe’s longest and bravest self-vanquishing319”. Nietzsche describes 
the final step of nihilism as the ability to overcome nihilism itself. As 
we have seen him describe in the Genealogy of Morals, it is ultimately the 
interiorization of man that creates the possibility of going beyond slave 
morality. Similarly, abstract ideals, including abstract ideals of Europe, 
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were historical stages that were required for us to move beyond them. 
That is ultimately why Nietzsche addresses Europe and not the world: 
nihilism remains for him a European experience, but it is no more than 
“a pathological transitional stage (what is pathological is the tremen-
dous generalisation, the inference that there is no meaning at all)”320. 
The counterpoint is that this meaning has passed beyond the idea that 
it needs to be given in some sense, whether by a God or by systematic 
philosophy. Instead, it needs to be created and left open. The present 
European Union, in arguing for a truth that is more fundamental than 
an earlier truth (the era of the nation-state is over, enter the EU), qual-
ifies as “incomplete nihilism” in this sense, still operating in the scheme 
of the “will to truth” that had run through Christian and scientific ways 
of seeing the world321. In our terms, it is a form of localized depolitici-
zation critique.
Going beyond the will to truth of the ‘more real’ European level 
as opposed to the nation-state level entails refraining from postulating 
an ideal European identity that is in some sense ‘more real’ than, for 
instance, national identity. Instead, the highest value of the ‘good Euro-
pean’ shifts from truth to freedom, and the possibilities that lie beyond 
the will to truth are experimental in nature, without any fixed notion of 
Europe at the far end of experimentation: in our terms, without moral 
finality. This lack of an ideal of what counts as ‘good’ is precisely what 
makes for the ‘good European’, on Nietzsche’s view322. In complete ni-
hilism, one goes beyond the loss implied by nihilism and the waning of 
old ideals, into the new dawn of unconstrained possibilities.
Let us take stock of the helpful and unhelpful aspects of Nietzsche’s 
thought for the purposes of depoliticization critique. Nietzsche’s shat-
tering of fixation and his idea of eternal recurrence allows politics to 
emancipate itself from material and normative constraints to political 
decision, because affirming the past is a creative exercise that fits into an 
artistic enterprise of selecting, fitting, interpreting, self-fashioning. His 
views on Europe clearly shows this. There are no ontological mecha-
nisms to make our political decisions for us. We have to do it ourselves: 
and we have to ask ourselves at every point whether the action we are 
about to take reflects the kind of politics we want to be a part of, the 
320 Quoted in Elbe 2003, 93
321 Elbe 2003, 86-87; 90
322 ibid, 90
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kind of society that we want to achieve. As is the case for the individuals 
considered by Nietzsche, full affirmation will probably be reserved for 
the ‘superhuman’ overman. 
A fundamental problem with this approach, at least for our pur-
poses, is that Nietzsche’s reboot of responsibility is necessarily centered 
on the individual: while we can metaphorically apply his categories to 
political contexts, we cannot treat the political as if it were the realm of 
macro-individuals. We will consider this point in more detail when we 
survey the ideas of Max Weber in the context of friction, our second di-
rect relation between ethics and politics. As a second potential problem, 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic approach contains the risk of reducing politics to 
an exercise of artistic self-fashioning, which is antipolitical in that pol-
itics is reduced to following an idea of what is beautiful or otherwise 
aesthetically accomplished323.
3.2 Friction
Nietzsche has shown us how, as ontology and universality retreat, eth-
ics and politics increasingly occupy the foreground. Morality itself is 
revealed as a historical construct with no special claim to ontological 
or normative status. Arguably, this only entails an increase in individual 
responsibility: precisely because there are no given values for us to hold 
on to or to fixate our politics, it becomes of decisive importance for us 
to make our own. Since fixation is no longer an option now that we have 
moved past the givenness of normative and factual constraints, we need 
to look for alternatives.
We have seen how Nietzsche positioned himself in relation to Kant. 
He is also pivotal in understanding the reversal that occurs between 
Kant and Schmitt, since Nietzsche had an enormous influence on 
Schmitt’s teacher Max Weber, as well as influencing Schmitt directly. 
The Nietzschean insistence that values are not given leads both Weber 
and Schmitt to conclude that they are posited. Weber moreover in-
herits the Kantian distinction between the technical and non-technical 
aspects of politics, which he is able to consider without recourse to 
the givenness of a moral horizon. This means that in his Politics as a 
Vocation [Beruf zur Politik], Weber conceptualizes the relation between 
323 cf. Schedler 1997, 4
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ethics and politics without relying on fixation. I will therefore analyze 
Weber as an illustration of friction, the second of my four direct rela-
tions between ethics and politics. Friction revolves around the idea that 
morality is important to politics, but cannot be directly implemented 
(which would take us back to fixation) because political reality is of a 
different kind than the moral universe and thus ‘resists’ moral norms324. 
This means that either ethics or politics will have to be transformed in 
order for politics to become moral: a monumental task that includes the 
risk of fixation if it ever were to be completed.
3.2.1 Friction in Politics as a vocation
Weber’s central notion Beruf is ambivalent, translating as both ‘profes-
sion’ and ‘vocation’. It is used in different ways throughout Weber’s work: 
as the devoted professional [Berufsmensch], as the ‘personality’ [Person-
alität], the charismatic individual, and the ‘genuine politician’ [Beruf-
spolitiker]325. The latter, political, category is closest to our concerns, but 
because the dynamic between rationalization and Beruf is consistent 
throughout Weber’s work the underlying tension between the two can 
be analyzed in a more general sense through this particular avenue. Like 
Nietzsche, Weber attempts a genealogy of modern subjectivity; also like 
Nietzsche, he grants a starring role to ascesis. For both thinkers, this 
ascesis has an initial effect of withdrawing or internalizing, which then, 
quite paradoxically, leads to a transformed outside world. This inter-
nalization can even turn against its own fundamental commitments. 
Nietzsche had analyzed how the spirit of Christianity had persisted 
in modern science, so that it even became necessary to do away with 
the God hypothesis entirely. But the will to truth persists through this 
development and is even apparent in analyses of European politics as 
‘more real’ than the politics of the nation-state. Weber describes a sim-
ilar development of internalizing processes turning on themselves in 
terms of rationalization and disenchantment. His narrative follows the 
puritans’ turn towards ‘good works’ and their subsequent identity as Be-
rufsmensche, as the toil of work in religious devotion became the only 
324 cf. Habermas 2017, 88 who speaks of a reality “resistant” to norms [widerständige 
Realität].
325 Weber 2016, Weber 1985, Weber 2012; cf. Kim 2012
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way to work toward one’s salvation. This meant that ascesis went “from 
the monks’ cells to professional life and began to dominate inner mo-
rality [innerweltlichte Sittlichkeit]”326. This in turn meant that the ascetic 
drive of the puritans helped to construct the technical and economic 
conditions of the ordered society that determines, “with overwhelming 
force”, the lifestyle of all individuals that are born into this machinery327. 
Weber continues:
In Baxter’s [puritan] view the care for external goods should 
only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which 
can be thrown aside at any moment.’ But fate [das Verhängnis] 
decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage328 [ein stahl-
hartes Gehäuse]. (Weber 2016, 171)
External goods, which had first assumed their meaning as interme-
diaries on the way to salvation, thus increasingly came to dominate both 
the internal and external lives of all, in Weber’s analysis. But, and this is 
another similarity to Nietzsche, a certain ‘practice of the self ’ becomes 
both the drive of the main problem – the possibility of meaningful ac-
tion in the context of rationalization – and Weber’s main hope. He con-
sistently points out two directions into which we are pulled, inward or 
outward, at the expense of its opposite: most of us are “sensualists with-
out heart”, “specialists without spirit”, or idealistic “airheads” [Windbeu-
tel]329. All of these are different registers of powerlessness. Weber sees 
an alternative conception, which he uncovers through his genealogy: 
the “unbroken whole” of subjective value and objective rationality330. In 
political terms, this requires a true leader, and even a hero331. The two 
directions into which we are pulled according to Weber are represented 
by what he calls the ethic of conviction [Gesinnungsethik] and the ethic 
of responsibility [Verantwortungsethik]: their unity is the mark of the 
“genuine human being” that can have the “call to politics”332.
326 Weber 2016, 171
327 ibid
328 “casing as hard as steel” is a better translation, but ‘iron cage’ has become the domi-
nant one. Cf. Strong 2007, xxx
329 Kim 2012; Weber 2012, 80
330 Weber 1978, 319
331 Weber 2012, 82-83
332 ibid, 81
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What is it to be called to politics? An important first step is that 
politics presupposes the state, a point that Schmitt will later reverse. 
Weber briefly discusses, but quickly dismisses such “wide” notion of 
politics as are involved in, for instance, the politics of banks and marital 
life333. He instead understands politics as “the governing [Leitung] or 
the influencing of governance of a political community, (...) hence, a 
state”334. This leads him to a definition of the state as “that human com-
munity, which (successfully) claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence within a certain territory (...)”335. Nietzsche’s influence 
can be felt here, since for Weber, legitimacy is an act in the sense that it 
has to be brought about actively; it is not a reflection of a pre-existing 
normative realm336.
Furthermore, Weber harks back to Kant when he differentiates be-
tween the “political official” [Beamte] and the “element of the politician”, 
which is most visible in the “political leader” [Führer]337. The official is 
expected to be “impartial” [unparteiisch] and is involved with “admin-
istration” [verwalten] rather than politics properly so called338. Weber 
elsewhere typifies this kind of administration as involving trained pro-
fessionalism [fachgeschulten Beamtentums], bureaucracy and “purely tech-
nical” factors in the history of state formation339. We here recall Kant’s 
political moralist and the general conception of politics as presenting 
problems of a technical nature. However, for Weber the contrary posi-
tion is not that of the moral politician, at least not as Kant would have 
used that term. For Kant, there was still an overarching moral frame-
work that could be invoked to put politics in its place. Nietzsche has 
cut off direct access to such a framework, however. For that reason, and 
consistently with his equation of legitimacy and the successful claim 
of legitimacy, Weber sees absolute moral principles as belonging to a 
realm that is separate from life itself: Weber’s own time knows only the 
struggles of different such principles among themselves.
 
333 ibid, 5
334 ibid
335 ibid, 6
336 ibid, 7: “ (...) legitimate (that is, seen to be legitimate) (...)”.
337 ibid, 32
338 ibid
339 ibid, 21; 21; 22
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So long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its 
own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods 
with one another. (...) The ultimately possible attitudes toward 
life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be 
brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make a de-
cisive choice. (cited in Wolin 1981, 403)
This so-called ‘warring gods thesis’ is connected to Weber’s view of 
the real politician and the political leader. The political official does his 
task “sine ira et studio – without anger and bias [ohne Zorn und Einge-
nommenheit]”340. However, “partisanship, battle, passion” [Parteinahme, 
Kampf, Leidenschaft] are “the politician’s element”341. Weber himself be-
lieves that both perspectives are important: the complexity of contem-
porary society requires a certain Beamtentum, but Weber rejects gov-
ernance by officials alone [Beamtenherrschaft] on multiple occasions342. 
This means that both perspectives are always in play: politics is simul-
taneously, albeit in different aspects, about technical decision-making 
by trained experts and decisive choices that are put into action by pas-
sionate leaders without being fully covered by underlying criteria. As in 
Nietzsche, it is the act that counts in that latter aspect: in this case, the 
act of decision.
Importantly, this does not mean that the politician should aim for 
indecision, or that he should waver between the mode of the political 
official and that of the leader. The task is always to achieve unity – the 
unbroken whole of subjective value and objective rationality we men-
tioned earlier. How does the politician do this? It is a hard and perhaps 
impossible task, but Weber’s answer involves a combination of the ethic 
of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Involving ethics with pol-
itics carries the risk of playing an “ethically highly fatal role” [sittlich 
höchst fatale Rolle]343. For ‘ethics’ can be employed to seek out a guilty 
party afterwards or to legitimate a certain course of action after the fact, 
selecting particular “grounds” which justify such judgment344. Weber as-
sociates this with “old wives”, “unchivalrousness” [Unritterlichkeit], and, 
most notably, the sanctimonious tendency to pronounce one’s own case 
340 ibid, 32
341 ibid
342 ibid, 33; 57-58
343 Weber 2012, 66
344 ibid
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and oneself as ‘correct’ [pfäffische Rechthaberei]345. The politician should 
not be concerned with this idle game of seeking to justify oneself in the 
past: rather, he should try to bear responsibility for the future346. This 
comes very close to Nietzsche’s critique of ressentiment as vengeful rage 
directed at the past, but Weber advances his critique of ‘moralism’ in 
political rather than psychological terms.
The true relationship between politics and ethics is thus not one of 
grounding or “decreeing”347. This is impossible because it is not the case 
that good actions always lead to good outcomes, and evil actions to evil 
outcomes. According to Weber, the whole structure of theodicy is de-
signed to come to terms with this fact: good actions can lead to evil out-
comes, and evil actions to good outcomes348. The ability to successfully 
grapple with such riddles in concrete situations is the mark of the true 
politician. He has to come to terms both with the aforementioned ethic 
of conviction, which in religious terms says: “the Christ does right and 
the consequences are up to God”, and the ethic of responsibility, which 
emphasizes that one has to reckon with the consequences of one’s ac-
tions349. This implies that any ethical order that attempts to establish 
itself through political means has to reckon with the factual require-
ments that are attached to the ideal. “Bringing forth absolute justice on 
the world” requires a following: the necessary “human machinery”, who 
require certain premiums, whether of this world or of a more spiritual 
kind. This necessity makes the leader fully dependent on the motives of 
his following, as distinct from his own. What the cosmopolitan finally 
achieves, is therefore not in his own hands, all the more since even the 
most devout follower is apt to use the leader’s cause as a cover to legit-
imate baser motives, in the sense outlined above350. This means that in-
volving oneself with politics and the violence it entails – recall Weber’s 
definition of politics – means signing a pact with “devilish powers”351. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty would later call this orientation on value 
which in turn depends on a ‘resistant’ reality the “curse of politics”352. At 
345 ibid, 66-67
346 ibid, 67. This can seem like a rather frivolous attitude towards past wrongdoings.
347 ibid, 73
348 ibid, 73-74
349 ibid, 70-71
350 ibid, 77-78
351 ibid, 78
352 “We have never said that any policy which succeeds is good. We said that in order 
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the same time, it is always possible to find oneself authentically unable 
to act in a certain way for reasons of conviction, regardless of the con-
sequences353. According to Weber, then, we need both conviction and 
responsibility in politics, but it is impossible to say which is more im-
portant, or in which circumstances one should prevail over the other354. 
To have the Beruf for politics is to stand inside of the resulting paradox-
es, and it requires one to reach for the impossible ideals: that in turn, as 
we have seen, requires not only a leader, but also a hero355. This is a high 
bar to set, and it is motivated by the idea that political reality somehow 
resists ethics, even though the latter is important to the former.
This account of ‘resistance’ and the heroism needed to overcome it 
show what is at stake in friction. Ethics and politics come into contact 
with each other, but not in a harmonious way; they collide with each 
other and this collision must result in some kind of impact. Friction in 
my sense requires that politics and ethics are brought into relation with 
each other, and also that through this contact one or both of the terms 
of the relation are transformed in some way. Either ethics changes once 
it is successfully brought into contact with politics (the hero answers 
to a different ethics), or politics changes once it is brought into con-
tact with ethics (the hero is capable of transforming politics). Crucially, 
these changes can only occur if the relation does not end in fixation. 
In other words, if friction is seen as an initial stage to be overcome and 
the transformation of politics and/or ethics achieves a higher ground 
into which both are absorbed, their interrelation ceases to be a relation-
ship. Their becoming one, as we have seen, is a symptom of fixation and 
to be good a policy must succeed. We have never said that success justifies ever-
ything. We said that failure is a fault and in politics one does not have the right to 
make errors and that only success can turn what was at first audacity and faith into 
solid reason. The curse of politics is precisely that it must translate values into the order 
of facts. At the level of action, every desire is as good as foresight and, reciprocally, 
every prognostic is a kind of complicity. A policy therefore cannot be grounded in 
principle, it must also comprehend the facts of the situation” (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 
xxxiv-xxxv, emphasis added).  Merleau-Ponty here prefigures the so-called problem 
of dirty hands, introduced by Michael Walzer (1973), who also discusses Weber as 
one of his predecessors but vehemently rejects Merleau-Ponty.
353 Weber 2012, 81
354 ibid, 80
355 ibid, 78; 82-83. Merleau-Ponty’s later political philosophy distances itself from 
heroism, in part through a historical-philosophical reading of Weber (2016): see 
Flynn (2007).
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hence complete depoliticization. Keeping them separate thus becomes a 
condition of friction as a direct relation between ethics and politics that 
cannot be reduced to fixation. Since the hero’s task is to bridge the gap 
that separates them, we may come to regard him as an agent of fixation; 
or perhaps as a symbol of its impossibility.
While this is perplexing, Weber’s account allows us to continue 
where Kant left off. After all, Kant comes close to friction’s double bind 
in the first appendix. He emphasizes the need of the politician to retain 
the intention to move towards and finally realize perpetual peace, even 
in the face of a reality that resists such attempts. That resistance is not 
a neutral fact: it impacts which reforms can be put in place at which 
time. Kant’s moral politics is thus a version of politics that is intimately 
connected to moral concerns, while at the same time keeping the abso-
lutism of moral theory at a distance. Similarly, political reality cannot 
determine political decisions in a technical sense, while remaining im-
portant in the determination of which moral principles can be made 
into policies. As we know, Kant remains involved in depoliticization 
since the moral goal itself is not subject to contestation. Kant insists on 
the theme of direct availability that also characterizes Rousseau’s gener-
al will. Because morality also has an all-encompassing scope, Kant even 
at his most ambivalent comes close to fixation. To be sure, the incontest-
able nature of the moral principles that are elevated into the position of 
directing politics makes for a form of depoliticization.
Weber presents an advance on Kant’s account by theorizing a trans-
formation of ethics in the face of the specificity of politics. The first 
condition of such a transformation is the idea that the means selected to 
achieve a particular outcome impact the kind of ethics that is applicable 
to that situation. The means specific to politics is power, which is backed 
up by violence. For Weber a position of “indifference” with respect to 
this fact flies in the face of the realities of political ethics: in this sense, 
relying on an ethic of conviction alone is irresponsible356. Weber’s po-
sition is that an orientation towards values is important, but needs to 
take place in the real world and requires the conscription of others, who 
have their own goals and need to be kept at peace in order for their con-
tribution to remain dependable. Striving for peace, for instance, cannot 
be done without involving oneself with political reality in this way – 
and the political element includes the dynamics of power and violence. 
356 ibid, 67-68
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That is why the politician involves himself with devilish powers in his 
very attempt to do good. Politics as a vocation thus involves not only a 
consciousness of ethical paradox, as Weber himself puts it, but also an 
ability to set up camp within it; to make paradox his permanent place 
of residence.
Friction thus teaches us that full justification is very problematic in 
politics. There are objective constraints on many political situations that 
we cannot move beyond, and these constraints lead to moral faults or 
remainders. Politics needs to orient itself to a perspective of value, but 
in doing so it is subject to a realm of facts that lies beyond the control of 
the politician because of its ‘resistant’ nature357.
 Friction also teaches us that evil cannot be exteriorized, in a double 
sense. Action is volatile on both sides of a political dispute, remaining 
at all times at a distance from, but also intimately tied to value: again, 
this is Merleau-Ponty’s curse of politics. By implication, any ethics that 
takes account of friction will thus have to explicitly theorize remainders. 
From this, it follows that most mainstream ethical theories are not up to 
the task: for instance, Kantian and utilitarian ethics consider the right 
thing to do as necessarily fully justified358. For instance, for a utilitarian, 
the remorse one feels may be wholesome in its consequences and in that 
sense ‘a good thing’, but it does not reflect any real fault on the part of 
the acting subject that chose the optimal course of action359.
Therefore, as a second notable implication, friction wards off the 
specter of moralization as described by Mouffe, and thus Schmitt’s fear 
of the notion of the absolute enemy characterized by Unwert. The cor-
don sanitaire of moralization functions as an enclosure, simultaneously 
excluding those who are evil and settling the identity of those with 
clean conscience. But if we take friction seriously, this enclosure is al-
ways already breached and thereby compromised. It also avoids the self- 
justification or Rechthaberei that Weber associates with the predomi-
nant uses of moralism in politics360.
What cannot be avoided in the context of friction, however, is the 
schematic of subjective values as opposed to an objective reality that re-
sists said values. That is why Merleau-Ponty speaks of the curse of pol-
357 cf. Merleau-Ponty 1969, xxxvii-xxxviii: “Does not every action involve us in a game 
which we cannot entirely control? Is there not a sort of evil in collective life?”
358 Walzer 1973, 162
359 ibid, 163
360 Weber 2012, 66-67
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itics, and also why Weber calls for a true leader and a hero to overcome 
the ethical paradoxes inherent in true politics, politics as a vocation. 
There is an air of hopelessness to such almost mythical invocations of 
curses and heroes. We have seen that when the direct relation between 
politics and ethics is one of fixation, politics collapses entirely into the 
factual and/or normative constraints that are imposed on it. In case of 
a normative constraint, there is no distance at all between politics and 
ethics, since the latter has swallowed up the former in its entirety. When 
the direct relation is one of friction, by contrast, the distance between 
them appears too wide. The dualism between subjective values and ob-
jective reality seems to be too starkly posed: that is indeed the substance 
of Carl Schmitt’s criticism of Weber, his erstwhile teacher, to which we 
now turn.
3.2.2 Weber’s nightmare
Schmitt attacks the supposed heroism of true political action, and the 
underlying account of friction as the direct relation between ethics and 
politics, by pointing out that both reinforce the underlying condition of 
the ‘iron cage’. Likewise, the gesture of aestheticism, which as we have 
seen is important to Nietzsche’s critical reboot of responsibility, only 
reinforces a purely subjective and individual focus which in turn allows 
the objective devaluation of human life to go on as planned. Weber’s at-
tentiveness to the ‘curse of politics’ confines itself to the individual con-
science of the political leader361; this is a strongly depoliticizing assump-
tion and shows a problematic aspect of Weber’s reliance on Nietzsche. 
According to Schmitt, the problem lies with the very idea of two oppo-
site poles of modernity: economic-technical thought on the one hand, 
and subjectivism and romanticism on the other hand. Schmitt’s goal is 
to move beyond this duality by way of his specific concept of the politi-
cal362. It is designed to counteract the domination of an objective order, 
which is completely indifferent to life and produces “a silk blouse and 
poison gas” “with the same earnestness and precision”363. A philosophy 
 
361 cf. Walzer 1973, 179
362 McCormick 2005, 31-32; 48-51
363 Schmitt 1996, 14-15; also cited by McCormick 2005, 43
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of merely (inter)subjective ideals cannot counteract this development, 
but instead facilitates and co-produces it.
This resonates well with the analyses I have carried out so far. We 
have encountered a series of central distinctions that involve a notion 
of authentic and inauthentic politics. In Rousseau, the general will is 
opposed to the will of all; in Kant, the political moralist is opposed to 
the moral politician. Nietzsche problematizes the moral foundations of 
both of the preceding philosophies, but participates in the same kind 
of distinction by way of the ‘old’, ressentiment-driven notion of respon-
sibility he rejects and the affirmative, aesthetic notion of responsibility 
that he advances364. In Weber, the real politician with Beruf to politics is 
opposed to both the political official and the naive child or airhead. All 
of these distinctions are normatively charged and their forcefulness re-
lies precisely on the reality of the second term and the as yet unrealized 
or extremely rare nature of the first term. Weber’s case shows this espe-
cially clearly, even though he is far from a systematic moral philosopher: 
his appeal to heroism reads like a sign of despair, a sign that authentic 
politics is almost impossible under present conditions. It is at most an 
ideal to be realized, and one plagued by a curse.
We have seen how in Rousseau and Kant the ideal is ‘given’ and in 
that sense straightforward, though decidedly less so in the latter than in 
the former. Kant already begins to withdraw from the idea that morality 
needs to monopolize politics, but still posits a moral horizon against 
which the moral politician must test himself. Nietzsche breaks up the 
givenness of morality entirely. In so doing, he makes ‘value stances’ 
strictly personal: they are purely subjective acts. This Nietzschean inher-
itance, as indicated above, is what makes Weber’s stance so powerless 
when he turns to politics. Without clearly delineated values of sancti-
moniousness, he is left in the objective world of the iron cage. The ideal 
of the authentic politician seems to have become ethereal and perhaps, 
following Nietzsche, more aesthetic than moral in the traditional sense 
of the term. In the context of his account of the tyranny of values, which 
we have discussed previously, Schmitt calls the worldview of his teacher 
“Weber’s nightmare”:
 
364 This is not in itself a political distinction, but that is part of the Schmittian point 
that follows.
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[T]he individual avoids the absolute value-freedom of sci-
entific positivism and opposes it with his free, that is sub-
jective world-view. The purely subjective freedom of value- 
determination leads, however, to an eternal struggle of values 
and worldviews (...) The old gods rise from their graves and 
fight their old battles once again, but now disenchanted and 
now, as should be added, with new means of struggle which are 
no longer mere weapons but terrifying means of annihilation 
and extermination – dreadful products of value-free science 
and the industrialism and technology that it serves. (...) That 
the old gods have become disenchanted and become merely ac-
cepted values makes the conflict specter-like and the antagonists 
hopelessly polemical. This is the nightmare Max Weber’s depic-
tion presents to us. (Schmitt 2011, 39-40)
The supposedly separate realms of the subjective and the objective 
are thus in truth entangled in two ways: merely subjective philosophy 
facilitates and co-produces objective devaluation of human life, and ob-
jective technology comes to the aid of the resuscitated warring gods, 
now understood as subjective ideals. The way out of this Gordian knot 
is to formulate “a collective standpoint that will not participate in a 
subject/object dualism but will itself be the identical subject-object that 
transcends it philosophically and politically (...)”365. The call for such a 
standpoint is, as we will see later on, answered by Schmitt through his 
notion of the political.
3.3 Isolation and immanence
Schmitt supposes that the political can best be understood as the possi-
bility of antagonism that arises on the interior of life domains. We have 
already considered the concept of the political in general terms in the 
first chapter. It is perhaps natural to suppose that Schmitt shakes off 
entirely the yoke of ethics, and perhaps this was his intention. To do en-
tirely without ethics (and ontology, in some cases) is the goal of what I 
call isolation. This is the third direct relation between politics and ethics. 
At least at first glance, this may be an attractive position to many theo-
365 McCormick 2005, 58
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rists of a post-foundationalist bent. But in terms of depoliticization cri-
tique, isolation is not a promising strategy. It requires that politics and 
ethics exist side-by-side without ever really coming into contact. This 
leaves open two options, of which the first is that politics is grounded in 
some other domain of life. We could call this demoralization: it entails 
the position that politics stands at a distance it does not need to bridge, 
since ethics and politics have nothing to do with one another; but there 
still exists a grounding relationship between politics and a non-political 
(and non-ethical) factor. Any such foundation of politics outside of it-
self is haunted by specters of fixation. Economic determinism, which 
I have been using as an example of fixation, would indeed satisfy the 
requirement that politics should be demoralized. Demoralization in this 
sense thus does not add to our earlier analysis of fixation. Still, it is here 
the expulsion of ethics from politics rather than its inclusion that leads 
to depoliticizing effects. In Andreas Schedler’s terms, we are left with 
either an “instrumental” form of antipolitics, which sees politics as a 
purely technocratic exercise – we have seen Kant and Weber condemn 
this position – or simply an “amoral antipolitics” which seeks to reduce 
politics to rational choice366. For our purposes, these two forms of anti-
politics represent the same dynamic: factual constraints are invoked to 
put politics in its place.
When demoralization in this sense occurs, politics only leaves eth-
ics behind to flee into the arms of other constraining factors. One may 
thus object that ethics should be left behind without substituting in 
something else to take its place. This is a more general form of isola-
tion, which seeks to free politics of any prior commitment. After all, 
the problem with fixation is that the force of the (ontological and/or 
normative) constraint resulting from such commitments limits politics 
in an absolute sense; and the problem with friction is that politics needs 
to struggle with the impossible task of translating values into the order 
of facts. But why should it voluntarily take on this curse?
Leaving all connections behind means that politics cannot be taint-
ed in any way by concerns and distinctions from other domains. Politics 
is its own sphere; it is self-grounding. Yet this still returns us to the idea 
of a ground and hence to a ‘proper place’ of politics367. The more we 
strive to give politics a place of its own, the more we limit politics to this 
366 Schedler 1997, 12-13
367 Chambers 2011, 310; Rancière 2001, para. 25
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proper place and thus undermine its conditions of possibility. A politics 
of proper place is of necessity a pure politics; one sphere among many, 
which does not mix with its neighbours. In other words, it is completely 
depoliticized. As Samuel Chambers convincingly argues from a Ran-
cièrian point of view, the political is precisely that which renders im-
pure368. This requires a starting point of apparent purity – politics, in 
terms of political difference – on which the political can then operate. I 
emphasize that this purity can ever only be apparent. Rancière’s police, 
recall, creates a society that denies its internal difference to itself: purity 
is only attainable for those who neglect this difference. The political is 
that which breaks the spell by rendering impure that which had pre-
sented itself as pure. Crucially, this operation takes place on the interior 
of politics or police: in more Schmittian terms, it is immanent to the 
domains of life from which it springs, to which we may add the impor-
tance of historical context.
A second argument against isolation can be gleaned from Lefort’s 
criticism of Cornelius Castoriadis, more in particular the latter’s cen-
tral concept of auto-institution which is parallel to what I have called 
self-founding. According to Castoriadis, every society is originally the 
result of a radical imaginative act369. However, most societies pass into 
self-alienation and heteronomy by imagining themselves as founded on 
an external cause: for instance, the will of God, nature, necessity, or his-
tory. For societies that wrongly think of themselves as founded upon 
alterity, the experience of alterity within society must result (for instance 
the experience that political institutions have their own logic, which 
cannot be mastered fully from the outside)370. Castoriadis aims to re-
store the truth of auto-institution, and this implies a radical destruction 
of society and its institutions, which have come to be materialized forms 
of the heteronomous lie it tells itself about itself. Lefort counters that 
such auto-institution and -alteration are never quite possible, since they 
presuppose complete control of every aspect of society. Castoriadis’ pro-
posal is thus the unlikely ally of totalitarian extremism in the pursuit of 
a society that is completely transparent and fully identical to itself, and 
that wills itself fully and is conscious of this act of will371. To Lefort, the 
368 Chambers 2011, 310
369 Loose 1997, 79
370 ibid, 80
371 ibid, 81 The language of immanence has been used to describe this fully self-identical 
society (“the completely immanent auto-institutional rendering of the social”, ibid). 
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alterity despised by Castoriadis is always already part of the experience 
of living among institutions that necessarily embody an alterity that 
originates from the ‘flesh [chair] of history’, which also points towards 
an alterity contained in the future that we cannot foresee or control. To 
imagine politics as isolated and self-founding is to think in terms of 
a fixation of society to its own act of radical imagination, which must 
seek – in vain – to erase any aspect of society beyond its control. It is to 
wrongly ignore, in more Schmittian terms, the pre-existing domains of 
life within which the political originates. 
The political thus cannot be pure and isolated. However, it is also 
not something that is given with the initial police order. Put in reverse, 
the political needs to take place at a distance from what pre-exists it, but 
without being completely distant from it. It is caught in between the 
crushing pressure of fixation and the absolute distancing of isolation. 
(Friction conceives of a way out, but only by waiting for a hero in a 
world of cursed politics.) Various authors have diagnosed Schmitt with 
parasitism to indicate the fact that for Schmitt politics ‘grows out of ’ or 
‘ingests itself with’ pre-existing domains of life372. I propose the concept 
of immanence rather than parasitism since the latter suggests an ad-
dition from the outside, whereas the political should be understood as 
arising on the interior of (and in that sense, immanent to) any given or-
der, as the possibility of antagonism. In Chambers’ reading of Rancière, 
the same figure emerges: the political transforms the given,  ‘pure’ order 
of the police by contesting it and rendering it impure, from the inside. 
Schmitt’s account allows for the possibility of antagonism to be part of 
this process of rendering impure the apparent purity of a given order. I 
will later use this notion of possibility to distinguish between two mo-
ments of the political.
3.3.1 Schmitt on the possibility of antagonism
With this in mind, let us reconsider Schmitt’s notion of the political. In 
what follows I will only consider On the Concept of the Political [Zur Be-
griff des Politischen]. There are many voices in Schmitt, as well as refine-
This is not the sense in which I will use ‘immanence’ as the name of the final direct 
relation between politics and ethics. 
372 Shapiro 2003, 107; Arditi 2008, 20-24
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ments of previous positions, but the notion of the political he develops 
in that work provides the most immediate response to the problems I 
have been discussing373. Indeed, Schmitt’s intention to refrain from non- 
participation in subject/object dualism can be invoked as an explanation 
for the way he opens this particular work. In direct reference to Weber, 
the political is freed from its reliance on the ‘prior’ concept of the state374. 
Schmitt in fact reverses this relationship in his opening sentence: “The 
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political”375. The 
political is thus not a property of an objectively existing political entity – 
nor is it, more obviously, an individual inclination. The political instead 
comes to the fore in concrete struggles of the political group, a “fighting 
totality of men”376, with its enemies, unaided at this historical point in 
time by ahistorical values that can be used to adjudicate this conflict. 
There is only the conflict itself377. In that sense, Schmitt’s notion of the 
political is an analysis of “the order of human things”378. That in turn 
means that “the possibility of dying for what one [is]” constitutes the 
“final determining quality of the human”379. For Schmitt, this possibility 
of politics and being truly human is under threat. His attacks on liber-
alism and depoliticization, which are central to his oeuvre as a whole, 
are motivated by his perceived need to respond to that threat, while the 
political itself necessarily remains in play as a possibility. Schmitt, after 
all, insists that human nature is and remains “problematic” and defined 
373 For an overview of the contrasting options Schmitt presents to interpreters, see 
Arditi (2008). The development of Schmitt’s work in the context of Weimar legal 
theory would proceed from very different motives than the ones I am pursuing in 
this investigation. Schmitt insists upon immunizing certain constitutional achie-
vements against any popular initiative and installing an effective ‘protectorat’ in 
various works. This is “hypocritical” posturing that masks Schmitt’s real intentions 
[scheinheilig], the “political aim” of which are “clearly perceptible” (Brunkhorst 2003, 
373). This aspect of Schmitt’s thought can be described as a development of “statu-
ary positivism” which in Schmitt eventually leads to the subordination of institutio-
nal politics to the will of the leader (ibid), which is itself unassailable. In my terms, 
this is a clear species of fixation.
374 Schmitt 2007a, 19-22, esp. note 2
375 ibid, 19
376 Strauss 2007, 112
377 cf. Wolin 1990
378 Schmitt 2007a, 96; Strauss 2007, 99
379 Strong 2007, xvii
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by the drive to conflict380. The political is nothing other than this ‘dan-
gerousness’ at the root of what it means to be human381. 
This makes clear that Schmitt’s discourse on the political is more 
than a dispassionate factual or semantic analysis of the political and the 
conditions that need to be in place for it to obtain. According to Schmitt, 
the political is in a certain sense inescapable, but it is still under threat. 
Depoliticization seeks to cover up the very possibility of antagonism 
by seeking recourse to, for instance, peacefully attained consensus and 
notions of historical progress. In other words, Schmitt’s response is nec-
essarily “more than the recognition of the reality of the political, namely, 
an espousal of the threatened political, an affirmation of the political”382. 
The element of affirmation as distinct from mere theoretical description 
is crucial for our entire investigation. Schmitt’s insistence on affirming 
the political involves him in a type of moral discussion: he wants to 
stake a claim for what it means to be truly human, and this brings with 
it certain commitments. Schmitt in fact insists on this link between 
philosophical anthropology and political theory. There are two classes 
of views, in his eyes: anthropological optimism and pessimism. The first 
implies that man is by nature good, the second that man is by nature 
evil383. For Schmitt, liberalism is essentially implicated in the quest, mo-
tivated by an “undifferentiated optimism of a universal conception of 
man”, for a “good world among good people”, where “only peace, securi-
ty and harmony prevail”384. Once again, this is the Rancièrean ‘indistinct 
point of view’. Pessimism, on the other hand, leaves the undifferentiated 
whole behind and thus leaves open “the concrete possibility of an ene-
my”, “the reality or possibility of the distinction of friend and enemy”385. 
In other words, Schmitt is explicitly committed to a pessimistic notion 
of man in view of his affirmation of the political.
Schmitt, like Rousseau, does not supply a derivation for his anthro-
pological presuppositions in terms of ontology. He rather speaks of “op-
timistic or pessimistic conjectures” and “anthropological confessions of 
380 Schmitt 2007a, 61; Viriasova 2016, 88; Mouffe 1999, 2
381 cf. Strauss 2007, 112
382 Strauss 2007, 112
383 Schmitt 2007, 58
384 ibid, 65. Schmitt adds that this is the “fundamental presupposition of a specific 
political philosophy” (ibid).
385 ibid
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faith”386. This makes a world of difference. For Schmitt, optimism and 
pessimism do not function as an independently deduced ground of the 
political. We instead start with a multiplicity of conjectures, and the 
decision we make in following through with one of them determines 
our ability to recognize the reality of the political. Schmitt himself af-
firms the political by taking sides in the debate: not by deciding the 
“question of the nature of man”387 in a final sense, but by deciding to 
affirm the pessimistic answer to this question. This affirmation can be 
called moral since a certain notion of the political is advanced based 
on a prior commitment to what counts as genuinely human; Strauss 
concludes on this basis that Schmitt is committed to an “affirmation of 
the moral”388. We should add immediately that this commitment itself 
is again politically motivated389. This likely goes beyond Strauss’ own 
intention. I assume Strauss wanted to show the continuity of Schmitt’s 
thought with a certain liberal tradition which he nominally repudiates: 
both liberals and Schmitt, says Strauss, accept a certain picture of the 
good life and make this the basis of politics. I do not follow Strauss 
in this regard. In Schmitt, as we have discussed above, pessimism and 
optimism are not externally imposed on politics as a limiting factor (as 
is the case for the liberal view Strauss has in mind) but are selected as a 
result of taking sides, which is a decision in the truest sense of the word. 
Schmitt’s conception of the political is committed to pessimism, and 
Schmitt’s pessimistic ‘confession of faith’ is itself political.
Approached from the other side, we may say that optimism is inti-
mately connected to a political stance; one that is in fact, paradoxically, 
concerned with denying the reality of the political. Pessimism is in the 
same way involved with affirming the reality of the political. Since af-
firmation of the political goes beyond merely recognizing its reality, it is 
itself a political struggle of affirmers against deniers. We are thus caught 
386 ibid, 57-58
387 ibid, 65
388 cf. Strauss 2007, 117; Strong 2007, xviii
389 “(...) one may say in general that as long as man is well off or willing to put up with 
things, he prefers the illusion of an undisturbed calm and does not endure pessimis-
ts. The political adversaries of a clear political theory [i.e. optimists, the adversaries 
of pessimists, JK] will, therefore, easily refute political phenomena and truths in 
the name of some autonomous discipline as amoral, uneconomical, unscientific and 
above all declare this – and this is politically relevant – a devilry worthy of being 
combated (Schmitt 2007, 65-66, emphasis added)”.
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in a circle – the concept of the political requires a certain position on the 
nature of man, namely as a problematic being, and this ‘problematic’ an-
thropology itself is politically motivated. I here want to emphasize the 
circular feature of this interrelation. The circle is perhaps best described 
as being moral-political in nature: it is moral in the sense that the con-
cept of the political is predicated on a notion of what counts as ‘truly 
human’ and meaningful human existence, and political in the sense 
that this notion itself is consequent to political decision. This circle will 
prove to be of great importance in the fifth chapter, where I will take it 
up for my own purposes. For now, we have ourselves come full circle: 
from Rousseau’s politicization of the nature of man to Schmitt’s politi-
cal insistence on ‘true man’ as a problematic being. While this avoids de-
politicization, it is not clear yet how immanence could be made fruitful 
for political practice. I now consider a kindred attempt by Mouffe along 
agonistic lines, and finding this wanting I shift focus in the next chapter 
to an investigation of indirect relations between politics and ethics. This 
is done with a view to either rivaling immanence or finding an indirect 
relation that can join it in its tasks. 
3.3.2 Mouffe’s agonistic politics for Europe
Following the Schmittian account I have used to illustrate the account 
of immanence above, the political can be separated into two moments. 
The first moment of the political concerns its presence as a possibility, 
namely the possibility of antagonism. We will see in a later chapter 
that this mainly has to do with the formation of a ‘space-against’, using 
Abensour’s term. This would be the conceptual home of an institutional 
framing of the political, in such a way that that the possibility of antag-
onism is not denied but affirmed. Then there is the moment in which 
the political is brought into actuality: antagonism erupts. This is the 
second moment of the political, which is exemplified by Rancière’s ac-
count of politics. In this way, the concept of immanence could allow for 
a connection between some form of institutional politics and the ‘fleet-
ing’ event that sees the political burst through. One influential attempt 
of forging such a connection while insisting on political difference is 
Chantal Mouffe’s formulation of an agonistic politics, which she con-
nects to ‘the future of Europe’.
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Mouffe takes as her point of departure Schmitt’s friend/enemy- 
distinction, but she transforms the enemy into an adversary, so that an-
tagonism is reformed into agonism, which is characterized by what she 
calls conflictual consensus. Indeed, one of her stated goals is to simulta-
neously stress the permanence of negativity or conflict within political 
orders and to prevent these conflicts from taking on an antagonistic 
form390. This means that “the idea of a consensus without exclusion and 
the hope of a perfectly reconciled and harmonious society” must both 
be abandoned391. Yet she thematizes a “necessary moment of closure392” 
because of the importance she places on hegemony. This harks back to 
Laclau’s description of the term (both Mouffe and Laclau adopt it from 
the work of Antonio Gramsci) which I discussed in the first chapter. 
The intended point is that the construction of differential complexes are 
simply the obverse side of the ruptures represented by chains of equiva-
lence: both are equally important. This reflects back on the notion of po-
litical difference, which still recognizes the differentiation between the 
political as the “ontological dimension of antagonism” and politics as 
the “ensemble of practices and institutions whose aim is to organize hu-
man coexistence”393. However, the terms of this difference are entangled 
for Mouffe; on the one hand, politics always operates on the “terrain of 
conflictuality informed by ‘the political’”, and on the other hand, insti-
tutions are needed in order to sublimate conflicts into forms of agonism 
rather than unbridled antagonism394. This entanglement makes it pos-
sible for her to provide ‘an agonistic approach to the future of Europe’.
Mouffe critically notes that addressing the oft-lamented democratic 
deficit (which I analyzed in the second chapter) is made nearly im-
possible because of the difficulties national peoples experience when it 
comes to identifying with transnational modes of politics. According to 
Mouffe, these difficulties are mostly engaged “through the paradigm of 
communicative rationality and a procedural method of legitimation”, 
but she notes that such an approach does not do justice to the affec-
tive dimension of identification395. In addressing this problem, contin-
390 Laclau & Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 2013, xi, xiii; Mouffe 1999, 4-5
391 Mouffe 2013, xi; cf. Mouffe 1999, 4
392 Mouffe 2013, 15, 17
393 ibid, xii
394 ibid, Mouffe 1999, 4-5
395 Mouffe 2013, 46-48; this is of course a reference to Habermas and Rawls, both of 
whom we will discuss in the next chapter.
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ued European integration seems to be something of a fait accompli for 
her, due to its potential to form an alternative to “the neo-liberal world 
model of globalization”396. Indeed, Mouffe asks: “what are the lessons 
to be drawn for the way in which the process of European integration 
should proceed?397” She is interested in proposals which allow for auton-
omy within the system by allowing for a variety of demoi at the center 
of European politics. The goal should not be to replace national political 
centers by a European one, but to proliferate the sites of politics and the 
opportunity for political subjects to engage themselves. An agonistic 
EU would thus “give people the possibility of participating in a variety 
of demoi, where they can exercise their democratic rights without having 
to discard national and regional allegiances”398. In order to realize this 
possibility, popular passions should be mobilized by way of a “politi-
cization of the European project that would allow (...) an adversarial 
confrontation between different ways to engage the nature of the EU 
and its place in the world”399. For this engagement on the part of citi-
zens to take place, a ‘common’ is required; but following Stephen White, 
Mouffe defines this common in political terms as a “web of allegiances 
and conflicts”400.
If we return to Vivian Schmidt’s notion of the regional state, it 
seems that the EU largely meets the requirements of ‘demoi-cracy’401 
already, because of the composite membership structures it enables. 
Likewise, the political ‘common’ Mouffe proposes seems to be largely 
in place. For instance, during the Greek debt crisis a web of allegiances 
became visible among member states in the Northern and Southern 
halves of the Union, respectively; as well as a web of conflicts between 
these two groups. Yet this seems to have done little to correct the per-
ception of the EU as a vehicle of negative integration, which seems very 
difficult “to reform” so that “the only solution that remains is to exit”402. 
396 ibid, 58
397 ibid, 48-49
398 ibid, 54
399 ibid, 55
400 White 2010, 114; Mouffe 2013, 57
401 This term is taken by Mouffe from Kalypso Nicolaidis; see for instance Nicolaidis 
2013, which goes much further than Mouffe, for instance outlining ten ‘guiding 
principles’.
402 Mouffe speaks of this perception in terms of the EU as an “increasingly neo-liberal 
project” (2013, 58): in terms of my analysis from the second chapter, this applies to 
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While it seems clear that the permanent possibility of contesting given 
political orders, which is a central tenet of agonism403, is missing from 
European politics – recall Schmidt’s notion of policy without politics 
– the conditions that Mouffe describes thus seem to be quite close to 
the present reality of the European project; and indeed she identifies 
its present success at keeping antagonism at bay404. Yet as we have seen, 
aspects of depoliticization can be found in many aspects of European 
politics. Thus, it appears we have to go into more detail about the kinds 
of institutions that would be needed to make sure that the possibility 
of antagonism is affirmed405. As Mouffe correctly states, Europe is in 
the midst of what Gramsci calls an organic crisis, where “the old model 
cannot continue but the new one is not yet born”406. In the next chap-
ter, we will consider proposals along procedural lines, formulated in the 
contexts of discourse ethics and political liberalism.
3.4 Direct relations and depoliticization
At the conclusion of our adventure, we thus have to conclude that the 
relationship between ethics and politics has been a conflicted affair ever 
since ontology began to retreat from political philosophy in the modern 
age. There are several routes that could have been travelled. We have 
also seen the relationship between politics and ethics transform. Ethics 
started off as a universality that was imposed onto the particularity of 
politics, leaving no room for the latter. This was true of Rousseau and 
the earlier part of our discussion of Kant. We then saw how in the 
first appendix of Zum Ewigen Frieden, Kant took a different view and 
placed politics and ethics in a more heterogeneous relationship. After 
Nietzsche, it was no longer possible to assume the givenness or even 
the one-sided pressure to negative integration which results from the EU’s need to 
rely on output legitimacy, and which in turn results in liberalization. 
403 cf. Fossen 2008
404 Mouffe 2013, 48
405 Mouffe argues briefly for a “European protectionism” that would go some way to-
wards establishing a new model of development that would be “more respectful of 
the environment” (ibid, 62) and that this would require an unpopular challenge to 
our current consumerist model (ibid, 63-64), but she does not inform us how these 
changes would be accomplished.
406 ibid, 60
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meaningfulness of the universality with which we started and a new in-
dividualized ethics was developed. In Weber, we encountered the notion 
that politics should grapple with ethics in a world where the outcome 
of political action is unknown and may well turn against the politician. 
This rested on a dualism of subject and object that made it very difficult 
for political action to be meaningful. Finally, in Schmitt, we saw that 
for all of his emphasis on the irreducibility of politics to ethics or any 
other domain, Schmitt positioned himself ethically through his formu-
lation of the concept of the political. This positioning, however, is itself 
political in nature. This moral-political circle is made possible by the 
direct relation of immanence, which sees politics as the possibility of 
antagonism ‘from within’ all domains of life.
The end result of this investigation is a number of potential rela-
tionships between politics and ethics that have to be explored further, 
most notably in their relation to a politicized European politics. So far, 
we have only considered direct relations: ones in which ethics is directly 
brought to politics. The four direct relationships that have been under 
consideration thus far are: fixation, separateness, friction, and immanence. 
Let us briefly consider them once more in a systematic rather than his-
torical fashion. 
The first direct relationship we have formulated is that of fixation, 
which is close to affixedness and even asphyxiation. Politics suffocates 
under the infinite weight of ontology, which grounds it without remain-
der. Ethics can play this ontological role, though as we have seen more 
straightforwardly ontological domains, such as economic determinism, 
can function in much the same way.
The second direct relationship is friction. We start out from the idea 
that ethics is politically important and quickly find that it is difficult 
to make this importance count. Political reality somehow narrows our 
range of possibilities, yet crucially without falling prey to fixation. This 
‘somehow’ can be specified in many different ways. We have already 
considered how for Kant choosing the ‘opportune moment’ for moral- 
political reform is an important consideration. Relatedly, Weber is of 
the opinion that ideals of conviction can become powerless in certain 
circumstances. Merleau-Ponty laments the curse of politics; only a We-
berian hero can save us. Here, too, ‘autonomy’ is safeguarded, but the 
gulf between politics and ethics becomes the source of new problems.
The most fundamental alternative to both fixation and friction is 
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isolation. This can be like praying to a Deus absconditus: politics can be 
agnostic about the very reality of ethical principles. Whether ethics rep-
resents something real or not, politics is ‘autonomous’ from it. Politics 
and ethics exist side by side without ever really coming into contact. 
From the perspective of friction, this is a vexing problem; from the per-
spective of isolation, politics is finally free. Its strategy of mutual avoid-
ance is the most fundamental way to go against fixation, which sees 
ontological and/or normative givens completely dominate politics. But 
isolation is committed to assigning politics to a proper place, where it 
can maintain its purity – or, as demoralization, it collapses into fixation 
all the same. In either case, isolation falls prey to depoliticization.
The fourth and final direct relationship is immanence. If it is the 
case that the political is simply an intensified form of human existence, 
as Schmitt claims, then it seems to draw on the categories and distinc-
tions from all other domains. That is in itself compatible with political 
distinctions being sui generis, in some sense. But it also suggests that 
the political is not of an altogether different kind than what we find in 
various domains of life, including ethics. The political ingests whatever 
it finds in its path and thereby energizes itself. In Schmitt’s affirmation 
of the political, an affirmation of the moral is presupposed in the sense 
that the former requires a position on what it means to be truly human. 
It remains to be seen how this concept of immanence relates to more 
procedural political philosophies, and whether it can be fruitfully used 
to analyze a possible politicization of European politics. That will be the 
aim of the fourth and fifth chapters, respectively.
The next chapter is devoted to indirect relations. I call them indirect 
because of the interjection of procedure that ethical positions have to 
go through before they can be admitted into politics. The focus thus 
shifts away from the ethical positions themselves to a large extent, and 
this by itself is often an important commitment for those who cham-
pion a procedural approach, whether in discourse-theoretical or liberal 
terms. The need for an indirect approach would thus seem to depend 
on the impossibility or undesirability of the direct approaches. In fact, 
it is not that simple. What sets the indirect approaches apart from the 
direct ones is not a derivative, but a positive signification: that politics 
in the true sense of the word requires specific procedures to be in place. 
The direct relationship do not necessarily subscribe to this requirement 
and are in that sense more ‘open’ approaches to the relationship be- 
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tween ethics and politics. We consider indirect relations in search of an 
account that comprises both the first and second moment of politics. 
Mouffe’s position counts as an example of this, but as we have seen is 
not the complete story.
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At the end of the previous chapter, we defined a central characteristic of 
indirect relations between politics and ethics. Whereas direct relations 
concern bringing ethics directly to politics, indirect relations breach this 
directness by interposing a procedure. Specific accounts of indirect re-
lations differ in the way they define this procedure. These procedures 
are supposed to confer legitimacy qua procedures. They make it possible 
to accept decisions without worrying about the values on which the 
content of these decisions rests, while remaining agnostic about “the 
ability of these values to function as general principles of decision”407. 
This appears to address the worries we voiced in the previous chapter 
under the heading of fixation. If ethical values, principles and the like 
do not function as an absolute normative constraint, then there is no 
risk of depoliticization on that front. On the other hand, this seems 
to merely displace the problem as the procedure is elevated to the sta-
tus of, in Schedler’s terms, a normative given on the procedural level408. 
However, the idea of procedure as such does not necessarily entail a 
depoliticization of this kind. At the end of the previous chapter, im-
manence emerged as a promising way to account for ethics vis-à-vis 
politics. We briefly considered that from the perspective of immanence, 
407 Luhmann 1983, 31
408 Schedler 1997, 13
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the political can be understood as the possibility of antagonism within 
the various domains of life, while it remains unclear how it should be 
connected to any political program.
Applying Schmitt to my categorization of the political in terms of 
moments, we can say that it is through intensification that the first mo-
ment of the political (the possibility of antagonism) changes into the 
second (its actualization). It is in this intensified form that it appears 
as the political, and it reaches back into its ‘host domains’ (pre-existing 
domains of life) to select its own commitments. These commitments 
may include attachment to a specific procedure. At this point, it is im-
portant to distinguish between commitment to a principle of procedure 
as an independently derived given and such commitment as a matter 
of politics. In the same way that Rousseau’s version of human nature, 
as a conjecture, differs crucially from that of earlier social contract the-
orists, the proceduralism that could attach to an immanence-based ac-
count of ethics and politics will thus be completely different from a rival 
proceduralism rooted in metaphysical principle or some other directly 
available factual or normative constraint. This may seem like a slight 
difference between a complete depoliticization through fixation and the 
only way out thus far: immanence. But the distinction between these 
two forms of proceduralism is rooted in their respective mode of justifi-
cation. It makes an enormous difference whether an outcome is justified 
as logically prior to and absolutely binding on any subsequent political 
decision or is presented as a political argument in favor or against a par-
ticular decision without the space for contestation being closed off. This 
possibility to contest is thus a critical test to any account of procedural-
ism, and it is with this in mind that we will consider indirect relations 
in the present chapter. 
I will consider two accounts of proceduralism: Habermasian dis-
course theory and political liberalism in the tradition of John Rawls. The 
first of these has direct implications for the future of European politics 
and will thus form our point of departure. Habermas has often been 
accused of a liberal shift by thinkers working in the tradition of political 
difference: a shift thought to occur in his seminal work of legal philos-
ophy, Faktizität und Geltung. Rather than working in the traditional 
ways of critical theory, Habermas begins to employ the language of jus-
tification rooted in procedure in his later work. There is a widespread 
tendency, especially among radical commentators, to see Habermas’ 
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adoption of this language as a turn in his overall philosophical work. 
Matthew Specter provides a list of complaints put forward by others: 
the work has been said to mark the end of critical theory, resign itself to 
Western-European parliamentary democracy, and substitute ethics for 
politics409. The latter accusation rings true of many of the attempts to 
ground politics in ethics that we have seen in previous chapters. Slavoj 
Žižek speaks of “Habermasian and Rawlsian ethics” as vestiges of an 
attitude that seeks to “depoliticize politics” by “formulating the clear 
rules to be obeyed so that the agonistic procedure of litigation does 
not explode into politics proper”410. In this formulation, both Habermas 
and Rawls seem close to overcoming the distinction between direct and 
indirect relations between ethics and politics. If politics, in the sense of 
the political, is indeed reduced to a mode of legal scuffling by rules that 
are not themselves the subject of political contestation, then it seems 
not a lot has been gained since Kant’s contractually enforceable ideas of 
reason. This in turn would have severe consequences for Habermas’ pro-
posals for the political reform of Europe, which he explicitly connects to 
his discourse theory411. In other words, the place of discourse theory in 
Habermas’ work, and notably the question whether it substitutes ethics 
for politics, is important to our evaluation of an influential set of views 
on European politics.
But perhaps something is to be gained from a partial shift towards 
liberalism. This is connected to a specific reading of the Rawlsian proj-
ect of political liberalism, which does not concern itself with a strategy 
of metaphysical justification but instead tries to show why those who 
are already committed to basic liberal premises should endorse a partic-
ular view of society412. This kind of political liberalism is thus a political 
wager that does not seek to justify itself ‘all the way down’. As such it 
provides interesting responses to the challenges facing the Habermasian 
project, and is the second procedural project we will consider. Having 
gathered resources from these two kinds of proceduralism, we are then 
in a position to draw preliminary conclusions on the way to conceive 
of the interface between direct and indirect relations and, thus, on the 
possibility of involving ethics in politics while avoiding depoliticization, 
409 Specter 2009, 92; see also Žižek 1999, 28
410 Žižek 1999, 28
411 Habermas 2015, 46-60
412 Rawls 1985; Quong 2011
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and perhaps aiding politicization. This theoretical account will then be 
further developed and put to the test in the next chapter with reference 
to its context of application: namely as a set of proposals for European 
politics. In the same way that the philosophical formulation of depoliti-
cization was tested and further developed by providing a critical account 
of European politics in terms of the aspects of depoliticization with 
which it is involved, the question whether and how ethics can function 
to politicize Europe will be answered through a constructive account of 
its possible politicizations (keeping in mind the earlier critical account).
Of the two accounts of proceduralism we will discuss, Habermasian 
discourse theory is most closely aligned with European politics. In order 
to bring out this connection, we have to first situate discourse theory 
within Habermas’ work as a whole and then connect it to his later plea 
for reform of the European Union.
4.1 Habermasian discourse theory
The most useful approach to Habermas’ theoretical starting point runs 
through the contrast he himself draws between the usage of Kantian 
practical reason as a foundational concept and his own account of com-
municative rationality413. The idea of practical reason introduces a newly 
found focus on the autonomous private individual, which can be super-
seded by other roles, notably the member of civil society, the nation-
al citizen and the world citizen: a possibility that was realized on the 
theoretical level in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, as we also 
saw in the previous chapter414. This kind of normative escalation from 
concerns of individual autonomy to the level of world society, where the 
‘I’ gradually becomes synonymous with the notion of man, is of course 
an indelible part of the political-philosophical tradition of the moderns. 
Since then, as Habermas notes, societies have become so complex that 
such escalations are no longer credible. The options that are open to 
the tradition of practical reason are not attractive. Habermas conceives 
of them in terms of a trilemma: we can, first, either impose teleology 
onto history and then ask it for directions, or, second try to glean some 
413 Habermas 2017, 15-22
414 ibid, 15
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substantive normative positions from “the constitution of mankind”415. 
It seems clear that these first two options cannot provide the kind of 
guidance we should be looking for. The third horn of the trilemma is 
to deny that reason is efficacious at all [Dementis von Vernunft über-
haupt]416. According to Habermas such a denial is simply belied by hu-
man experience.
Habermas’ solution to this impasse is to displace the ascription of 
the exercise of reason from a solitary subject or a stately macro-subject 
to an interlinking of interactions and a structuring of life forms through 
the medium of language. In this sense, Habermas is heir to the social 
contract tradition, which ties the validity of norms and institutional ar-
rangements to the consent they do or would receive in the context of 
certain communicative practices417. The place of Rousseau’s general will 
is taken by practical discourse in Habermas’ argument. We can enter 
into such discourse by stepping out of ordinary action contexts418. The 
medium of discourse is home to a specific form of ‘communicative’ ra-
tionality, with a specific linguistic telos of understanding or agreement 
[Verständigung]419. Unlike practical reason, communicative rationality is 
not the source of norms for action. It does, however, have a normative 
side: communication involves pragmatic presuppositions [Unterstellun-
gen], often of a counterfactual nature, which usually remain implicit in 
language but are explicitly formulated and discussed in discourse420. An 
example of such a presupposition is the claim that utterances are val-
id outside of their particular context [kontextüberschreitenden Geltung-
sanspruch]421. Habermas notes how in this manner the tension between 
idea (perhaps ‘ideal’ would be more accurate) and reality breaks into 
the facticity of forms of life structured by language422. Too much is be-
ing asked of everyday practices of communication, but it is through the 
ability of these practices to transcend themselves that learning processes 
can take place423.
415 ibid, 16-17
416 ibid, 17
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Habermas’ overall strategy is to reconstruct the ‘know-how’ and its 
pragmatic presuppositions contained in every act of communication424. 
Perhaps his central insight, and one that has remained consistent across 
his long and distinguished career425, is the idea that communication is 
anticipatory in nature, in part because, as pointed out above, claims to 
validity are intimately connected to the context within which they are 
formulated, while at the same time pointing above and beyond this 
limited context. Since the telos of communication is understanding or 
agreement, what is anticipated ‘in the limiting case’ is a formal structure 
that is free from constraint in every sense, so that the understanding 
or agreement attained will be the result of the force of the better argu-
ment rather than strategic concerns or faults in communication426. As 
Habermas himself puts it, this ideal speech situation should be under-
stood neither as an “empirical phenomenon” nor as a “mere construct”; 
rather, it is an “unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse”, 
which even if counterfactual or fictitious is operatively effective as an 
“anticipated foundation”427. The practical aim and function of invoking 
the ideal speech situation is to serve as a guide for the institutionaliza-
tion of discourse and as a critical standard against which every actually 
achieved consensus can be measured; in this sense, Habermas accom-
plishes his stated goal of providing moral-practical foundations for crit-
ical theory428. Therefore, in order to name the indirect relation between 
politics and ethics that pervades Habermas’ recent work, I propose to 
use the term anticipation.
Habermas aims to develop a reconstructive theory of society by ap-
plying this overall account of communicative rationality to an interpre-
tation of law as society’s steering capacity through a specialized kind of 
discourse than can relate itself to the equally specialized systemic dis-
courses of power-driven administration and money-driven economics429. 
424 McCarthy 1985, 276
425 Habermas says in his 1963 inaugural lecture in Frankfurt that “the goal of critical 
theory – a form of life free from unnecessary forms of domination in all forms – is 
inherent in the notion of truth: it is anticipated in every act of communication”, 
quoted in ibid, 273; see also ibid, 308.
426 McCarthy 1985, 306
427 Habermas 1975, 258; see also Habermas 2017, 392-394 and Benhabib 1995, 346.
428 McCarthy 1985, 307-309
429 Habermas 2017, 108; see also McCarthy 1985, 276; 288 for an account of the noti-
on of reconstruction in Habermas’ work.
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If law is to have this capacity, it needs to have recourse to both factual 
force [faktischen Zwang] and legitimacy [legitime Geltung] in the sense 
that it must be based on intersubjectively recognized claims to norma-
tive validity430. What law steers towards is the formulation (in this same 
double sense of its factual and normative dimensions) of norms that will 
enable social integration431. Law is needed to formulate these norms 
because the conditions of social integration through what Habermas 
calls the lifeworld, if left to themselves, are no longer unproblematically 
available in modern societies. The lifeworld operates in the background 
of communicative action “in the mode of an unmediated certainty, from 
which we live and speak without distance”432. But with the widening of 
ethnocentrically limited perspectives, the pluralization of life forms and 
the individualization of life histories, the familiarity of the lifeworld 
increasingly dwindles. This raises the problem of the normative validity 
of social order in modern societies, which is then addressed through the 
efficacy of law433. For Habermas, it is not the case that law is an “image” 
of morality in the Platonic sense; rather, general norms of action branch 
out into moral and juridical rules, which can thus be governed by a 
discourse principle:
Only those action norms are valid to which all those possibly af-
fected could agree as participants in rational discourses (Haber-
mas 2017, 138).
As Habermas specifies, this principle “makes explicit the meaning 
of impartiality within the context of practical statements [Urteile]”434. In 
other words, the real consensus that is the aim of any act of communi-
cation can be attained in moral and juridical contexts through a faithful 
adoption of the ideal of impartiality, which finds expression in the dis-
course principle. This means that laws and moral norms must both be 
justifiable in terms of this principle435. On this basis, Habermas goes on 
to reconstruct a “system of rights” that shows the entanglement [Ver-
430 Habermas 2017, 44-45
431 ibid, 45
432 ibid, 38
433 ibid, 42
434 ibid, 138
435 cf. Chambers 2009, 235-238
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schränkung] of individual rights, democracy and the legal form itself436. 
He ends up with familiar institutions such as human rights, the rule of 
law and the separation of powers. It is sufficient for us to discuss the 
underlying discourse theory and the principle that is used to critically 
inspect instances of consensus that have crystallized into aspects of a 
given society, whether from a moral or juridical perspective.
An important addition is that Habermas’ is not seeking an end of 
politics through the achievement of some philosophical goal. He warns 
against the conflation of the “design [Entwurf] of a concrete form of life” 
on the one hand, and a “project” [Projekt] on the other437. He is thus not 
in the business of spelling out institutional arrangements of the ‘ideal 
society’, but involved in an attempt to articulate the conditions under 
which such an ideal could be formulated by those involved, so that the 
ideals themselves are sublimated into discursive procedure438. Similarly, 
legal norms as articulated in constitutions should not be seen as finished 
structures, but as a “delicate and sensible – above all fallible and revis-
able – enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew 
in changing circumstances (...)”439. What is more, the notion of consent 
or agreement [Verständigung] itself is not understood as an end goal or 
as a reified presence that politics needs only to tap into, but as a process 
for the cooperative generation of validity440. 
We thus end up with a dynamism inherent in the project of law-
making and consensus formation guided by (or at least reconstructable 
through) discourse theory. Habermas has emphasized throughout that 
the system of rights has recourse to and presupposes an administrative 
power structure with the ability to punish, organize and perform ex-
ecutive functions441. Such a structure cannot be self-perpetuating or it 
would lose touch with the public sphere that is supposed to invigorate 
democratic politics. Habermas’ solution is to differentiate between ad-
ministrative power and communicative power [kommunikative Macht], 
where law is the medium through which communicative power is con - 
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verted into administrative power and the former is the only allowed 
avenue for regenerating the latter442.
In my analysis, the notion of communicative power represents an 
important possibility to break free from a given legal order. It harks back 
to Arendt’s definition of power of the ability to act in concert443. If that 
is so, power does not belong to the individual. Habermas concludes that 
on this understanding of the power of groups, communicative power 
should be understood as a law-making [rechtsetzende] capacity, name-
ly as the potential of a common motivational will that can authorize 
or resist. According to Habermas, it “emerges in its purest form when 
revolutionaries seize the power of the streets; when a (...) population 
opposes tanks with its bare hands; when convinced minorities contest 
the legitimacy of existing laws and practice civil disobedience; when in 
protest movements the pure ‘lust for action’ surfaces”444. This seemingly 
comes close to a Rancièrean notion of politics, but there is a limiting 
condition: even the potentially explosive force of communicative power 
is made subservient to the conditions of real consensus. “[It] can only 
form in a non-deformed public sphere and can only emerge from an 
undamaged intersubjectivity and non-distorted communication”445.
In summary, norms and laws, wherever they appear, are necessar-
ily subject to an ongoing and open-ended normative conversation446. 
This conversation models itself on, and is revisably justified by, the ide-
al speech situation that is anticipated in every act of communication 
which answers to a purely communicative rationality and is thus devoid 
of social pressures and other asymmetries. On the societal level, ad-
ministrative power is regenerated or criticized by communicative power, 
which is likewise beholden to requirements of ‘pure’ communication. 
This represents Habermas’ discourse-theoretical conception of law and 
the democratic state, developed in the eighties and nineties and centered 
on the nation-state. In more recent times, Habermas has devoted himself 
“for obvious political reasons” to the process of European unification447.
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4.2 The EU and transnationalized discourse
In his 2012 contribution to the ‘Forum Europa’ organized by the As-
sociation of German Jurists, Habermas advances three basic arguments 
for ‘more Europe’. First, the opportunity for Germany to cultivate a 
liberal self-understanding, which according to Habermas it “was able 
to develop for the first time (...) [b]y embedding itself in Europe”448. 
The “old West Germany” is held up as an example of how to practice a 
“‘Germany in Europe’”449. Second, in present circumstances the balance 
between politics and the market has shifted beyond the ingenuity with 
which they were combined in the constitutional state, where markets 
provided “the guarantee of equal subjective freedoms” and politics pro-
vided “equal opportunities to participate in the process through which 
society exercises collective influence over itself ”, so that the “two media 
can enhance each other’s effectiveness” in securing freedom450. Haber-
mas sees a dual development wherein politics is self-subjugating to the 
market, while at the same time “systemic mechanisms are increasingly 
escaping the intentional influence of democratically enacted law”451. He 
adds immediately that “[t]his trend can be reversed, if at all, only by 
recovering the scope for political action at the European level”452. Third, 
Habermas believes that “existing and growing structural imbalances” 
within the Eurozone also call for “transferring further national sover-
eignty rights to the European level”, since at current the conditions for 
Europe’s single currency (the Euro) to function are not present453. This 
final reason can easily be reversed and turned into a Euro-sceptical ar-
gument, and is contingent upon prior acceptance of the single currency. 
However, the first two reasons are more deeply embedded in Habermas’ 
work in multiple ways and thus bear some elaboration.
The first reason may read like an argument peculiar to Germany’s 
position within the EU. However, it bears on his more general notion 
that the “decisionistic substance of the power involved in the exercise 
of political authority” decreases first with the rise of constitutional state, 
whose “major historical achievement was how it contained despotism”, 
448 ibid, 80
449 ibid
450 ibid, 81
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and second how it is being broken down further “in the crucible of 
the communicative currents of transnational negotiations and discours-
es454”. Addressing this idea of containing despotism through a domesti-
cation of decisionism requires an account of the relation between deci-
sion and deliberation: I will develop such an account in the next chapter. 
For now, it is notable that Habermas sees the development from pre- 
constitutional to constitutional and finally transnational state in terms 
of a continuous quest to transform the substance of political power away 
from decision, and that the loss of “functional autonomy” of individual 
states is pressing them into cooperation that further domesticates the 
violent tendencies of politics455.
Habermas’ second reason is likewise about containment, this time 
not of despotic rulers but of despotic markets. Habermas believes the 
present EU represents a further power increase markets at the cost of 
politics rather than a political counter to markets. He sees a pragmatic 
incrementalism at work that responds to market changes with targeted 
policies, without an overall vision in place about the direction of the 
political union. These moves and shifts are made by technocratic means, 
while democratization – which Habermas insists is urgent – is deferred 
towards an indefinite future456. According to Habermas, this potentially 
makes member states “even more meekly prey to the imperatives of the 
market”457. This pragmatic incrementalism is coupled with a “strong, but 
free-floating executive”, an example of which is the “executive feder-
alism” that allows European authorities to impose their political will 
onto member states ‘informally’, with the threat of punishing them via 
economic sanctions if they do not comply458. The political problem rep-
resented by such institutional skews is the “danger of the gap between a 
consolidation of regulatory competences, on the one hand, and the need 
to legitimize these increased powers in a democratic manner, on the 
other, becoming still larger”459. This returns us to Habermas’ criticism of 
the EU that I discussed in the second chapter: centrally, the idea that 
the form of law, as contained in the Treaties for example, is not sufficient 
to generate the substance of law, which for Habermas depends, as we can 
454 ibid, 52; 52; 55
455 ibid, 54-55; cf. Habermas 2012, 10
456 Habermas 2015, 9-12
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add after our analysis of Faktizität und Geltung, on both factual force 
and legitimacy. We also know that legitimacy has to be understood in 
terms of the discourse principle. Habermas’ critique can thus be stated 
in terms of the incompatibility of the EU’s political practice with the 
normative requirements imposed by communicative rationality.
According to Habermas, controlling the market, so that systemic 
mechanisms function at the mercy of the lifeworld rather than the other 
way around, can no longer take place at the national level. He speaks of 
“the abject spectacle of a capitalistic world society fragmented along na-
tional lines”460. Habermas refers to the increasing entanglement of states 
in “systemic relationships that permeate national borders”461.
Above all, globalized markets make use of accelerated digital 
communication to create ever denser networks and bring these 
collective actors into completely new kinds of dependencies. In 
view of the politically undesirable side effects of systemic inte-
gration, there is a need for steering that single nation-states are 
increasingly unable to meet. (Habermas 2015, 30)
Habermas’ proposed solution starts with the metaphor of the 
‘two-chamber system’ that arose within the nation-state, and specifically 
within the political system of the federal United States. Here, a “histor-
ical threshold” was crossed with the aim of integrating not just govern-
ments, but the participating ‘peoples’ as well462. Through the establish-
ment of the Senate, combined with the federal capacities of the citizens 
of the United States as such, the equality of states and the equality of 
citizens were brought into harmony463. This is also how Habermas con-
ceives of supranational democracy in Europe, through counterfactual 
means. We must imagine such a democratically developed European 
Union “as if it had been developed by a double sovereign (...) [,] com-
posed of the entire citizenry of Europe, on the one hand, and of the 
peoples of Europe, on the other”464. Citizens and peoples are here con-
ceived as a double constitution-framing subject.
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The assumptions that inform this thought experiment include the idea 
that the European citizen “[has] good reason to pursue” both a trans-
nationalization of democracy, so that politics can assume its ‘shaping’ 
function in a manner that is both effective and legitimate, and an agen-
da that reserves an important role for the nation-state as “[guarantor] 
of the achieved level of justice and freedom”465. There is thus a definite role 
for both the European and the national ‘aspect’ of the double sovereign: 
the sovereign needs to take a ‘European shape’ but this shape is “limited 
by the obligation to conserve (...) what citizens claim as the emanci-
patory achievements of their respective national democracies”466. This 
also means that Habermas’ construction of the double sovereign shifts 
between two levels of discussion. On the one hand, he refers to the 
level of the ‘well-considered interests’ of citizens (which echoes Rous-
seau’s general will) in the form of the good reasons they have to favour 
transnationalization. On the other hand, the level of their particular 
wills (multiple ‘wills of all’) is likewise relevant in the form of claims to 
nation-state achievements that citizens factually advance.
This proposal gives Habermas the means to consistently side with 
the institutionalization of communicative rationality through adequate 
procedure. In his view, on the European level this means counteracting 
despotism-through-decionism and the colonization of the lifeworld by 
market forces. Habermas believes that the nation-state does not have 
the steering capacity required to adequately control market forces, and 
that the nation-state on its own, though its leadership is constitutionally 
bound, still leaves unwanted space for violence. The solution to these 
two problems, of course, must be an intense cooperation between states 
that addresses both the political response to market pressures and a way 
to further civilize politics. Habermas has repeatedly stressed the need to 
pursue coordination at the continental level467, and the European Union 
is to his mind a promising attempt at such coordination, although as we 
have seen it is at present plagued by pragmatic incrementalism.
We have used the one-sided reliance on negative integration 
through juridical means as an explanation for the political direction of 
present European politics: a reliance which is in turn predicted by a 
further reliance on output legitimacy. In my interpretation, Habermas’ 
465 ibid
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figure of the double sovereign is meant as a perspective from which 
input legitimacy can consistently be applied on the European level, to 
be used for reform of the Treaties. Habermas deduces a number of par-
ticular reforms: for instance, the European Parliament should be able 
to propose legislative initiatives, and the European Commission would 
have to answer to both the Parliament and the European Council: such 
measures would introduce a “symmetrical participation of both ‘cham-
bers’” and their “symmetrical status (...) with respect to the executive 
branch”468. For Habermas, this is the “obvious” response to the ques-
tion which reforms are necessary to eliminate the legitimation deficit 
in European politics from the perspective of the double sovereign469. 
Habermas asserts elsewhere that the idea of the double sovereign leaves 
“considerable leeway for the concrete design of the state bodies and of 
the separation of powers at the European level”470. However, this leeway 
should not be taken too broadly, as the arguments in favor of a particu-
lar design would be advanced “under the normative aspect of an at once 
democratic and workable supranational [European] polity471”.
Habermas thus uses the European nation-states (and their citizens 
qua national citizens) as a kind of vaulting pole: he needs them in or-
der to jump into the great beyond of a truly European politics. Yet this 
leaves Habermas in a conundrum. He himself insists that European 
politics is “of a different caliber”, so that it cannot copy the legitimation 
process of national (federal) states472. While Habermas certainly shows 
us many respects in which the reformed EU would function differently 
to ‘regular’ states, the transition from the national to the European level 
is taken merely as a further abstractive step in a development already 
begun by the onset of the nation-state itself: from local or dynastic con-
cerns, we have already gotten to the national level and must now take 
the next step in the learning process473. This suggests a kind of transh-
istorical continuity, which smooths over the idea of structural transfor-
mation from Habermas’ earlier work474.
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More specifically, the discursive framework that Habermas develops to 
maturity in Faktizität und Geltung, while it seemingly takes a normative 
approach at the cost of its involvement with socio-economic and legal 
developments475, is actually rooted in the German legal tradition. This 
tradition engages both with the Weimar republic – which traces Haber-
mas’ own development, but can also be seen as a way of cultivating and 
safeguarding the aforementioned German liberal self-understanding 
– and the Bonn republic476. In the process of German unification, 
Habermas was an active proponent of an integration of the two exist-
ing, East and West German, constitutions. In the end, the West Ger-
man constitution was applied in full to the newly formed Bundesre-
publik Deutschlands. Habermas was dismayed at this development and 
polemically described it as a form of Anschluss, referring to the German 
annexation of Austria in 1938477. His concern was that the existing po-
litical culture of East Germany would be bulldozed out of existence, so 
that the constitution would not have the proper will formation behind 
it. Habermas thus wanted to accord East Germany its proper weight, 
but at the same time was wary of its illiberal impulses. According to 
Matthew Specter, this is the historical context for the tension between 
liberal and republican aspects that Habermas makes productive in Fak-
tizität und Geltung478. The same tension is reflected in Habermas’ double 
sovereign in his European writings. There is both the need to safeguard 
concrete political culture and the need to go ahead and unify because 
that is the outcome of normative deliberations. As Habermas puts it, in 
regretful tones: “Unification hasn’t [yet] been understood as a norma-
tively willed act of the citizens of both states, who (...) decided upon a 
common civil union”479. This is the historical situation that informs the 
discourse principle. But this seems to pose problems for Habermas’ pro-
posal for Europe. Can we apply the framework of German unification 
to European integration – are member states simply so many East and 
West Germanies? This would mean that the EU can acquire its political 
shape as if it were simply a federal national state; something that we 
have already seen Habermas deny. This is where his continuity thesis 
becomes problematic.
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We are only now in a position to evaluate Habermas’ European 
writings from the perspective of depoliticization critique. He admirably 
emphasizes the open-endedness of the political process in many ways, 
where he might have been satisfied with postulating an end goal or a 
reified condition that simply justifies current developments. First, we 
have discussed Habermas’ political-philosophical goal as the elabora-
tion of a project rather than the production of a concrete design. Sec-
ond, consensus [Verständigung] is not pursued as an end goal in terms of 
which everything as justified, but as a processual and gradual accrual of 
justification; and consensus already achieved remains open to criticism 
and revision. Third, we have seen how highly Habermas speaks of the 
exercise of communicative power, either in support or in rejection of a 
given legal order. Fourth, there is no conclusive story to be told about 
the concrete design of European institutions or the separation of pow-
ers. It may be said in response that Habermas accepts a version of the 
ontological argument that claims the nation-state is simply no longer 
a viable model, so that Europe becomes an unavoidable next step. But 
we should note that Habermas is not trying to justify any given political 
design on the political level, and that his commitment to supranational 
politics has a further argument behind it. Fifth, the ground Habermas 
invokes, in the form of the ideal speech situation as it arises out of the 
presuppositions that govern language, is an anticipated ground rather 
than a material (moral) given. But this is also where the main problem 
with Habermas’ position comes more clearly into view. 
The discourse principle and the double sovereign both fit into a 
continuum of processual consensus, which, although it is not closed 
off with respect to its content, always already takes on an anticipatory 
posture. That is to say that there is at every moment a directionality in 
play. It falls to law to bring order to politics, and while the letter of the 
law is subject to changing circumstances and revisions, the law itself 
continually needs to transcend its own context – this is simply an echo 
of Habermas’ analysis of validity claims that are inherent in every act 
of communication. Every such act in a way brings forth the moment 
of supranational political order: act and order relate to one another as 
micro- and macrocosm that are both expressive of the communicative 
rationality that underlies them. The filtering out of arbitrary power in-
fluences in speech is an obvious consequence of the figure of the ideal 
speech situation. Arbitrary power in the political sense likewise has to 
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travel through the discursive filter, and because of the structure of the 
ideal speech situation has to give way to a proceduralized two-chamber 
system; first in the nation-state and then in the EU. In this sense, there 
is no difference between German unification and European integration. 
Both are a discursive step forward, and Habermas sketches in relative 
detail the conditions that would be needed to make them reflective of 
that which had already anticipated them and will continue to regulate 
them: the discourse principle. He says of a world state that it is “unlikely” 
and “a global welfare regime seems a rapturous, if not bizarre idea”480. Yet 
if we stick to the transhistorical logic that Habermas applies to get us 
from the national (federal) state to the EU, which as we know is mere-
ly a second abstraction after the nation-state had already abstracted 
from dynastic and local affairs, there is no reason why it should not be 
brought about. We can imagine a higher-tier double sovereign com-
posed of the peoples of the world (divided according to continent) and 
the citizens of the world. Would this not entail a further containment of 
both decisionistic politics and unfettered markets? Habermas does not 
accept this conclusion, as is clear from his pronouncements on the ‘quite 
bizarre’ idea of a world state. But this seems to require an appeal to a 
qualitative difference between world politics and continental politics. 
However, any such appeal to the effect that the former is of a ‘different 
caliber’ should surely also apply to the transition from national politics 
to continental (European) politics. Habermas does require us to take 
seriously the innovations of European politics, but does not fully draw 
the conclusion that European politics itself is fundamentally new.
Habermas’ account can thus not bring us all the way towards a newly 
politicized Europe. His conception of the goals of political philosophy, 
the processual account of consensus and his account of communicative 
power in relation to administrative power under the roof of a dynamic 
conception of law are all modes of politicization. But this is counteract-
ed by the continuity clause that stretches all the way from a particular 
act of communication to a supranational European polity based on a 
two-chamber system, in the shape of a directionality that can be called 
a ‘processual normative given’481. We started our discussion of Habermas 
480 Cited by McCormick 2007, 190; 192
481 This terminology refers back to Schedler 1997, who we have already used to diffe-
rentiate between different kinds of givens. Schedler himself does not use this parti-
cular term in this way, nor does he use it as part of a critical analysis of Habermas.
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with the idea of the normative escalation he had left behind, namely 
that which led from the individual ‘I’ to the identification with human-
kind as such through practical reason. Here we arrive at a structurally 
similar conclusion: Habermas’ own work is characterized by a normative 
escalation from individual acts of speech to the integration of Europe 
as a whole through communicative reason. This compromises the extent 
to which Habermas is able to affirm the possibility of antagonism at 
all, that is to say, at any level of analysis. In this sense, Žižek’s allegation 
that processes of litigation are used to forestall explosions into politics 
proper is justified. All the openings we have discussed above seem to 
be part of a greater, well-ordered whole which had always already been 
anticipated. Conflict, and political decision in the sense Weber required 
of political leaders, is reduced to occurrences that in some way fall short 
of an ideal.
Reflecting on Habermas in terms of the relation between ethics and 
politics, we can distinguish between an ethic of design, which derives 
from ethics the tools to derive a concrete political order, and a project 
ethic, which uses ethics in order to determine the direction of politics in 
an open-ended fashion. It should be clear that Habermas’ discourse the-
ory gives us a project ethic. An ethic of design would be a species of fix-
ation and hence depoliticization, since there is no room to deviate from 
the concrete political design that follows from given ethical first prin-
ciples. Said principles thus operate as an absolute normative constraint. 
We can say of project ethics that it no longer deals in first principles that 
decide politics from the outset; rather, it operates on the basis of ‘final 
principles’ that reflect the conditions of a fully legitimate procedure; one 
that in Habermas is in most cases impossible to reach, but still, as we 
know, anticipated. These final principles do not fixate the politics that 
are said to follow from an ethic of design (so that ethics and politics can 
really no longer be distinguished, which marks the disappearance of the 
political qua political). However, their guiding role cannot be denied. 
Politics is necessarily expressive of the operative effectiveness of its fi-
nal principles, and in that sense a path is marked out for it in advance. 
This means that anticipation as an indirect relation between politics and 
ethics has many virtues, but also necessarily involves depoliticization482. 
482 We might say that it is a form of localized depoliticization critique, which points 
out some of the shortcomings of an ethic of design but ultimately puts a project 
ethics in its place.
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Yet this is not all that we can learn from procedural approaches. 
On the intuition of most who are concerned about depoliticization, the 
works of Rawls are either a hunting ground for positions to criticize or 
a place to avoid entirely. In the next section, I try to show what is lost 
in such a negative approach by showing the politicizing potentials of 
political liberalism, mostly through the lens of an updated version of the 
project by Jonathan Quong.
4.3 Political liberalism
In order to understand why Rawls is usually treated in a one-sidedly 
negative way, we can follow Bonnie Honig’s reading. In the first chapter 
we referenced her notion of resistibility (traced by Honig to the work 
of Arendt), and it is from this perspective that Honig criticizes Rawls. 
According to her, Rawls stifles political conflicts by erasing undecidable 
and tragic situations from his account of justice in the context of devel-
oping a “critical lever or standard” that can be used to evaluate existing 
institutional arrangements483. We can see that in comparison to Haber-
mas, the focus has shifted from consensus and legal orders to justice and 
institutions. For Rawls, justice pertains to the “basic structure” of society 
and is involved in the distribution of primary goods484. The latter are not 
limited to resources in the narrow sense, but also comprise immaterial 
aspects of life such as freedoms and rights485. Like Habermas, Rawls 
seeks to approach his particular problem – for Rawls, the problem of 
distribution – through the ideal of impartiality. Rawls does not seek this 
ideal in the presuppositions of language, but in the design of society it-
self. The importance that is attached to impartiality explains why Rawls 
summarizes his own project as justice as fairness. The counterpart of 
the ideal speech situation is the so-called original position. This is the 
perspective that Rawls uses as a “representative device” in order to ad-
vance two principles of justice that should follow from the adoption of 
an impartial position486. The first principle concerns the distribution of 
basic goods in such a way that they are maximized, while the freedoms 
483 Honig 1993, 126-127
484 Quong 2011, 128-129; Rawls 1996, 178-180
485 Rawls 1999, 54
486 Rawls 1985, 258
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of one are not limited by the freedoms of another487. This is connected to 
the broader liberal idea of the priority of the right over the good, which 
states that a given society should not be governed by substantial moral 
principles but instead should be concerned with allowing each citizen of 
that society the opportunity to formulate and practice his own concep-
tion of the good life, so long as the version of the good life that is selected 
is compatible with the limits drawn by justice as fairness488. The second 
principle describes conditions under which inequalities can be allowed. 
 A lot depends on how we choose to interpret the original posi-
tion. Honig states that over the course of A Theory of Justice, Rawls “be-
comes more and more beholden to its ideal”489. But in the years after 
its publication, as Habermas notes in his own commentary on Rawls, 
the argument for justice shifted from an almost universalist project to 
a more humble claim to spell out a coherent liberal project specific to a 
particular culture and time period490. Habermas characteristically finds 
this an unattractive dilemma. It is certainly possible to view the original 
position as a reified and “monological” perspective on the idea of justice, 
which in contrast to Habermas does not take the views of all those 
potentially affected into consideration but merely operates to maximize 
the socio-economic position of a non-distinct individual under condi-
tions imposed by the “veil of ignorance”491. Then it would be a variety of 
social contract theory not only in the respect that political community 
is imagined as if it were the result of a founding act which structures 
said community, but also in the sense that a privileged position has been 
found from which the further course of politics can be derived. The 
original position would thus take over the role of natural man: a notion 
that we saw was already discredited by Rousseau. In any event, it is clear 
that this reading of the original position would amount to declaring it a 
vehicle of depoliticization.
Let us therefore shift the interpretation some way toward a more 
specific commitment to liberalism that precedes the formulation of the 
principles of justice themselves. Jonathan Quong proposes that liberal-
ism should not aim to justify itself ‘all the way down’: rather, it should 
attempt to persuade those who are already committed to basic liberal 
487 Rawls 1999, 53
488 Rawls 1988, 251-252
489 Honig 1993, 126
490 Habermas 2017, 82-83
491 Benhabib 1992, 166f; for the veil of ignorance, see Rawls 1999, 11, 17, 118-123
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principles492. The idea of the Rawlsian framework, on this interpretation, 
is not that everyone subscribes to it at present, but that under the right 
(‘liberal’) conditions, reasonable people would subscribe to it. There is a 
similarity to Kant’s Ideen der Vernunft here, but while for Kant the moral 
experience is valid for everyone under all circumstances, Rawls on this 
reading operates on the basis of “shallow foundations”493. This means 
that the principles of justice cannot ground themselves and are also not 
deducible from some other first principle: indeed, no “deep justification” 
is sought for them494. Instead, they are supposed to integrate well with 
the moral positions intersubjectively held by citizens (in the Rawlsian 
parlance, these are called “comprehensive doctrines”495). The derivation 
Rawls engages in over the course of A Theory of Justice is thus consequent 
to political decision; and the latter is necessary to make Rawls’ into a full 
argument. The original position is here thus precisely not a reified and 
monological perspective, but rather a specification of certain moral val-
ues that are rooted in a particular society. This is consistent with the no-
tion of “reflective equilibrium”, which for Rawls is the moment in which 
the principles of justice are considered not as species of “ideal theory”496, 
but as outcomes of an abstract process of reflection that have to line up 
with the sense of justice of persons affected497. In the process of reflec-
tive equilibrium, the factual “considered convictions”498 or “shared un-
derstandings”499 are accorded their due weight and the ‘fit’ with the nor-
mative principles of justice is determined in a back-and-forth process. 
Although Rawls’ is a very different theoretical angle, Habermas’ dou-
ble sovereign, which as we have seen was prefigured by the productive 
 
492 Quong 2011, 6-7, 139
493 Raz 1990, 8; Quong 2011, 225
494 Raz 1990, 8
495 Rawls 1996, 13
496 The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory concerns the idealizing assump-
tions that are made, for instance about compliance with the proposed principles. 
For an overview on the discussion on ideal theory, see Vallentini 2012 and 
Stemplowska 2008.
497 Rawls 1999, 18, 42-45, 507
498 Rawls 1996, 3; Rawls 1999, 216
499 This term was introduced by Walzer and represents a modification of Rawlsian 
approaches as it highlights the ‘shared’, i.e. intersubjective nature of convictions/
understandings. See Walzer 1981 for a statement of Walzer’s polemic against the 
‘radical detachment’ view of philosophy.
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tension between republican and liberal elements in Faktizität und Gel-
tung, seems very similar to Rawls’ much earlier account.
That being said, while Rawls opens the gate to his political philoso-
phy by allowing and indeed insisting on shallow foundations, the inside 
is riddled with strictures. What exactly we find on the inside is a matter 
of interpretation, as is borne out by the commentary industry that his 
work has spawned (and to which I am now making a contribution from 
the perspective of depoliticization critique). Since this particular com-
mentary focuses on the openings and closures that political liberalism is 
able to provide, the next step is to view the notion of disagreement from 
a Rawlsian perspective.
The first thing to note in this regard is that Rawls believes that 
only oppression can create societal adherence to a single comprehensive 
doctrine: under conditions of liberty, it will prove impossible to have 
this kind of unity, for reasons Rawls describes jointly as the burdens 
of judgment500. Said burdens include the complexity of empirical and 
scientific evidence, the fact that our assessment of moral political values 
is to some degree shaped by our total life history, and the limitations of 
social institutions when it comes to their ability to incorporate values, 
so that difficult or even tragic choices can become unavoidable501. The 
combination of these factors makes disagreement endemic to any liberal 
society: in this spirit it is sometimes said that pluralism is not a counter 
to liberalism, but its starting point. Pluralism here refers to the coex-
istence of social groups with different answers to metaphysical, moral, 
religious and other ‘substantive’ matters. Rawls is a proponent of liberal 
political philosophy in that he argues for the priority of the right over 
the good502. That is, reasoning about the good is left to citizens them-
selves – at least, citizens in a certain capacity – and the normative goal of 
the state should be to facilitate the articulation of a view of the good life 
by these citizens. Doing this facilitating work requires “some point of 
view, removed from and not distorted” by contingent circumstances that 
500 Rawls 1996, 36-37, 55-57; cf. Quong 2011, 36-37
501 Quong 2011, 37. The burden mentioned last here directly contradicts Honing 1993, 
130: “The promulgation of an ideal that closes [the spaces between institutional 
promise, individual expectation and delivery] has a depoliticizing effect that resona-
tes throughout Rawls’ regime and makes it harder, not easier, for Rawlsian citizens 
to be true to (to rise to the challenge of ) the spirit of the democratic scheme that 
Rawls envisions.”
502 Rawls 1985, 250
 Open-endedness and justification -165-
create unfair bargaining advantages “from which a fair agreement be-
tween free and equal persons can be reached”503. That is the function of 
the original position: it is “simply a device of representation” or a spell-
ing out of what it means to bracket all concerns that have no bearing on 
the question of distribution; the fact that Rawls represents the question 
in this specific way does not signal a commitment to psychological or 
metaphysical positions concerning the self504. In an important phrase, 
justice as fairness is taken to be a political rather than a metaphysical 
project. In the sense outlined above, Rawls starts from ideas taken to be 
implicit in the public culture of a liberal-democratic society, and this 
includes a normative conception of the person as free and equal, which 
he adapts so that it can form part of a political conception of justice505. 
Rawls explicitly differentiates his conception from “an account of hu-
man nature” as we find it in “comprehensive moral doctrine” or “natural 
science or social theory”506. In summary, we can say that we have so far 
seen Rawls avoid depoliticization in two ways. First, he develops an 
account of justification that is not premised on the agreement of a given 
institutional structure to a pre-established normative standard. Second, 
Rawls also refrains from closing this newly created opening when he 
turns to the scheme he uses to create a perspective from which to decide 
on matters of justice. His conception of the person is consistent with 
the idea of shallow foundations in that it is not fixated in normative or 
ontological ways; it is itself a political take on the person, much like the 
strategy we saw Rousseau and Schmitt employ in the third chapter.
The idea of free and equal citizens who engage in fair cooperation of 
course leads Rawls to his two principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme 
of liberties for others.
503 ibid, 235
504 ibid, 237; 230-231. Rawls seems annoyed when he says that when “we simulate-
being in this [original] position, our reasoning no more commits us to a meta- 
physical doctrine about the nature of the self than our playing a game like Mono-
poly commits us to thinking that we are landlords engaged in a desperate rivalry, 
winner take all” (ibid, 239).
505 ibid, 232 n15, 233
506 ibid, 232 n15
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Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. 
(Rawls 1999, 53)
It is possible to criticize the progression from the original position 
to these principles, but more important for our purposes is the extent 
to which disagreement about these principles is ‘allowed’ from the per-
spective of political liberalism. This is especially important since the fact 
of reasonable pluralism concerning conceptions of the good has now 
been filtered down into two principles concerning ‘the right’. But what 
makes these considerations of justice so different from more straight-
forwardly moral principles; could there not be disagreement about the 
principles of justice under liberal conditions? The assertion that prin-
ciples of justice are given undue special treatment in comparison with 
moral principles has been called the ‘asymmetry objection’507. Jonathan 
Quong, who poses the problem in this particular way, also devises a 
strategy to defuse it. His strategy is based on a distinction between two 
types of disagreement: justificatory and foundational disagreement. Jus-
tificatory disagreement concerns the conclusions (to be) derived from 
standards of procedural justification held in common by the disagreeing 
parties, whereas foundational disagreement regards the standard of pro-
cedural justification themselves508.
The idea of a shared justificatory framework thus makes all the dif-
ference: for Quong it acts as a “filter” that ensures mutual acceptability 
of conflicting arguments advanced by disagreeing but ultimately rea-
sonable people509. This framework is that of public reason, which makes 
sure that it is possible for each party to accept arguments “in [their] 
507 Quong 2011, 149-150, 192-193
508 ibid, 193; cf. Luhmann 1983, 31: “With respect to the concept of legitimacy, one has 
to distinguish clearly between the acceptance of the premises of a decision and the accep-
tance of a decision itself. (...) Once can affirm [bejahen]the principles and norms, from 
which a decision is ‘deduced, but still reject the decision itself, because it is logically 
false or is grounded on false interpretations or false assumptions of fact. And con-
versely one can accept decisions without worrying about the values on which they 
rest, in complete indifference to, or even while rejecting their grounds as general 
rules of decision-making” (emphasis added).
509 Quong 2011, 207-208
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capacity as free and equal citizen[s]”510. This does not refer to particular 
outcomes, but rather to the standard of justification reasonable people 
owe one another511.The burdens of judgment thus leave untouched the 
necessity of advancing reasonable arguments, that is to say, arguments 
informed by acceptance of the burdens of judgment and the commit-
ment to finding fair terms of agreement with others who are conceived 
as free and equal citizens512.
Of course, the implication is that foundational disagreement can-
not be a challenge to liberal legitimacy. As we have already considered, 
Quong advances an ‘internal conception’ of liberalism that does not 
seek to ground liberal values in some ultimate foundation, but already 
assumes the availability, through reflective equilibrium, within public 
culture of notions like free and equal persons, social cooperation and 
public reason. It makes good internal sense for Quong not to see unrea-
sonable views as a problem for the legitimacy of political order513. Yet 
once again, there are echoes of Rousseau’s closure here. Political liberal-
ism does not need to be acceptable to “everyone, as we find them in our 
imperfect world”; saying that the exercise of power needs to be justified 
on that basis is a “wildly implausible thesis514”. “Rapists and murderers, 
for instance, may not accept the arguments offered to them when their 
liberty is restricted by the state, but this does not make the restriction of 
their liberty wrong or illegitimate”515.
Not only are unreasonables not owed a justification that they would 
factually accept (rather than one they should accept), but they are also 
viewed as dangerous elements. As Rawls himself puts it, doctrines that 
reject one or more democratic freedoms are “a permanent fact of life (...) 
This gives us the practical task of containing them – like war and disease 
– so that they do not overturn political justice”516. Quong agrees that 
510 ibid, 209 (emphasis in original)
511 Rawls 1996, 241
512 Quong 2011, 218
513 Quong points out that public reason does not exclude the unreasonable citizen,but 
rather “unreasonable views or claims”: ‘certain aspects of a person’s beliefs or behavi-
our, rather than (...) a clearly identifiable class of real people” (ibid, 291). Yet it seems 
that citizens are in fact excluded from advancing their views or claims precisely 
insofar as the latter are deemed unreasonable.
514 ibid, 312
515 ibid
516 Rawls 1996, 64 n19, emphasis added; cf. Quong 2011, 299
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such a strategy of containment may be necessary in order to provide the 
normative stability that a well-ordered liberal society requires517.
This may seem like an incredible escalation: starting from the seem-
ingly benign observation that democratic values can be found in our 
public culture, we have ended up with the task of containing unreason-
ables. The critical point is that these values, for Quong, are not based 
merely on an interpretation of the culture from which they arise, but 
arise from a process of reflective equilibrium that takes place inside of 
said culture518. In this way, the Rawlsian strategy of marrying facticity 
and validity through a process of rationalizing views and claims and 
thus transforming them into ‘considered convictions’: our views “at all 
levels of generality” and “on reflection”519. This is then opposed to our 
views, not merely insofar as these do not satisfy these requirements 
(they are not ‘considered’ enough), but insofar as these contradict the 
political order that is informed by the normative perspective to which 
we all subscribe, at least in our capacity as free and equal citizens. We 
are once again opposing the general will to the will of all (‘as we find 
them in our imperfect world’, ‘rapists and murderers’). It should be clear 
that this opposition is a mode of depoliticization. This is confirmed by 
the idea of needing to contain rather than politically engage ‘unreason-
able’ views. The depoliticizing requirement of filtering ethical positions 
through a test of reasonableness is the indirect relation I propose to call 
generalization.
This being said, not all Rawlsians are Quongians. But Quong con-
vincingly argues against the external conception of liberalism, and this 
leaves Rawlsians in an uncomfortable dilemma. The overall argument 
can be summarized as follows: the idea that justification is owed to 
“real citizens” rather than idealized ones is problematic because in order 
to avoid collapsing into the internal conception520, the political liber-
al would have to accept public culture at face value, so that he has to 
517 Quong 2011, 300: Quong also distinguishes between a right to be wrong (in ways 
that do not contradict the requirement of reasonableness) and a right to be unrea-
sonable, and concludes that the latter does not exist (ibid, 309-310).
518 ibid,155
519 Rawls 1996, 8
520 According to Quong, the rejection of public culture at face value as well as the boot-
strapping argument, which says that people should believe in Rawlsian ideas even 
though they do not, both collapse into the internal conception. See Quong 2011, 
151-152
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account for the dissensus about justice that exists in real society. This 
makes political liberalism vulnerable to the asymmetry objection, to 
which only an empirical reply is now possible: citizens do in fact agree 
more about justice than they agree about the good life521. This is contin-
gent on actual agreement, so that political liberalism collapses entirely 
into a descriptive enterprise. If the choice between internal and external 
conceptions of liberalism is a valid description of the options open to 
political liberalism, it seems hard to prefer one over the other.
Quite apart from the choice between the internal and external con-
ception, Rawls is haunted by specters of depoliticization in other ways. 
The first is the identification of politics with the justice-administering 
state, which drives us back into Weber’s arms (as it constitutes a re- 
reversal of Schmitt’s reversal of Weber)522. This identification is an as-
sumption Rawls employs in order to “fix ideas”: “society is a more or 
less self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations to one 
another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the 
most part act in accordance with them”523. This assumption is reflect-
ed by the idea that citizens within society can collectively engage in 
reflective equilibrium. Likewise, the idea of a community of free and 
equal citizens already assumes a moral community524. In a formula, it 
is reconciliation rather than politicization that drives Rawls’ strategy, 
and the remainders of reconciliation are depoliticized525, for instance 
by casting them as disease-like and in need of containment. It is thus 
always simultaneously too early and too late for politics: at first we need 
to assume a stable society in order to ‘fix ideas’, and this then results in 
a mode of reconciliation that cannot be contested in a reasonable way, 
which is to say that such contestation will always present a danger.
There is thus much we have learned from Rawls. He offers us a way 
of avoiding the crossfire between ethics of design and project ethics, 
since Rawls stops short of deriving either a design or directionality from 
either first or final principles. This avoids charges of depoliticization, 
from which we can surmise that political philosophy is to be not only 
521 ibid, 151-153
522 cf. Honig 1993, 129: “In the name of a democratic politics [Rawls] recenters the 
state that other democratic activists are actively involved in decentering.”
523 Rawls 1999, 4
524 Van Schoelandt 2015
525 cf. Honig 1993, 127-129. This is also apparent in Rawls’ writings on punishment; 
see Honig 1993, Ch 5.
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concerned with its own content in a positive sense, but also needs to 
decide where it ends; what it leaves up to politics itself526. There is a 
distinction to be made here between two kinds of restraint527. First, 
political philosophy can build on moral positions that are prevalent in 
a given public culture and in that sense restrain the search to justify it-
self completely. This is rooted in a conception of the role of philosophy 
vis-à-vis society and politics. On my analysis in this section, Rawls is 
an example of this first kind of restraint, so long as we see his selection 
of pubic culture as informed by an interpretation of that culture rather 
than the result of reflective equilibrium. Second, political philosophy 
can allow for an open-ended normative conversation as part of its sub-
stance. This is part of the philosophical theory itself, so that Habermas is 
an example of this second kind of restraint.
Conversely, it is also the case that Rawls, while building on received 
public culture rather than deducing independent justifications from first 
principles, formulates a theory that does not exhibit the open-ended 
structure championed by Habermas. The indirect relation of generaliza-
tion which operates on ‘comprehensive doctrines’ implies the invocation 
of a standard that is ascribed to citizens themselves, but it ends op op-
erating on the level of the general will rather than that of the will of all. 
Habermas himself, by rooting his political philosophy in the presuppo-
sitions that govern every act of communication by anticipating the ideal 
speech situation, ends up saddling his discourse-theoretical approach 
with final principles. Thus, both of them preclude conflict at some point 
in their theories, but they do so in different ways. Rawls opens up the 
justification of his theory but constructs a system that is only able to 
contain and punish those who are ‘unreasonable’, while Habermas is not 
committed to such a concrete design, but ‘says too much’ about the dif-
ferent steps that his project must take in view of what it anticipates. Go-
ing forward, our aim should be to refrain from depoliticization on both 
scores. This would mean keeping open the structure of justification that 
supports political philosophy as well as the substance of political philos-
ophy itself. Delivering on this aim will be the purpose of the next chapter. 
526 cf. Fagan 2016
527 The notion of restraint is here modeled on Raz 1988, 110, 136.
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In the previous two chapters, I conducted an analysis that was at many 
points critical, while at the same time the theorists we criticized (from 
Rousseau to Rawls) offered a lot of insight on how to proceed in or-
der to avoid depoliticization on particular points. Yet the danger that 
localized depoliticization critique can have depoliticizing effects by 
not addressing the ontological dimension of the problem was never far 
removed from our considerations. The challenge thus remains how to 
conceive of a politics that is able to pass the test of a generalized depo-
liticization critique, and to show what such a conception would imply 
for European politics.
In order to build op to this conception, I want to propose a meth-
odological interpretation of Schmitt’s remarks on the polemical nature 
of political concepts, properly understood. By adopting this notion of 
polemics and extending it from the conceptual to the political domain 
more generally, we can give an account of a politics that would be able 
to fulfill the conditions entailed by the first moment of the political, as I 
have called it in previous chapters: the idea that a truly political arrange-
ment should affirm and confirm rather than seek to overcome or curb 
the possibility of antagonism. This means that, like Mouffe’s agonistic ef-
fort described in the third chapter, I seek to overcome an overly clinical 
separation in terms of political difference: institutional politics operates 
Chapter 5  
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on “the terrain of conflictuality informed by ‘the political’”528. Yet unlike 
Mouffe, I do not see the need to postulate a “necessary moment of clo-
sure”529 in this regard. The first and second moment of the political (the 
possibility of antagonism and its realization) need to remain on the ta-
ble. As indicated at the end of the third chapter, I disagree with Mouffe 
on the desirability of keeping antagonism ‘in check’ through agonism, 
and I have argued for my position in terms of the shortcomings of her 
proposal for an agonistic future for Europe. In this final chapter I will 
bring together direct and indirect relations between politics and ethics 
in order to maintain both the first and second moment of the political. 
I combine the immanence-based account of politics and ethics with a 
newly developed indirect relation: that of political engagement. This no-
tion extends some of the theoretical apparatus we have seen at work in 
Rawls and Habermas while attempting to avoid their respective pitfalls. 
Political engagement also completes my account of indirect relations 
between politics and ethics.
Indirect rel. politics-ethics Definition
Anticipation Politics is attuned to final principles that are 
anticipated by its every expression
Generalization Moral positions are only admitted into poli-
tics once they pass a specific test of reason-
ableness 
Political engagement Polemical politics that consistently politicizes
Political engagement in turn requires an account of the relation be-
tween a given political content and the room it leaves for decision. I will 
use an insight from Honig on deliberation and decision as well as some 
evocative fragments of thought from Derrida and Lefort in order to lay 
the groundwork for such an account. We will then be able to discuss 
political engagement itself. Political engagement is a form of ‘engage-
ment’ in two senses. First in the sense of being an instance of action 
in a context that requires it; second in the sense of being connected or 
attached, since what is at stake is a polemic to which one is committed. 
To be politically engaged, as I will define it, is to pursue a polemical 
528 Mouffe 2013, xii
529 ibid, 15, 17
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politics while consistently politicizing. This poses a double requirement: 
first, positively speaking, that the possibility of antagonism is affirmed 
across the board and advanced in a polemical politics, and second, neg-
atively speaking, that depoliticization is avoided across the board. The 
importance of consistency is not to attain elusive political purity – I 
have already criticized such an approach in the context of discussing 
the direct relation of isolation. Rather, the point of consistency is to 
think clearly about the subject matter of (de)politicization, which is by 
its very nature unclear. It is precisely to root out political claims to po-
litical clarity, and more generally depoliticization, that we must remain 
philosophically clear-headed and point out exactly where depoliticizing 
arguments (the claims to political clarity) fail. Failing to do so would 
entail running headlong into the by now well-rehearsed objections to 
localized depoliticization critique, which falls short of politicization 
across the board. Granting the importance of consistency on this basis, 
political engagement can serve as the model to be applied in both the 
first and the second moment of politics. With this model in hand, we 
then return to European politics and explore one of the ways in which 
it could pass the test of political engagement. More specifically put, I 
attempt to apply the lessons learned through a notion of Europopulism 
which builds on Laclau’s work.
5.1 Polemical usage
In the first chapter, we used the Schmittian framework developed in The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations to show how the object of 
depoliticization critique shifts around depending on the area that is for 
a while elevated to the status of producing neutral positions that can be 
used to adjudicate ongoing conflicts. However, every sphere that is made 
to serve this function quickly finds itself at the center of a new conflict. 
This conflict is new precisely because its subject matter has changed – 
for instance, it is now an economic rather than a metaphysical one. At 
each step, both the neutralization of conflict and the nature of conflict 
itself (once it re-emerges) are thus tied to a particular historical context. 
This resonates with a specific pronouncement on political concepts in 
The Concept of the Political, which we can now add to our overall account. 
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Schmitt says that all truly political concepts are “polemical”530. In light 
of his thesis that conflict is adjudicated by the invocation of a nov-
el neutralized sphere which then becomes the site of further conflicts, 
such polemics have to be understood in terms of providing a concrete 
“place-against”531 from which a particular goal can be achieved against 
the particular order of a given time-period532. In this spirit, Schmitt 
lauds Kant’s notion of a Volkenbund as a polemic against royalism533. Yet 
it also follows from Schmitt’s analysis that political concepts can be-
come stale, that is, they may lose their political character534. He indeed 
describes an example of such a loss of political status in reference to the 
concept of humanity, which in the eighteenth century could function as 
“a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic-feudal system and 
the privileges accompanying it”535. This same concept divorced from this 
concrete polemic becomes a universal, which is all-embracing and in 
that sense depoliticized. In the same way,
The League of Nations idea was clear and precise as long as 
such a body could be construed as a polemical antithesis of a 
league of monarchs. But this polemical meaning disappeared 
with the political significance of monarchy. (...) For many peo-
ple the ideal of a global organization means nothing else than 
the utopian idea of total depoliticization. (Schmitt 2007, 55)
530 Schmitt 2007, 30
531 cf. Abensour 2011, 94
532 Schmitt 2007, 30-32
533 cf. Monod 2013, 141
534 Schmitt here comes close to a position defended by Marx and Engels. They had 
claimed that class warfare had not advanced far enough for ‘utopian socialists’ to 
theorize the revolution correctly, which in turn meant that while revolutionary in 
their own time, an uncritical adoption of their theory now would count as reactio-
nary. In their words: “The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Commu-
nism bears an inverse relationship to historicaldevelopment” (Marx & Engels 2007, 
41). His emphasis on historical rootedness and development likewise seems to have 
been a continuation of Hegelian themes: “one may (...) view Schmitt as the chief 
example of what can be called the dialectical right” (McCormick 1997, 37; see also 
ibid, 17-18). Yet see also ibid, 300, which places Schmitt’s historicism in existentia-
list rather than Hegelian terms.
535 Schmitt 2007, 55
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In order to be political, a concept thus has to be involved in a con-
crete polemic within a particular historical context. As soon as this con-
text ceases to exercise influence, the concept itself can only remain in 
play insofar as it is unduly taken out of context, which results in the 
Rancièrean ‘indistinct point of view’ we discussed in the first chapter 
– and hence in depoliticization. Whether a concept is political or not 
thus turns on the question of its relation to a given historical context. 
Speaking from a more theoretical perspective, generalized depoliticiza-
tion critique always politicizes and never depoliticizes, while localized 
depoliticization critique politicizes within the limited context it polem-
icizes against while simultaneously carrying the depoliticizing effect of 
not addressing the matter of political ontology. In addition, localized 
depoliticization critique leads to depoliticization when it is taken out 
of context and stated from the indistinct point of view. This is possible 
at all precisely because the ontological dimension is not addressed. The 
three examples given above (Kant’s Volkenbund, the concept of humani-
ty and the League of Nations) all illustrate this latter point of a polem- 
ical usage that gives way to a depoliticizing effect when the polemical 
element is taken out.
Building on this analysis, I propose to extend Schmitt’s notion of 
polemical usage from the realm of concepts to that of politics more 
generally. This means that we have to ask the question under what con-
ditions the formation of a ‘space against’ is possible on the interior of 
politics and (possibly at the same time) as a reaction to it. It is clear that 
we have avoid what Laclau calls the “reabsorption [of politics] by the 
sedimented forms of the social”, as this would entail “the death of pol-
itics”536. Laclau’s own solution is populism, and we will weigh its merits 
later on in this chapter. The danger of reabsorption makes clear that 
there must exist a real element of decision against the ‘ossified’ struc-
tures put in place by the logic of the prevailing institutions. This means 
that as with the notion of the polemical usage of concepts, what counts 
as a polemical politics is determined by the political context that is tar-
geted in an attempt to unmask it as open to political contestation rather 
than the result of absolute constraints. Continuing this line of reason-
ing, it is possible for a once-polemical politics to become part of police 
and, conversely, for ‘ossified’ politics to rediscover their political poten- 
 
536 ibid, 155.
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tial and affirm the possibility of antagonism against the political context 
of which they are a part.
In a way, the same point is demonstrated by Rancière’s distinction 
between police and politics: politics happens in the interior of police, and 
the second moment of the political (as I call it here) is reabsorbed into 
an adjusted police order. What Rancière does not quite give us, however, 
is the notion of a tension within a given politics. The first moment of 
the political, which concerns the possibility of antagonism, seems to be 
undervalued. As we saw in the first chapter, it is through the performance 
of a society’s internal difference to itself, the active shattering of the 
apparent purity or in our terms the second moment of the political, that 
politics in Rancière’s sense becomes possible. What is lost by this seem-
ingly exclusive focus on the second moment is a sense that anything 
other than the fleeting ‘moment’ of breakthrough could be politically 
meaningful. Yet from the perspective of depoliticization critique, the 
crucial break-off point is to be found one level deeper: in the affirmation 
or denial of the possibility of antagonism.
It is important to emphasize at this point that this possibility is 
never truly closed off. Depoliticization does not occur when fixation 
succeeds in a final sense, as it cannot: this impossibility is built into the 
idea of affirming the ‘problematic’ nature of man and the ever-present 
possibility of an enemy. But this does not mean that fixation cannot be 
efficacious537. Fixation, and depoliticization more generally, can deny the 
possibility of antagonism. This happens at the level of claims, sometimes 
at the level of paradoxically political claims. Ontologically speaking, this 
does not mean that the possibility of a political breakthrough is off the 
table. This was already traced historically by Schmitt: the fact that cer-
tain conflicts were neutralized through the intervention of a particu-
lar domain of human life (metaphysics, morality, economics) could not 
prevent new conflicts from springing up. The status of these domains 
themselves becomes the focus of conflict, and as they are displaced their 
depoliticizing spell is broken. It is thus the transformation of the status 
of a domain within a given political context in view of the possibility of 
antagonism that decides all in Schmitt’s historical approach, as well as 
in my extension of it.
537 The kind of efficacy involved is close to the notion of symbolic efficacy introduced 
by Claude Lévi-Strauss and taken up by Lefort: see Flynn (2005), 131-133 and 
Lefort (1999), 185 (cf. Flynn 2005, 254).
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I think it is possible to relate polemical politics to its context in 
a parallel fashion, along two axes: one concerns direct relations and 
the second concerns indirect relations. First, within a given political- 
institutional context, the status of that context itself and its political ele-
ments must not be claimed as subject to absolute ontological/normative 
constraints (fixation); nor must it be claimed in terms of a juxtaposition 
of powerless subjective ideals and objective reality (friction) or in terms 
of a separate, standalone domain of politics (isolation). Second, within 
such a context it must not be claimed that the context of its political 
elements are bound by anticipation or generalization. This status of not 
being ‘claimed’ may appear rather harmless as a condition for what is 
considered polemical. But a politics which answers to both conditions 
will necessarily take on a polemical character when it is posed against 
a background of depoliticization. As we have seen, generalized depolit-
icization critique asks questions of an ontological nature which are in 
most cases simply assumed away. The politics we have in mind would 
have to resist the force of such assumptions. There can be no “necessary 
moment of closure”538 or necessary theoretical “bedrock”539 underlying 
its politics. Having briefly sketched the kind of condition against which 
a polemical politics would be posed, we are now in a position to signal 
two potential problems. In the next section I will then resume the ac-
count of polemical politics.
The first potential objection signals that it is possible in principle 
that such a politics would attain hegemony within a given political con-
text. On my analysis this would not entail a novel kind of depoliticiza-
tion, since the affirmation of the possibility of antagonism is necessarily 
a part of their practice. Because we affirm that the nature of man is and 
remains ‘problematic’, it cannot be supposed that contestation would 
die down under such circumstances, as if a single correct way of gov-
erning had been stumbled upon. Rather, many political contents (and 
hence contests) are possible within a polemical framework, as we will 
later consider in more detail. Yet even if there would be no contestation 
across a certain time period, this would not in itself pose a problem so 
long as this contestation remained possible, in the sense that its possibility 
is not denied on the level of claims. This is again to be understood as the 
absence of depoliticizing claims within the political context concerned. 
538 Mouffe 2013, 15, 17
539 Quong 2011, 313
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 There is a second important objection to the extension of Schmitt’s 
notion of polemical usage to politics: the concern of parapolitics. In 
the fourth chapter, we saw Žižek phrasing the concern in terms of the 
replacement of the political and its conflicts by recourse to litigation: 
we investigated this claim with respect to Habermas and Rawls. The 
term ‘parapolitics’ itself Žižek adopts and indeed adapts from the work 
of Rancière, who employs it in several distinct senses, referring to a 
transformation of the strategy in successive phases: Aristotle’s political 
philosophy, social contract theory (in Hobbes and Rousseau), and so-
cial science540. Parapolitics in general can be said to mean: the official 
incorporation of political elements into police logic, which actually ex-
cludes them by assigning them a proper place in the system which does 
not count them among its parts541. Rousseau is cited as a proponent of 
“breaking down the people into individuals”542, which on both of the 
readings I offer on these pages is an overly hasty interpretation that 
completely assimilates Rousseau to the project of his predecessors. As 
we saw in the third chapter, Rousseau does not derive an ideal society 
from a fixed notion of ‘individual’ human nature, but instead compli-
cates the idea of natural man by placing it beyond factual claim. Fur-
thermore, as we will see further on in the present chapter, it is possible 
to read Rousseau in such a way that the specter of closure that haunts 
his general will is expelled.
Rancière’s hasty rendering of Rousseau is instructive for our pur-
poses because it exposes the fact that one of the core premises of his 
parapolitical critique is that the political (which for Rancière must be 
performed by the demos) can only be included within a political order at 
the price of reducing the political to a fixed role within the institutional 
framework, thus removing its disruptive potential. This is confirmed by 
his proto-Hobbesian reading of Aristotle, in which the fundamental 
matter of political equality gives way to concerns about the occupa-
tion of offices and the distribution of power543. Through the lens of this 
540 Rancière 1999, 69-81
541 See in particular ibid, 72: “It is Aristotle who managed to square the circle, to pro-
pose the realization of a natural order of politics as a constitutional order by the 
very inclusion of what blocked any such realization: the demos, either in the form of 
exposure of the war between the “rich” and the “poor,’’ or in the ultimate form of the 
effectiveness of an egalitarian anarchy (emphasis added).”
542 ibid, 78
543 ibid, 73
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supposedly Aristotelian parapolitics polemical politics must appear as 
a mode of “squaring the circle”, that is, accomplishing the impossible 
task of squaring the political with political philosophy by reducing the 
former to the latter544.
My response to objections of this kind is that the notion of a po-
lemical politics is not tied to such matters of stable ‘inclusion’ and there-
by exclusion, but rather represents the constitution of a space-against 
in and of politics (rather than a “spatialized politics”545 engendering a 
specific inclusion/exclusion). We have not yet considered the full entail-
ments of politicization across the board. But we can use the notion of 
a polemical politics to gain more insight into the kind of politics that 
would be able to favor politicization consistently, without cutting off 
truly political possibilities by focusing on the fleeting moment in which 
antagonism is actualized so that the political appears on the stage only 
as an explosion. Narrowing politics to its explosive second moment is 
at least potentially premature based on the notion of the political as 
we find it in Schmitt, which centers on the possibility of antagonism or 
what I here call the first moment of the political.
Our search for this first moment cannot be concerned with spelling 
out a definite content for politics in advance. Indeed, this would merely 
render politics subservient to project ethics and thus collapse into fix-
ation. Any analysis that fulfills the conditions of a polemical politics 
has to ‘leave content to politics itself ’. That is not merely a negative 
description of what politics itself may not do, but likewise a positive 
description of its task in facilitating a politics that is indeed able to for-
mulate its own content without being claimed and thus preempted by 
depoliticizing direct or indirect relations to ethics (and/or ontology). It 
also combines the two lessons on restraint we learned from Habermas 
and Rawls in the previous chapter. The ramifications on the level of 
politics itself must be that all designs, and certain projects (namely those 
that depoliticize) are not to be part of politics since they are not political 
themselves. Depoliticization itself may be politically motivated, but its 
effect is a closure of politics that spells the latter’s end. From the per-
spective of generalized depoliticization critique, our goal is to unmask 
and avoid such effects. Yet we are now confronted with the apparent 
paradox that to avoid the closure of politics, we must ourselves close 
544 ibid, 72
545 ibid, 75
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off politics in a certain regard – namely to avoid depoliticization. In my 
analysis, this paradox can be defanged because avoiding depoliticization 
is not itself a form of depoliticization owing to the ethical-political cir-
cle that informs the direct relation of immanence.
In order to fully make this point, we first have to elaborate on what a 
polemical politics would entail. From the preceding remarks, we can ad-
duce that the art of being polemical has to consist in a formal structure 
that will allow the formulation of non-depoliticizing political content 
while always leaving open the possibility of political decision (in the 
sense of not precluding its affirmation). This means that a polemical 
politics stands in a very particular relationship to the ‘contents’ of poli-
tics itself. We are now in a position to discuss the relationship between 
polemics and politics, and I will use the angle of a critique on delibera-
tive theory in order to bring this out.
5.2 Deliberation/decision and polemics
Theorists of deliberation worry about their ability to give valid justi-
fications based in procedure for political and philosophical principles 
and positions. This is a worry since for them outside of deliberation we 
find nothing other than decision, whose proponents cannot justify any 
principle in a valid manner and therefore end up promoting dangerous 
arbitrariness in the style of Nietzsche and Schmitt (sometimes Derrida 
is included)546. The task of deliberation is thus to exorcise the ghost of 
naked decision, and this is done by finding the right balance between 
practical reason and sovereign will; the idea of human rights and the 
principle of popular sovereignty; Kant and Rousseau. In the analysis 
of Bonnie Honig this means that deliberativists rely on hypostatized 
categorizations that limit politics by seeing the terms they attempt to 
reconcile as binaries547. She rereads Rousseau in an attempt to bring out 
what is lost to such an approach, and we will follow her reading here. 
This will allow us to reflect on the central place of decision, in spite of 
deliberativist protest, in any kind of politics: and we will consider how 
this centrality should be affirmed and engaged as part of a polemical 
politics.
546 Honig 2007, 1; Benhabib 1994a
547 Honig 2007, 14-15
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Rousseau, as we are aware, seems to distinguish sharply between the 
will of all and the general will. The effective history of this distinction 
has been to read Rousseau as a proponent of fixation, who at first pio-
neered an important strategy for politicization (placing human nature 
beyond factual claims) but later succumbed to closure. This was also our 
reading in the third chapter. Yet Honig draws attention to the ways the 
general will remains tied to the will of all within Rousseau’s work. One 
of them is the idea that the general will is the “sum of particular wills”, 
which allows for the calculation of the general will from the starting 
point of the will of all: “take away from these same [private] wills the 
pluses and minuses which cancel one another, and the general will re-
mains as the sum of the differences”548. Seyla Benhabib reads this as the 
first of Rousseau’s two attempts to find a solution to the paradoxical 
nature of limiting a sovereign people by means of the law that forms 
them in the first place: this is what is called the paradox of democratic 
legitimacy. She finds this first, “arithmetic” solution unsatisfactory; Ho-
nig agrees but only on the grounds that is should not be thought of 
as a solution in the first place549. For Honig, Rousseau’s “fuzzy math” 
illustrates the impossibility of knowing “when we have our hands on 
only one and not the other”, so that the general will continues to be 
inhabited by the will of all550.
Rousseau’s second ‘solution’ receives similar treatment. As we have 
seen, Rousseau postulates a lawgiver which in situations of founding or 
deeply rooted corruption can define for the not yet fully formed people 
what their general will consists in. Honig extends this problem to cover 
not only situations on the brink of politics, but democratic politics as 
such: “the subject postulated by politics is seen as never quite the cause 
because also always the effect of political practice”551. Again, here the 
point is not that the paradox of democratic legitimacy is resolved but 
that Rousseau marks the problem as an enduring one: the ‘people’ is un-
decidable and ‘multitude’552. In other words, the lawgiver stands for the 
idea that active shaping is a necessary part of political practice, since the 
people is never ‘just there’ but is itself the result of continuous political 
 
548 Rousseau 2002, 172; cf. Honig 2007, 4; Benhabib 1994b, 28
549 Benhabib 1994b, 29; cf. Honig 2007, 4
550 Honig 2007, 4-5 
551 ibid
552 ibid, 5
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shaping processes (for instance, an externally imposed law that simulta-
neously gives rise to and reflects the public dimension of a general will).
Such a reading is reinforced, as Honig also notes, by the fact that for 
Rousseau the lawgiver is as unknowable as the general will. Just as the 
general will may be feigned by the will of all, the lawgiver can be imper-
sonated by charlatans553. As soon as Rousseau moves to the durability of 
the resulting laws as a sign of the lawgiver’s “great soul”554, he cites critics 
of the Law of Moses who would see in their survival nothing but the suc-
cess of “lucky imposters”555. While Rousseau disagrees, claiming that “the 
true statesman admires in their systems the great and powerful genius 
which directs durable institutions”556, this leaves open the possibility of 
lucky imposture and thus deprives the criterion of durability of its use-
fulness. A will claimed as general may merely be a will of all, a claimed 
lawgiver may merely be a charlatan and institutions that are claimed to 
be durable because of their intrinsic qualities may merely last because of 
good fortune557. This means that the decision558 of the not yet or no lon-
ger fully-formed people themselves remains important in distinguish-
ing between the two options in each of these cases; and only through 
this decision they form themselves as a people.
This entails that the very focus on paradoxes like that of democratic 
legitimacy, which presuppose that their terms are themselves complete 
(in this case, the people is taken as a given), misses the truly political 
questions that decide which and whose claims are ‘admitted into’ the 
people and its politics in the first place. This means that deliberation 
between settled parties forecloses fundamental political questions about 
who gets to claim entry into the ranks of those deliberating and who is 
dismissed as unreasonable before deliberation proper is initiated559. This 
is a more general configuration of the indirect relations of anticipation 
and generalization (both of which depend on deliberative procedures) 
 
553 ibid, 6
554 Rousseau 2002, 183
555 ibid; cf. Honig 2007, 6
556 Rousseau 2002, 183; cf. Honig 2007, 6-7
557 cf. Honig 2007, 6-7
558 Honig instead refers to the “will or judgment” of such a people (ibid, 7)
559 This more general point is similar to Rancière’s notion that in any police order, 
there is an uncountable element that is this not taken into account: see e.g. Rancière 
1999, 116
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and their effect of securing a privileged mode of politics to the exclusion 
of alternatives, in such a way that depoliticization occurs.
It is clear that deliberation is merely one political project among 
many other possibilities. Still, Honig shows that even in the context 
of deliberative political philosophy, which has the foreclosure of naked 
decision as one of its main aims, an element of decision is present as the 
condition of deliberation so that decision is an internal factor which 
actively informs politics rather than an external threat from which it can 
be safeguarded (only) through the interjection of proper procedures. As 
Honig avows, the nature of the political is to resist the hypostasis of any 
project that relies on rigid categorization. This element of resistibility, as 
we have already seen it described in the first chapter, is what opens the 
space-against which engenders a polemical politics.
This describes polemical politics in its insistence that any political 
order must be resistible as a matter of political decision. At the same 
time, in order for there to be resistance against something, we need to 
have a ‘content’ first. In this sense, the political exists in a double bind. 
As Derrida puts it in the context of describing decision in more gener-
al terms, there needs to be an irreducible “heterogeneity between two 
linked orders”, namely the ‘content’ (that is, the concrete political pro-
gram that is advanced) and the insistence that this content cannot go 
all the way560. Derrida conceptualizes this in terms of “knowledge and 
non-knowledge”: both are demanded by decision at the same time561.
We need to have knowledge, the best and most comprehensive 
available, in order to make a decision or take responsibility. 
But the moment and structure (...) of the responsible decision, 
are and must remain heterogeneous to knowledge. An absolute 
interruption must separate them (...). (Derrida 2005, 145)
In more expressly political terms, we need to be at pains to formu-
late the best possible political program without allowing the moment 
of decision to be determined by the content of this program (in which 
case there would be no decision at all). Indeed, for Claude Lefort, the 
conceptual possibility of politics involves the “intertwining” of “knowl-
560 Derrida 2005, 25-26
561 Fagan 2016, 74
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edge and non-knowledge” in this sense562. Only given these conditions, 
where one’s prior political commitment is not absent but also not an 
absolutizing force, politics is possible. Extending this to our notion of 
the political, we can say that what is needed is not the mere presence of 
an element of decision – since ontologically speaking such an element 
is present even under conditions posed by depoliticization, however de-
liberative we may wish to be – but the affirmation of decision, both in 
terms of resistibility (being able to decide against the prevailing political 
order) and in terms of non-cynical commitment to one’s own position 
(deciding for a particular political content)563.
This completes our notion of polemical politics. Such a politics is 
polemical only with respect to a specific political-institutional context 
and, relative to that context, affirms the element of decision that is pres-
ent in every political order (in spite of deliberative theory). Decision, 
as we have seen, should be understood both in terms of the ability to 
resist a given political order (the element of non-knowledge or decid-
ing against) and in terms of non-cynical commitment (the element of 
knowledge or deciding for). This gives us the conceptual material re-
quired to move from polemical politics to the indirect relation of polit-
ical engagement.
5.3 Political engagement
Throughout this investigation, I have developed depoliticization critique 
as a theoretical angle in two distinct varieties: localized and generalized. 
We now understand that the shortcomings of the first variety should be 
understood in reference to its inability to consistently affirm decision; 
it does not do so across the board, since its analysis does not extend far 
enough. The ontological dimension is left unquestioned, as we have seen 
in our analysis of political philosophies that do engage in depoliticiza-
562 Lefort 1972, 367; see also Flynn 2005, 21, 70-71
563 This requirement of non-cynicism is close to asking for consistency, since cynicism 
is described as not drawing practical lessons from theoretical insight pertaining 
to falsity (Sloterdijk 1983, 37-38). Furthermore, cynicism itself necessarily depo-
liticizes because of its accompanying notion of “enlightened false consciousness”, 
which vitiates any contestation or critique because of its sheer indifference (ibid, 
37). Non-cynicism is in this sense required for consistent politicization: see section 
5.3 on the formal requirements posed by the latter aim.
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tion critique, but in the end succumb to their own form of depoliticiza-
tion. This leaves us with an ambiguous patchwork of theoretical paths 
cutting across the political. What we have found was usually both a ca-
pacity to unmask depoliticization in others and a seemingly insuppress-
ible need to have recourse to elements of closure all the same. What 
one argument opens up, is closed down by another – sometimes even 
within the same theory, as we have seen. If we imagine all the possible 
aspects of politicization and depoliticization that we have considered 
as a single area divided into regions, then mapping theories onto them 
would prove to be a chaotic affair, with regions both folding back into 
themselves and politicization in one area leading to depoliticization in 
another. This paradoxical feature of localized depoliticization critique 
cannot be left standing; in order to keep politics open, the possibility of 
grounding it without remainder needs to be excluded. That sounds like 
a new layer of paradox, as remarked earlier, and we will engage with it 
shortly. At stake is the possibility of a generalized politicization critique 
that does not fall victim to a further mode of depoliticization: that is, 
consistent politicization.
My proposal is to achieve this in terms of what I call political en-
gagement, which is the third and final indirect relation I consider. Po-
litical engagement earns the title of engagement in a twofold way. First, 
political engagement is engaged in the sense of being connected or at-
tached, since what is at stake is a polemic to which one is committed. 
Second, political engagement refers to an instance of action in a context 
that requires it due to problems that it faces: it ‘engages’ these problems. 
The problems in question here are of course the modes of depoliticiza-
tion, in all the forms we have discussed in the last two chapters. To be 
politically engaged, as I will define it, is to pursue a polemical politics 
while consistently politicizing. These two elements correspond to the 
two senses of engagement. While there is thus an emphasis on what 
is polemical, political engagement avoids turning politics into an arena 
without rules since the aim is to achieve politicization consistently. This 
means that depoliticizing claims are anathema for the purposes of a 
polemic. For example: polemicists – those who engage in the kind of 
polemic I envisage – are to avoid fixating, that is, invoking or claiming 
absolute ontological and/or normative constraints to, the political. The 
same is true of the other (in)direct relations I have introduced with 
regard to their (de)politicizing effects. We have to remember that these 
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are merely formal conditions for a polemic that is consistently politiciz-
ing: the polemic itself is at least as important. Yet the formal conditions 
themselves are quite efficacious; it can be readily seen that applying po-
litical engagement would exclude many currently commonplace ‘politi-
cal’ themes. We will consider this idea further on.
For the moment, our most important concern is the fact that po-
litical engagement in our sense requires a shutting out of depoliticiza-
tion. It must affirm the importance of the decisive moment and extend 
this affirmation to the exclusion of anything that would preempt it. In 
Strauss’ analysis of Schmitt, as we saw in the third chapter, this affirma-
tion of the political implies an affirmation of the moral. I am not inter-
ested here in how Strauss himself intended his remark, or how Schmitt 
should respond to this alleged second affirmation. But the connection 
between the two affirmations certainly follows for the position that I am 
taking. There is no prospect of a good world among good people that 
is characterized by harmony: that would be the ultimate depoliticizing 
claim. But why is this prospect ‘not there’? Because I insist – in this 
respect, side by side with Schmitt – that meaningful human existence 
simply does not have this harmonious quality, and this is an ethical 
insistence. Meaningful human existence exceeds well-defined problems 
with fitting solutions, and the political itself (at least, what I have called 
the second moment of the political) is nothing but an intense realiza-
tion of such an existence, as the concept of resistibility makes clear. It 
is this idea of what makes human life meaningful that involves us with 
moral categories. Without them, the concept of the political and there-
fore political engagement could only be described, and not affirmed. 
Political engagement, as an indirect relation that builds on affirmation, 
thus points us back to the direct relation of immanence.
But we still have to address an important issue. Is political engage-
ment a paradoxical affair, or even an impossibility? Fixation looms if 
this moral idea of meaningfulness somehow preempts the identity of 
the political. It would then pose an absolute normative constraint on the 
political itself, thereby negating it completely. Does the idea that depo-
liticization needs to be shut out limit politics before it has even gotten 
started, so that with or without the notion of political engagement, de-
politicization must be the end result? Note that this would only follow 
if politics were to be ‘swallowed whole’ by a non-political given that is 
external to it. From this perspective, the response readily suggests itself. 
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Politics, in our analysis, is immanent to all domains of life rather than 
external to it. Nor is the ‘affirmation of the moral’ a given that is deduced 
from some external foundation. As we have seen, the idea that the affir-
mation of the political requires an affirmation of the moral lands us in 
a moral-political circle. The choice of the moral principle that informs 
meaningful existence is itself political. That is to say, the affirmation of a 
‘problematic’ human nature is not a deduction or a derivation from giv-
en first principles. In Rousseau’s formulation, the principle is not solved; 
a conjecture is risked with the hope of throwing light upon it. Schmitt 
shares the notion of a conjecture, or a confession of faith. Perhaps Rawls’ 
formulation is most to the point here: the moral notion that is advanced 
is political, not metaphysical. And the choice to go with this particular 
conjecture is not one that closes off its alternatives in a final sense; it 
does not even justify itself, except by showing that neither the choice 
made nor its alternatives are the necessary consequence of an ontologi-
cal and/or normative given. There is no fixation here. Politics directs us 
to morality, which directs us back to politics, and this is a circle we could 
keep on drawing. To politically affirm the moment of decision, we need 
to insist on the meaningfulness of antagonism; this meaningfulness is 
not a first principle that informs politics from the outside (and would 
thus fixate it), but is itself subject to political choice.
Political engagement can thus avoid the apparent paradox that in 
the very attempt to affirm politicization, it depoliticizes precisely by 
shutting out depoliticization based on a moral notion. For the affirma-
tion is not a moment of closure, but itself an instance of opening up 
through the political engulfing of this very moral notion, which itself 
engulfs politics as part of the same circle. There is no point at which a 
winner can be declared: likewise, there is no disjunction to the effect 
that either morality or politics is to be preferred. Instead, the direct re-
lation of immanence is characterized by a mutual encroachment of the 
political and ‘the moral’. It is for moral reasons of meaningful human 
life that we end up with the political, and these moral reasons are them-
selves politically motivated, without laying claim to ontological founda-
tions. The circle goes on ad infinitum and expresses the mutuality of the 
terms when they are seen through the lens of immanence.
Yet the direct relation of immanence by itself is not enough, since 
while it does not itself engender depoliticization, it is not clear how it is 
able to give shape to any kind of politics. The mutuality that exists with-
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in immanence is not yet developed. It still needs to answer the ques-
tion how politics can consistently avoid depoliticization. The response 
I offer is the indirect relation of political engagement. The contribution 
of ethics to generalized depoliticization critique and hence to the con-
ceptual condition of politicization is thus that it fulfills the requirement 
of the affirmation of the political without thereby grounding and thus 
absolutely constraining it. This is how politicization can be strived for 
consistently, that is, while avoiding the pitfalls of depoliticization. The 
fact that it has recourse to both a direct and indirect relation between 
politics and ethics relates to both (directly) affirming the possibility of 
antagonism as immanent to all life domains and (indirectly) excluding, 
as part of the strategy of political engagement, direct and indirect re-
lations that depoliticize. On that level of analysis, too, immanence and 
political engagement are related in a specific way.
Now we need to ask the question how political engagement im-
pacts practical politics. In other words: what limits are imposed by 
the requirement of a polemical politics and expressed by the formal 
structure of consistent politicization? We will consider these limits in 
terms of our direct and indirect relationships insofar as I have already 
shown their depoliticizing effects, in six steps. First, fixation in terms 
of ontology needs to be excluded. Below I introduce the dimensions of 
given factual references, given factual goals, and descriptions of factual 
situations that are posed as absolute constraints on the political. Sec-
ond, fixation in terms of normativity has to be excluded as well. The 
dimensions are the same as the factually based ones, with the addition 
that the combination of moral references, goals, and constraints forms 
an ethic of design. There can be considerable overlap between fixation 
in factual and normative terms, as norms can play an ontological role 
and vice versa. Third, powerlessness based on friction has to be excluded. 
Fourth, the removal of politics based on ‘nonpolitical’ domains based 
on isolation has to be excluded. Fifth, given (discursive) procedures for 
determining ‘final principles’ based on anticipation need to be excluded. 
Finally, sixth, given (reflective) procedures for filtering out unreasonable 
elements based on generalization need to be excluded. Given these con-
ditions, a polemic that politicizes consistently is possible; the polemic 
itself can take any shape that does not fall foul of the conditions.
The first item on the list above, the exclusion of fixation in terms of 
ontology, already throws into doubt the political nature of many existing 
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political programs. For one, references on the basis of claimed ‘givens’ 
are off the table. This refers to any reified will of the people that is put 
forward as part of a political program, and likewise to the identity of the 
people construed as a given, whether ethnically, religiously, historically 
or more generally culturally. The same mechanism of claimed factual 
references is at work in the by now well-rehearsed example of economic 
determinism, which sees politics as confronted by the managerial task 
of how to optimize society given the efficacy of certain economic forces. 
Thus from the perspective of depoliticization critique politics based on 
race and religion is of a kind with politics based on an economic model, 
in that both falter at the first opportunity by allowing fixation to undo 
what is political about them. A like mechanism returns in the postula-
tion of factual goals, such as economic growth or CO2-reduction, as a 
given. The point is not that these goals themselves are unworthy, unde-
sirable or otherwise ill-suited. Related to both factual references and 
goals is the idea of an absolute factual constraint, and this, the manner 
in which the goals are claimed, is what is problematic from the perspec-
tive of depoliticization critique.
As is true of the direct relation of fixation more generally, the onto-
logical and normative can begin to shift into each other. The ambiguous 
nature of a constraint already hints at this shift: the idea that such a 
constraint needs to be posed in the first place already shows that its 
formulation carries a certain evaluative content. An example of an abso-
lute constraint that displays a shift between ontological and normative 
concerns is the idea that sovereign debt must not be forfeited. One can 
ask: does this refer to an impossibility of governance, to an ethic of debt 
payment, to a politics designed foremostly to win the trust of the Mark-
tvolk, or all of the above? What is true for all variations on this theme is 
the function of the constraint in the delimitation of a space that politics 
can or must not venture into. That by itself means that political engage-
ment in my sense is no longer possible.
This is true more generally speaking for the idea of an ethic of de-
sign. The design is supposed to pick out a legitimate way of proceeding, 
and in that sense delimits the uses to which politics can and cannot be 
legitimately put. We can work back from this idea to the more pure-
ly normative constraints that can be placed on politics. For instance, a 
given moral reference takes place when the real, unmediated interests 
of the people are invoked – this goes beyond the will of the people in 
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that the reality of these interests need not refer to or be expressed by an 
already existing set of circumstances. Likewise, given moral goals can 
include liberalization, and an absolute commitment to representative 
democracy can be described as a moral given which places an absolute 
constraint upon politics.
Moving from fixation to friction, the idea that politics requires the 
insight that one is subjectively powerless to realize admittedly import-
ant values in a ‘resistant’ objective reality is to be avoided for the same 
reasons. Allowing the distinction between subjective and objective 
‘poles’ means that one is caught in a position of powerlessness that can-
not be overcome without the intervention of a hero. This latter category 
seems to be more expressive of an ideal qua ideal than of some prop-
erly political categorization or possibility. In a related sense, isolation 
would require the distancing of politics from supposedly non-political 
domains based on a strict division. In both of these cases, politics fore-
goes its potential to impact the reality within which it finds itself; in 
friction because this reality is cast as non-responsive to the normative 
demands that are placed upon it, and in isolation because politics is 
asked to maintain its purity in order to avoid polluting itself.
Practical politics is also impacted by its need to avoid depolitici-
zations that occur as a result of indirect relations. We have seen that 
Habermas’ mistake was to suppose that politics has recourse to a proce-
dure for determining ‘final principles’, which sees politics as an expres-
sion of that which it necessarily anticipates. In parallel fashion, Rawls’ 
mistake was to suppose that politics can have recourse to a procedure 
designed to filter out ‘unreasonable’ elements. Both of these kinds of 
procedure, anticipatory and generalizing, must be avoided. In both cas-
es, posing the accompanying procedural requirements in advance may 
allow one’s moral commitments to withdraw into procedure, but these 
commitments do not thereby lose their efficacy. A path is marked out in 
advance and politics cannot help but enter upon it and, as it were, trace 
its own progression in the path it follows.
While it is important to recognize the limits depoliticization cri-
tique places upon practical politics, it is not the case that politics is un-
duly limited or simply made impossible by the imposition of said limits. 
It does, however, call for a reconsideration of specific political forms and 
how we customarily discuss and evaluate them. In what follows I will 
resume our discussion of populism, which we have encountered in many 
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roles and to which we can now turn with the complete set of conceptual 
tools and criteria that have been developed on these pages.
In the first chapter, referring to the analyses of Rancière and Laclau, 
we saw how the name ‘populism’ can be invoked to unmask a dissent-
ing people as unworthy of carrying political influence. Populism as a 
political phenomenon (as distinct from the name) revolves around the 
shattering of a complex of meaning that is composed of differentially 
related terms. A demand that cannot be absorbed by the existing po-
litical system will performatively forge equivalential connections that 
go beyond singular logics. But it seems that such a demand must have 
an ethical structure of its own: contemporary populism arguably builds 
upon the idea of directly moral precepts concerning the proper destiny 
of the people that do not stand in need of mediation and in fact are 
not even compatible with mediation564. On this basis, it can seem mis-
leading to claim that populism is to be celebrated for its politicizing 
potential in all of its guises, as critics have noted565. It rather seems to 
imply the very opposite: a form of antipolitics, which turns against the 
specificity of politics, as a specific form of human activity not just aimed 
against institutions, but against the political as such566. More specifi-
cally, the specificity of politics comes under pressure because it is made 
absolutely beholden to the central concerns of an outside domain. In 
populism, this would be the antecedent force of moral precepts in the 
sense referred to above.
What the model of political engagement allows us to establish is 
that from the perspective of depoliticization critique, populism is not 
to be universally praised or condemned. Whether populism politicizes 
or depoliticizes is dependent on the claims it makes regarding its own 
political content. As we have seen, as soon as a reference to the will 
or interests of the people is claimed as an absolute ontological and/
or normative constraint politics drops out. If populism is able to avoid 
this and truly “[constructs] a people that does not yet exist”567, that is, 
successfully shatters the pre-existing differential field, then the ties of 
previous facts or norms will not put an absolute constraint on politics. 
Instead, the space of political decision itself will remain open. Let us see 
564 Osborne & Molyneux 2017
565 ibid; cf. De Mul 2017, 41: “not less”, or more for that matter, “but a better populism”.
566 Walter & Michelsen 2013, 60- 61
567 Laclau 2005, 154
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what this implies for political practice. That is to say: using political en-
gagement as a model, we can now begin our return to European politics.
5.4 Europe’s political frontier
The notion of polemical usage that I have taken from Schmitt allows for 
a certain notion of historicization. Political status comes to depend at 
least in part on the role a concept or politics plays in either entrenching 
or challenging the prevailing political order, and this role can change 
depending on how the concept or politics in question is used. To repeat 
Schmitt’s own example: Kant’s Volkenbund was polemic in its own time 
in its role as a critique of royalism568. This means that we can reread the 
‘Europes’ we encountered in the third chapter in the same way, namely 
as polemics: those imagined by Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant and Ni-
etzsche. Saint-Pierre and Rousseau’s position then appear as counters 
to the absolute position of power enjoyed by national leaders, which 
in part through the doctrine of raison d’état led to an engulfing of the 
European continent by ceaseless wars between the European nations. 
Within that context, Rousseau’s idea that Europe expresses a kind of 
whole that goes beyond the alliances that have also served to tie the 
nations together acquires a polemical and in that sense political potency. 
He does immediately warn us of the upheaval that would be entailed 
in attempting to realize a more federal Europe, and in the end urges 
caution. That political temperament is one of the less obvious ways in 
which Kant follows Rousseau: like Rousseau, Kant urges caution and 
allows the moral politician to delay until a fitting opportunity arises. 
What matters is that the moral spirit of the project is continually and 
truthfully embraced by the political leaders. In one sense, this is a polit-
ically toothless interpretation of the European project at a time where 
the naked abuse of power by mono-nations on the continent was still 
a very real problem. What is worse, the political attempts by Rousseau 
and Kant insist on the givenness of their respective moral goals. This is 
indeed what allows them to derive in relatively straightforward fashion 
an ethic of design that expresses the moral truth of the situation, with 
the proviso that it may be hard and perhaps even impossible to realize. 
But the underlying normative commitment remains intact, so that po-
568 Schmitt 2007, 30-32
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litical engagement is on the final analysis rather far removed from both 
Rousseau’s and Kant’s European project.
Nietzsche’s notion of good Europeans poses a different set of chal-
lenges because it represents a polemic against the idea of ordering Eu-
ropean politics based on the idea of a ‘truer’ politics, still operating with-
in the scheme of the ‘will to truth’569. It is precisely relinquishing this 
hierarchical notion of truth that defines the good European, according 
to Nietzsche. Nietzsche thus advances a polemic not only against ‘petty 
politics’ and ‘petty states’ but also against the very idea of a European 
ethic of design. Yet even here that is a sense in which the European 
identity is the given destiny of citizens on the continent, as indicated 
by the concept of ‘complete’ nihilism that Nietzsche affirms. One could 
argue in response that the idea of self-overcoming that accompanies 
Nietzsche’s description of the good European does not imply a finality, 
but instead insists on the continual overthrowing of supposed truths, 
which in politics can be said to have an “ennobling” effect on those who 
engage in it570. The way Nietzsche describes the good European can 
then be taken as a step within the wider process of self-overcoming; 
the good European is he who has left the automatic reference to the 
nation-state behind.
As we remarked earlier, for Nietzsche nihilism remains a Europe-
an phenomenon, so that Europe is not thought in terms of a positive 
constellation of political forces but rather as a territory that contains 
certain political potentials to be unleashed against the ‘European’ states 
of Nietzsche’s day. Seen through the lens of contemporary European 
politics, Nietzsche is one-sided in the sense that he only allows us to see 
the limitations of the nation-state perspective and prefers the Europe-
an perspective without posing the question in reverse. This is to some 
extent unsurprising, since Nietzsche was not in a position to criticize a 
European politics that did not yet exist. But it also shows us the limits 
of his approach. In order to transform the ‘Nietzschean’ polemic into 
one consistent with political engagement from a current standpoint, we 
must make both the national and the European perspective into a mat-
ter of politics571.
569 Elbe 2003, 90
570 cf. Owen 1995
571 Perhaps this can be seen as an additional step in the process of self-overcoming, 
consistent with Nietzsche’s wider project.
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Depoliticization critique addresses a part of this requirement, since 
its aim is to bring out the political gestures that are usually obscured 
from view. Adding to our earlier analysis the model of political engage-
ment, it is clear that certain aspects of political engagement are current-
ly not being met in European politics. As we saw in the second chapter, 
the EU was initially considered worthy of being pursued for its own 
sake. This is essentially connected to the project of European integration 
as a matter for elites to discuss, where the outcome of these discussions 
could only be greeted with permissive consensus. As the influence of 
‘Europe’ on citizens’ lives grew, legitimacy pressures increased and were 
addressed by referring to peace and (later on) prosperity as justification 
ex post facto for European integration. We have already analyzed the 
status of these references and pointed out their depoliticizing elements. 
Insofar as this analysis was convincing, we can conclude that justifying 
Europe through absolute factual and/or normative claims (with peace 
and prosperity completely blurring the divide between factual and nor-
mative) is not compatible with political engagement.
It is not only the status of integration itself that is subject to this 
kind of critique. We have also considered in detail the strategy of out-
put legitimacy and, relatedly, negative integration that has been favored 
by the EU. Dependence on output legitimacy entails that European 
legitimacy is tied up with the ability of European politics to solve cer-
tain well-defined problems for the member states and their inhabitants. 
The competences required to address such problems were acquired by 
juridical rather than political means. The institutions whose role is to 
address and decide on gaps in the Treaties, respectively the European 
Committee and the European Court of Justice, have therefore come 
to be of crucial importance for the European project as a whole. The 
possibility of correcting such institutions is accordingly quite limited. 
They turn into shaping forces that are over and above the political pro-
cess properly so called, since their transnational status – the condition 
of their political activity – becomes ever-more pronounced and at the 
same time increasingly implies a removal of European institutions from 
societal and democratic legitimacy572, so that they become increasingly 
unassailable573.
572 Brunkhorst 2014, 101-105
573 Habermas 2015, 100
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In our attempt to respond to this problem, we need not draw the 
opposite conclusion and insist on the accountability of European pol-
itics at large to the democratic publics of member states. Doing this 
can easily slip into claiming democracy as a given normative referent 
or moral finality. However, in general the figure of policy without pol-
itics574, which is well illustrated by the effects indicated above, is again 
incompatible with the model of political engagement. The initial dignity 
which allowed the European project to launch under conditions of per-
missive consensus has been displaced, through means associated with 
negative integration, to the institutional-juridical level. As I remarked 
in the final pages of the second chapter, we can differentiate between an 
ontological, a rights-based and a moral-political argument that underlie 
this dignity today. All three arguments are effective depoliticizations. 
Let us briefly reconsider them in view of the theoretical baggage gained 
in the present chapter.
First, the ontological argument states that Europe, more than any 
nation-state on its own, is able to conform to the necessity of unified 
power blocs imposed by the border-transcending qualities of market 
forces. This hierarchy between the nation-state perspective and the Eu-
ropean perspective runs straight into Nietzsche’s argument concerning 
the will to truth, aside from overlooking general legitimacy concerns, as 
noted earlier. The argument also presupposes both a constraining fac-
tual description about the nature of market forces and a moral finality 
pertaining to their containment (coupled with a further factual con-
straint about how such containment could be achieved). Second, the 
rights-based argument states that Europe is a force for good through its 
championing of human rights. We have already seen that this has not 
been brought out in practice – we can add that the argument provides 
a convenient opportunity for moralization in Mouffe’s sense, describing 
a moral reference and inscribing it into the European territory, while 
excluding it from the ‘outside’. Third, the moral-political argument per-
tains to the political dignity of Europe, which is thought to be in need of 
securing through transnational organization. However, such an appeal 
to dignity relies on an absolute moral reference to what politics should 
be like, while populism is cast as the evil twin of this ideal politics. This 
is again a moral reference that is claimed as a given. In addition, the 
 
574 Schmidt 2006, 22-23; 157-162
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moral-political argument does not hold for the practice of European 
politics either.
There are, however, possibilities for reform. The concept of the re-
gional state confirms this: recall Vivien Schmidt’s assertion that the EU 
does not share in the “finality” that characterizes nation-states, but is 
better conceptualized “as in a constant process of becoming”575. Histor-
ically this process can be summarized by the interrelated triad of con-
cepts we have already discussed: output legitimacy, negative integration, 
depoliticization. Again, I am not arguing for a simple reversal of these 
concepts, so that an input-oriented democratic model of legitimacy 
could be established leading to positive integration and politicization. 
Either by representing the will (input) of the people as reified or by 
subjugating it under a Habermas-style project ethics, such an approach 
would likely lead to depoliticization all the same. The route I am pro-
posing in its stead is that of political engagement. Let us now consider 
it on its own terms.
What would be needed to render a European politics compatible 
with political engagement? In general, we can say that it must be po-
lemical, and that it must politicize consistently. The second of these con-
ditions conforms to our analysis of the direct and indirect relations with 
depoliticizing effects – fixation, friction, isolation, anticipation, general-
ization. If these pitfalls are avoided the possibility of antagonism is left 
open. In addition, a polemical politics functions as a space-against from 
which every element of the political framework can be criticized and 
reformed. This implies both being able to decide against the prevailing 
political order and deciding for a particular political content. These in 
turn conform to the double requirement of non-knowledge and knowl-
edge in Derrida and Lefort, used in their work to make decision possi-
ble in a political sense.
Speaking more specifically of the European institutional frame-
work, we have to find a way for the European project of ‘becoming’ 
to be governed by the model of political engagement, with the cur-
rent constellation of European institutions as the historical context that 
serves as our immediate point of critical reference. The specifics of that 
context are the historical product of an attitude of permissive consensus. 
This attitude depoliticizes to the extent that it foregoes the possibility of 
antagonism. The effective history of permissive consensus has certainly 
575 Schmidt 2006, 9
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been such a foregoing, and eventually foreclosing. This is due to the 
self-entrenching effect that occurred in response to the onset of legit-
imation pressures: the initial phase of permissive consensus had given 
the European project enough stature, resources and momentum to build 
up considerably. It was in a way its own success that made the impact 
of European politics on the lives of individual citizens sufficiently per-
ceptible to generate questions of legitimacy in the first place. We know 
that output legitimacy was the answer and what the institutional effects 
of its selection were. At the far end of this development, in the current 
phase of European politics, the attitude has arguably traveled all the way 
across the spectrum and become one of constraining dissensus576. This 
is hardly an improvement over permissive consensus, since constraining 
dissensus enshrines the political status quo because of the difficulties it 
poses for any practical change. The challenge for political engagement is 
to achieve the first moment of the political under these circumstances.
Part of the action required to meet this challenge is situated at the 
national level. The increasing distance between European politics and 
national arenas in which it could be contested is part of a mutually rein-
forcing cycle of one-sidedness: leaders of member states very rarely dis-
cuss what does not concern the national political discussion, and when 
this does happen, their response to European concerns either comes in 
the shape of ‘blaming Brussels’ or overstates the capabilities for action 
that are open to individual member states within the European frame-
work577. Both of these modes of discussion emphasize the proper place 
of the nation-state at the center of politics: those who blame Brussels 
long to restore the good old days when nation-states could act without 
finding themselves subordinated to a European legal framework, and 
those who overstate the nation-state’s capabilities for action are insist-
ing that the good old days have never quite faded, or have at least made 
a return. Conversely, as we have seen, European institutions themselves 
widen this gap between national and European affairs. Part of their 
ability to do so stems from the initial ratification of the ECJ’s capacity 
to interpret the European Treaties not only in letter but in spirit578.
The importance of the ECJ’s interpretive monopoly suggests one 
way to potentially break through the cycle of one-sidedness. The ECJ’s 
576 Hooghe & Marks 2009
577 Habermas 2015, 101; Schmidt 2006, 9
578 Weiler 1982, 44-45; Weiler 1992; Burley & Mattli 1993; Van Middelaar 2009, 51-52
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position is one of virtually unassailable interpretative monopoly, and it 
is part and parcel of the negative integration by juridical means, which 
as we know favors liberalization. A case could be made that the prece-
dence of European law over member state law should not have been 
uncritically ratified by the national courts (as part of the practice of 
permissive consensus). This would suggest both an overturning of the 
initial ratification and placing renewed emphasis on the importance of 
national constitutions, for instance by invoking a perpetuity clause such 
as the Ewigkeitsklausel that exists in the German constitution579. Still, it 
seems highly unlikely that such an argument could be made into a suc-
cessful case given the self-entrenching mechanisms that have long been 
at work. What is more, even if the Ewigkeitsklausel would prevail over 
an ECJ verdict in a particular case, thus creating a powerful legal prece-
dent, the ultimate effect of this precedent could only be a reinstatement 
of the primacy of the nation-state. What we are shooting for at such 
cases is a retreat, not only from European politics in its current form but 
from the very battle lines Nietzsche had drawn by invoking his good 
European against the ‘petty politics’ of his time. It is meaningful that the 
clause that would be invoked in such a court case is itself depoliticizing 
in nature, since its very function is to insulate a national constitution 
from political contestation.
This should make us cautious with respect to the more general wish 
to exit from the EU that exists somewhere on the political spectrum in 
most member states. ‘Remaining’ is liberating to the extent that it allows 
us to move beyond organicist metaphors that see individual societies as 
moral spaces home to the accomplishments of equality and consensus 
within a given community580. Imagining society in such a way is perhaps 
one of the most fundamental species of depoliticization, which like the 
European narrative of peace and prosperity fixates politics from two di-
rections at once: both ontological and normative. Rather than pursuing 
societal integration and hence the repression of dissensus and instability 
presupposed by the very image of the moral space, this type of imagina-
tion should be disrupted. Luhmann has approached this imperative in 
terms of the need to ensure sufficient disintegration581.The characteriza-
tion of the EU as a regional state certainly shows the political promise 
579 Scharpf 1999, 57
580 Schinkel 2017, 60
581 ibid, cf. Luhmann 1993, 584
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of some form of the European project in this sense. It remains a political 
project in the sense that it is non-final, has multiple, composite and 
shifting membership structures, and is home to a specific process of be-
coming that cannot be replicated on the national level582. It is true that 
the non-finality of the European project by itself does not entail that a 
series of exits would necessarily fail the test of political engagement. But 
we should add, echoing Nietzsche’s invocation of the good European, 
that there are at least good reasons for looking to a politicized Euro-
pean politics to remedy some of the shortcomings of national politics. 
Moreover, serially reinventing the national politics of all member states 
is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
What, then, is to be done? The three strategies that suggest them-
selves at first all come with their own problems. First, pushing for neg-
ative integration reinforces the cycle which involves the juridical means 
required, which themselves turn on the narrative of output legitimacy 
and the ever-expanding list of competences required in order to attain 
it. Second, pushing for positive integration shatters on high consensus 
barriers583 and overstrains the limited legitimation resources that are 
available for specifically European resources in view of a general absence 
of Gemeinsamkeitsglauben584. Third, the attempt to undo the process of 
integration entirely is unclear in terms of its (de)politicizing effects and 
would turn on a serial reinvention of national politics within member 
states. The only opening that presents itself as an alternative to these 
strategies is polemicizing European politics from the inside. In order to 
do this, both the national and the European political level need to be 
engaged with politically. I have already enumerated a number of ‘politi-
cal’ programs that could not meet the requirements. But what could be 
a positive example of political engagement in the context of European 
politics?
We have already reflected on the place of populism when viewed 
from the perspective of political engagement. We should now distin-
guish between familiar national populisms and what I will call Euro-
populism, which is currently being attempted in very different ways by 
various pan-European political movements585. Current European poli-
582 Schmidt 2006, 9
583 Michelsen & Walter 2013, 335-336; cf. Scharpf 1999, 31; 53
584 Kielmansegg 2013, 18-19
585 The most significant of these movements are: Operation Libero, Initiativet, New 
European Energy, European Alternatives, The European Moment, We Are Europe, 
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tics only speaks of populism in the darkest of terms and sees part of its 
own dignity as rooted in the avoidance of populism. On the other hand, 
many national political parties identified as populist glorify the ‘good 
old days’ of the nation-state (both within the member states and out-
side of Europe). A consistently politicizing Europopulism would wage 
a polemic on both of these fronts, to avoid the depoliticizing effects of, 
respectively, the self-entrenching effects of current European politics 
and the automatic identification of the political with state politics in an 
absolutizing ontological/normative sense586.
As we know from the first chapter, Laclau defines politics itself in 
terms of populism. Populism forges an equivalential chain based on a 
logic or several logics that overdetermine demands that find themselves 
unfulfilled and which cannot be reabsorbed into the existing differential 
structure of hegemonic meanings existing within established institu-
tional frameworks. We have added to this the notion that according 
absolute status to ontological and/or normative claims must result in 
depoliticization. In terms that are closer to Laclau, this would amount 
to a complete reduction of politics to the realm of the social that is ad-
ditionally being presented as grounded without remainders. But what 
matters for Laclau is that the option of grounding in this sense is not 
available as the equivalential link that connects demands from different 
domains is established performatively. There is no logic that ties them 
together at first: it is the process of tying together in a new way that 
characterizes populism and therefore, according to Laclau, politics587.
The new chains to be created through and by Europopulism are in 
one sense close to the demands of Nietzsche’s good Europeans, in view 
of their shared general desire to move past the petty politics of petty 
states. Yet in another sense, they simultaneously move in the opposite 
direction, countering the peace and prosperity policies the EU prides 
itself on. The unabsorbed demand, in Laclau’s terms, would be to open 
up the EU’s current policy-making competences to the possibility of 
antagonism. The conjoining work that results would transform both the 
European and the national level. European politics could then no longer 
operate from the vantage point of unassailable institutions; and national 
and Volt. Note that most of these would vehemently resist being labeled ‘populist’.
586 National political parties that do not lay claim to this identity between state and 
politics would avoid the latter charge.
587 Laclau 2005, 154
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politics itself would have to be reconsidered from the perspective of 
political engagement.
It is impossible to predict the exact course of events that would follow 
a Europopulist movement. For instance, whether there would be local- 
national chapters or parties – Front (or Rassemblement) Européenne, 
European Block, The European Interest, etc. – or whether the movement 
would have to insist on its transnational status rather than intervening 
in national political discussions. What we can say in terms of the pop-
ulist argument that would be made is that it necessarily operates on the 
basis of a specific equivalential chain, and since we know the double 
polemic and at least some of its stakes, Europopulism in the sense that 
concerns us here will necessarily have certain features. It gains further 
content from the ways in which it is limited by its commitment to po-
litical engagement. These two shaping factors will also be connected 
through equivalence: in particular, the polemic against depoliticizing 
aspects of European politics will be performatively linked to an affir-
mation of the political. As we know, this affirmation in turn relies on 
an affirmation of the moral, which is itself politically motivated. This 
is what we have called the moral-political circle. The insistence on the 
meaningfulness of (the possibility of ) antagonism that comes with this 
circle creates a further platform for equivalence. It is not compatible 
with what Schmitt calls an optimistic anthropology, which is associat-
ed with the possibility and desirability of harmonizing society: human 
beings have to remain ‘problematic’, and this facilitates the idea that 
non-harmony is meaningful to human existence.
Of course, this leaves open a set of possibilities that can be specified 
in myriad different ways588. For instance, the political dynamics of the 
private sphere could be intensified as the result of an equivalential chain 
connecting the demand of European working women to no longer be 
subject to a “second shift” in their homes589. From the perspective of 
current social dynamics, this may be a natural conclusion to draw: but 
whether it becomes part of the broader equivalential chain is contin-
gent on the act of forging the chain in a particular way. In other words, 
creating the full chain is the proper task of the populist movement in 
question rather than something that can be made to follow from phil-
osophical principles. The same restraint must apply to the question of 
588 On the general idea of the specification of principles, see Richardson 1990.
589 Hochschild & Machung 2012
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the proper political subjects to be associated with Europopulism: indi-
viduals, movements, national parties, European parties, others. ‘Pulling 
the trigger’ on this question would unduly limit the ways in which Eu-
ropopulism can be pursued.
However, given the background against which Europopulism would 
be polemically set, there are certain aspects that cannot be part of equiv-
alence since they are part and parcel of the differential set of relations 
that forms the immediate context within which the unfulfilled demand 
is constituted and finds itself within a ‘political’ system that is not com-
patible with said demand. Laclau, recall, speaks of a “reabsorption by the 
sedimented forms of the social” as the “death of politics”590. This means 
that non-absorption or rather the systemic impossibility of absorption 
of a particular unfulfilled claim within a given institutional framework 
is a precondition of politics. It follows from this argument that in the 
particular context of a Europopulism set against contemporary Europe-
an politics, the equivalences that can be forged are necessarily polemical 
with respect to this background. This presents a first set of limits. Given 
the equivalence that we have sketched between this particular polemic 
against European politics in its present form on the one hand and the 
broader commitment to political engagement (including but not limit-
ed to the national level) on the other hand, there is a second set of limits 
with regard to what Europopulism could mean. The very example of a 
local chapter of, in this case, France-based Europopulism that would 
be called Front Européenne is itself necessarily polemical with respect 
to the local-national Rassemblement Nationale which seeks to advance 
the interests of a factually and normatively anchored French population 
set against the parts of French society that do not satisfy these require-
ments, as well as the properly foreign interests of non-French (non-)
Europeans. A hypothetical French chapter of Europopulism could not 
argue for this kind of factual or normative anchor in any absolute sense, 
whether in terms of France or Europe. Put another way, there could not 
be a factual or normative reference that fixates the political program 
before it even gets started.
What then of representative democracy as an obligatory moral ref-
erence? This would not be compatible with a Europopulism committed 
to political engagement for the same kind of reason that excludes factu-
al reference to a certain identity of the people in the style of the Rassem-
590 Laclau 2005, 155
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blement Nationale. In both cases the political status of the references falls 
prey to fixation, respectively of an ontological and a normative kind. 
At the same time, there is no reason to conclude that any Europopu-
lism would have to be antidemocratic. As thinkers like Jacques Rancière 
have long pointed out, there is a link between the absence of positive 
requirements that entitle one class to rule over others (such as riches or 
kin591) on the one hand and democracy, conceived as the insistence that 
not having any title to rule is what enables politics, on the other hand592. 
In this way there is a certain family resemblance between Europopu-
lism and democracy in this Rancièrean sense. We again cannot say in 
advance to what extent Europopulism would rely on received notions of 
representative democracy and the ways in which it has been employed 
as a mode of government. It rather belongs to the core of political 
engagement that no mode of government or institutional configuration 
should be considered final or absolute.
For the same reasons given before, we cannot spell out in detail the 
nature of European politics after Europopulism has taken hold. We do 
know that the affirmation of the possibility of antagonism is part of its 
practice. We should understand this practice along the lines of Derri-
da and Lefort’s double requirement for decision: both knowledge and 
non-knowledge. Politics has to be engaged based on non-cynical com-
mitment to a particular political content, without the pretense that we 
should never have to return to the matter at hand or that our collective 
hands are (perpetually) forced due to some relevant fact or norm that is 
taken as a given. So long as unfulfilled demands are able to influence the 
direction that politics takes, this ensures an openness to contestation. 
Which demands should be allowed to exert this kind of direct influ-
ence can only be decided from the interior of these very institutions, 
once again keeping the formal conditions of consistent politicization in 
mind. But whatever demands are arrived at through political engage-
ment, no set of demands can ever be considered final.
Europopulism that consistently politicizes, as remarked, would also 
polemicize against national politics. In the first chapter I used the no-
tion of self-withdrawal to illustrate the inner workings of contemporary 
institutional politics on the national level. Insofar as national politics 
in Europe is characterized by self-withdrawal, Europopulism would 
591 See Rancière 2007a, CH1
592 Rancière 2010, 31
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turn against the underlying ideas of, first, a fear of contingency and a 
corresponding desire for objectivity in politics, and, second, globaliza-
tion construed as unavoidable which must also result in the irrelevance 
of the nation-state. The same applies to the uncritical reference to the 
nation-state as the solution to all problems, as we considered when ad-
dressing the matter of the (de)politicizing effects of a series of exits 
from Europe.
A possible concern that affects both fronts is the nature of the antag-
onism that would be unleashed on the current configuration of member 
states both individually and within the larger context of European pol-
itics. Given the call for antagonism, is there not a risk of out-and-out 
violence? Several lines of response are possible. First, one of the advan-
tages of Laclau’s approach to populism is his interpretation of politics as 
a battle over meanings, and more in particular over which meanings as-
sume a hegemonic position. While this is not without danger, it makes 
clear what kind of struggle Europopulism would call for. Relatedly, sec-
ond, it is the possibility of antagonism that is at stake. Third, the recog-
nition of political volatility and dirty hands on both sides of any conflict 
closes off most justifications that are commonly used to excuse violence. 
A prominent example of this kind of justification is found in moraliza-
tion. In this sense, it seems more likely that Europopulism would itself 
be subject to moralized violence, for instance because it threatens the 
moral-political dignity of current European politics or because it goes 
against fixated and fixating concepts of race, religion, and nation – not 
to mention economics.
As Laclau also teaches us, the real contest in a struggle for hegemo-
ny between Europopulist forces and those representing current Europe-
an political interests concerns the status of Europe as a floating signifier: 
its meaning is as yet suspended, though subject to stabilization in some 
of its aspects593. One aspect that unites the ‘two Europes’ is a recognition 
of the limits of national politics. However, even here current European 
politics would emphasize the capabilities of European politics to con-
tain market forces, champion human rights and dispel the evils of pop-
ulism; none of these justificatory levers is available to a Europopulism 
593 Laclau 2005, 131; 133, cf. Bourdieu 2002. Laclau speaks of ‘fixation’ rather than 
stabilization, but he means a temporarily settled discursive frontier rather than the 
mode of depoliticization that we have called fixation. 
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consistent with political engagement. For that reason, from the perspec-
tive of depoliticization critique it seems we should prefer alternatives to 
current European politics, so long as one of the alternatives is consistent 
with political engagement. 
I must insist that Europopulism is here offered as nothing more 
than a positive example of a politics consistent with political engage-
ment. This does not entail that it is the only way, and it would indeed 
be contrary to the requirements of generalized depoliticization critique 
to reduce politicization to a single strategy. Europopulism succeeds be-
cause in its consistently politicizing form it allows for a polemic on two 
fronts (against national and European politics) that does not itself fall 
victim to a depoliticizing commitment to for instance absolute onto-
logical or normative references that are invoked as a given. Avoiding 
such a commitment is possible because of the performative element 
that characterizes populism in Laclau’s sense. But this is not intended 
as a claim that nothing of value can be found outside of this strategy of 
populist performativity: presented here as an example, Europopulism 
does not in any way exclude other strategies of political engagement. 
It does, however, point out one strategy to consistently politicize, and 
shows that it is possible to do so.
In closing, I express the hope that political engagement, expressed 
in whichever form, will offer a serious alternative to the current config-
urations of European politics and that some of the arguments I have 
advanced on these pages – or their intellectual offspring – will find their 
way into the political arena, with the goal of politicizing consistently. 
This goal represents Europe’s truly political frontier.
5.5 Conclusion
We started out the inquiry with the simple intuition that depolitici-
zation expressed the claim that some matters are beyond politics. The 
strategy I had in mind for attempting to combat this kind of claim, 
through the theoretical angle of depoliticization critique, was to use 
ethics as a tool of politicization rather than its mortal enemy. This strat-
egy is quite contrarian, but it has proven fruitful in establishing the dif-
ferent direct and indirect relations between politics and ethics and their 
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bearing on (de)politicization. These relations themselves gave substance 
to certain important insights, for instance the possibility of an apolitical 
given that shifts between ontological and normative registers as a spe-
cies of fixation, and the notion of pure politics as a consequence of the 
attempt to free politics from ethics completely. While cataloguing and 
diagnosing different modes of depoliticization both on the theoretical 
level and within the applied context of European politics is certainly 
part of the contribution of this investigation, I have also shown a way to 
combine direct and indirect relations that enables political engagement 
and hence consistent politicization. The first part of this combination 
is the direct relation that is able to avoid depoliticization: immanence, 
here understood as the existence of the political within ethics and oth-
er life domains as (the possibility of ) antagonism. The parenthesized 
possibility makes the difference between the first and second moment 
of the political: these two moments represent respectively its status as 
a not-yet-realized possibility and as the actualization of antagonism. 
As we have seen, depoliticization constitutes a negation of the possi-
bility of antagonism, whereas politicization is its affirmation. Such an 
affirmation of the political is necessarily accompanied by an affirmation 
of the moral, namely by an insistence that antagonism is important to 
meaningful human existence. This moral notion is not derived from first 
principles, but itself a political stipulation. In this manner, politics and 
ethics are part of a never-ending moral-political circle that exposes their 
mutuality.
On its own, this does not give us an account of any kind of politics. 
That is why I also sought to learn from influential interpretations of an 
indirect relation between politics and ethics. From Habermas I took a 
general model of politics conceived as an open-ended conversation and 
extended it into the notion of polemical politics, while leaving behind 
Habermas’ added conclusion that the ‘conversation’ is characterized by 
a certain directionality. I analyzed this latter feature in terms of the 
indirect relation of anticipation and showed its depoliticizing effects. 
From Rawls I took the idea that shallow foundations and political con-
ceptions of, for instance, the person can be effectively employed, while 
leaving behind the notion that moral positions (or in Rawlsian parlance, 
comprehensive doctrines) have to pass a specific test of reasonableness 
in order to be admitted into politics. Again, I analyzed this latter feature 
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in terms of an indirect relation, in this case generalization, and showed 
its depoliticizing effects. The newly conceived indirect relation of polit-
ical engagement avoids the depoliticizing effects plaguing Habermas 
and Rawls. In political engagement, there is no anticipatory direction-
ality or generalization that selects for reasonableness. It transforms the 
Habermasian notion of a political conversation and applies to this the 
Rawlsian insistence that we need not and in fact should not work with 
first principles without either posing final principles or procedural rea-
sonableness as limits. What is left is a polemic, which does not entail 
that ‘anything goes’ but does liberate politics from the depoliticizing 
commitments of the other indirect relations.
The only limit that is imposed concerns the nature of the political 
itself. The aim of political engagement is to provide consistent politici-
zation, so that the various modes of depoliticization catalogued earlier 
are not only valuable as items in the catalogue but also give further 
substance to political engagement. The apparent paradox of expelling 
certain positions from politics in order to avoid depoliticization is de-
fanged by referring back to the moral-political circle that is part of the 
direct relation of immanence. In this manner, immanence needs politi-
cal engagement in order to express the mutuality of politics and ethics 
within politics itself, whereas vice versa, political engagement needs im-
manence in order to consistently argue for politicization in the manner 
required by generalized depoliticization critique.
Using ethics as a tool of politicization is thus a complicated mat-
ter. It concerns an ethics that is not to be derived from first or final 
principles, but is rather involved in a circular relationship with politics. 
Ethics supplies a certain perspective on human life that does not have 
the finality of practical reason in the classical sense. Rather, it is shot 
through with elements of decision, and keeping this element open is 
in a way its whole point. It is only this open-ended quality that keeps 
ethics from being a force of depoliticization. At the same time, ethics 
does not become identical to the political. While the political remains 
a descriptive phenomenon, describing as it does an ontological level at 
which antagonism is always possible, from the perspective of depoliti-
cization critique it is not sufficient to merely describe this ontology in 
theoretical terms. The contribution of ethics in terms of depoliticization 
critique and politicization is that it is able to support an affirmation of 
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the political. In this way, the political, as it is used in Schmitt (as a crit-
ical category) and within depoliticization critique as I have defined and 
applied it, positively requires ethics.
While this makes clear the functional role of ethics with respect to, 
in our case, the politicization of European politics, the notion of ethics 
that is employed here deserves further attention. As I have noted, it in-
forms a notion of political action that is volatile on both sides and does 
not permit full justification for either side of a conflict. The strongly 
contextual features of the political according to Schmitt, which I have 
put to productive use here, also carry implications for the kind of ethics 
that is compatible with the notion of the political. The political by it-
self imposes certain constraints on ethics based on the commitment to 
avoid depoliticization. In particular, there are clear limits to the theoret-
ical ambitions of ethics based on the non-availability of first principles 
or alternative deductive mechanisms. It should thus be clear that ethics 
in this sense cannot be about formulating general moral requirements 
about ‘how one ought to live’594. By contrast, it is about seeing beyond 
obscuring generalizations that pave over the complexities of moral life. 
Such an ethics is also necessarily self-critical, as part of its mission is to 
show the inability of pure argument to reach a fully justified conclusion 
based on some version of moral deliberation. It affirms this inability in 
the face of any proclaimed moral certainty, and given the widespread 
nature of the idea of full justification in moral and political philosophy, 
this polemical aspect will often be felt. As part of the same strand of 
arguments, this kind of ethics is committed to seeing human beings as 
‘problematic’, in Schmitt’s terms. To repeat, no definitive truth claim 
can be made about this status, since it is more of a conjecture, confession 
of faith and political presupposition than the result of a neutral proce-
dure in search of definitive certainty. This in itself implies a position 
from which most types of ethical theory can be criticized in a particular 
way, namely from the standpoint of the politics of problematic human- 
kind. I cannot pursue this further presently, as it is outside of the scope 
of our investigation.
The central question under consideration has been: What role can 
ethics play in the politicization of European politics? My answer is that 
it is necessary in order to affirm the possibility of antagonism, which 
exceeds the task of merely describing it on a theoretical level. For that 
594 cf. Williams 2006
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reason, ethics underlies politics, as politics in turn underlies ethics: I 
described this as the moral-political circle. It summarizes the lesson 
concerning their direct relation that I have described under the heading 
of immanence. This attains political relevance for Europe when we add 
the indirect relation between politics and ethics which I have called 
political engagement, through the pursuit of a polemical politics and 
a recognition of the formal limits imposed by the aim to be consistent 
by avoiding depoliticization. Political engagement thus demarcates the 
lesson concerning the indirect relation between ethics and politics. Par-
allel to the need for political engagement from the perspective of imma-
nence (in order to be extended to politics itself ), political engagement 
needs immanence in order to avoid depoliticization. The moral-political 
circle makes it possible to affirm the political without falling back on a 
first principle that precedes political decision.
Together, immanence and political engagement show what would 
be necessary to politicize Europe. At present, European politics is de-
politicized in terms of its self-justification and legitimation strategies, 
the insulation of some of its central institutions (for instance, the in-
terpretative monopoly of the European Court of Justice), the political 
process and its feature of policy without politics, and the ways in which 
European politics engages in moralization. My starting point during 
the analysis of these modes of depoliticization was the idea that ethics 
could provide a productive way of looking at the problem. Our master 
problem thus became the relation between ethics and politics. Different 
direct relations (fixation, friction, isolation, and immanence) and differ-
ent indirect relations (anticipation, generalization, and political engage-
ment) were distinguished and analyzed in terms of their (de)politicizing 
effects. The crucial distinction throughout has been that between local-
ized and generalized depoliticization critique. While the former leaves 
the ontological dimension unperturbed, thus not asking the proper 
question in connection to (de)politicization, the latter scrutinizes pre-
cisely that dimension and is thus able to politicize consistently given 
certain conditions. The aim of consistency is animated by the pursuit of 
philosophical clarity in the context of political un-clarity; the only way 
to demonstrate the latter is through the former, and the former leads 
necessarily to the latter. Affirming the political requires showing where 
depoliticizing claims go wrong. I have analyzed how they can go wrong, 
and how they do in fact go wrong both in European politics and in 
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some of the theoretically significant ways in which ethics is brought to 
bear on politics. As remarked, this has not ended in despair: under the 
combined flag of politics and ethics, through both direct (immanence) 
and indirect (political engagement) relations between them, and only in 
and through these combinations, is it possible to politicize consistently. 
The fact that this strategy has recourse to both a direct and indirect 
relation between politics and ethics relates to both (directly) affirming 
the possibility of antagonism as immanent to all life domains and (in-
directly) excluding direct and indirect relations that depoliticize as part 
of the strategy of political engagement. That is the test that should be 
applied to any version of European politics. The possibility of such ap-
plication was shown by the example of Europopulism, which combines 
the elements of polemical politics with satisfying the formal conditions 
of political engagement. It would undercut the whole argument to claim 
that this is the only way: I do not make this claim. I have merely indi-
cated the possibility of a consistently politicizing Europopulism. The 
conditions that make it into a possibility in the first place are more than 
an indication, however: they tell us how politicization finds itself poised 
against mechanisms of depoliticization in European politics, how 
(de)politicization itself works and under what conditions the politiciza-
tion of European politics can be attained.
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Summary
Depoliticization presents itself to us both as a theoretical and a practi-
cal-political problem. The argument of the thesis aims to develop depo-
liticization as a philosophical concept which gains its impetus from and 
is tested against the politics of the European Union (EU). My approach 
to depoliticization (critique) is that ethics provides part of the solution, 
rather than simply being part of the problem. After a conceptual reflec-
tion, I analyze EU politics in terms of its modes of self-justification, the 
incontestable nature of some of its central institutions, and its one-sided 
reliance on negative integration through juridical means. In an attempt 
to develop the relationship between politics and ethics more construc-
tively, I then develop an account of both direct and indirect relations. 
A key aspect of my analysis is the distinction between localized and 
generalized depoliticization critique – only the latter extends to the on-
tological dimension, which is why the former falls short. This leads to an 
ambiguous patchwork of politicizing and depoliticizing effects, which is 
illustrated by the development of the ethical-political relationship bet-
ween Rousseau and Schmitt. These are what I call direct relations bet-
ween politics and ethics, in which ethics is directly ‘brought’ to politics. 
I then consider indirect relations, in which a specific procedure is inter-
posed: I consider Habermas’ proposed reforms of EU politics, and inter-
pret Rawls’ political liberalism as a complementary account. In the end, 
direct relations between politics and ethics are found to be insufficient 
by themselves, and indirect relations, while promising, end up depolitici-
zing in ways that complement each other as much as the relations them-
selves. In order to remedy these flaws, I introduce a notion of political 
engagement that combines what is promising about direct and indirect 
relations. Political engagement combines a polemical politics with the 
shutting out of depoliticizing effects and is thus able to politicize across 
the board, fulfilling the requirement of generalized depoliticization cri-
tique. Europopulism, which I define in connection with Laclau, is my 
proposal to extend political engagement to European politics.
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Depolitisering dringt zich zowel als theoretisch als praktisch-politiek 
probleem aan ons op. Het argument van de voorliggende dissertatie 
heeft als doel depolitisering in te zetten als filosofisch concept, dat zijn 
praktische motivatie ontleent aan de politiek van de Europese Unie 
(EU) en daartegen kan worden afgezet. Mijn benadering van depoliti-
sering(skritiek) is dat ethiek onderdeel van de oplossing vormt, in plaats 
van louter onderdeel van het probleem te zijn. Na een conceptuele re-
flectie analyseer ik EU-politiek in het kader van haar rechtvaardiging, 
de niet-aanvechtbare aard van enkele van haar belangrijkste instituties, 
en haar eenzijdige afhankelijkheid van negatieve integratie volgens een 
juridische weg. In een poging om de relatie tussen politiek en ethiek op 
constructieve wijze te definiëren, ga ik hierna in op directe en indirecte 
relaties tussen beide termen. Een belangrijk onderdeel van mijn analyse 
is het onderscheid tussen gelokaliseerde en algemeen toegepaste depo-
litiseringskritiek – enkel de laatste heeft betrekking op de ontologische 
dimensie, zodat de eerste niet ver genoeg door kan voeren. Toepassing 
van dit onderscheid leidt tot een ambigu lapwerk van politiserende en 
depolitiserende effecten, dat wat betreft de directe relaties wordt geïl-
lustreerd aan de hand van het begrip van de relatie ethiek-politiek tus-
sen Rousseau en Schmitt. Ik ga dan, in het kader van indirecte relaties, 
in op hervormingen van de EU voorgesteld door Habermas en bied 
een interpretatie van Rawls’ politiek liberalisme zodat deze als com-
plement van Habermas kan dienen. Na analyse blijken directe relaties 
tussen politiek en ethiek niet te kunnen volstaan, terwijl indirecte re-
laties, hoewel veelbelovend, depolitiserende effecten hebben. Om deze 
onvolkomenheden te adresseren introduceer ik een notie van politiek 
engagement die een polemische politiek combineert met het uitsluiten 
van depolitiserende effecten. Op deze wijze kan politiek engagement 
consistent politiseren en dus voldoen aan de voorwaarden van algemeen 
toegepaste depolitiseringskritiek. Europopulisme, dat ik definieer in het 
verlengde van het werk van Laclau, is mijn voorstel om politiek engage-
ment mogelijk te maken in de Europese politiek.
Samenvatting

Europe’s Political Frontier uses the problematic of depoliticization as a 
springboard for a new type of critique, which gains its impetus from and 
is tested against the politics of the European Union (EU). It is argued 
that for the purposes of depoliticization (critique) ethics has a constructive 
role to play, rather than being merely part of the problem. Depoliticization is 
developed as a philosophical concept, which is then analyzed on an EU-level as 
involving specific modes of self-justification, the incontestable nature of some 
central institutions, and a one-sided reliance on negative integration through 
juridical means. In an attempt to address these aspects of depoliticization within 
European politics, an account of the direct and indirect relations between 
ethics and politics is developed and illustrated through developments in modern 
and contemporary philosophy. These interrelations either lead to depolitici-
zation or are found to be insufficient by themselves. The notion of political 
engagement is introduced with a view to combining the strengths of both 
direct and indirect relations, so that it becomes possible to politicize across the 
board. This possibility is brought to the EU through a proposal of Europopu-
lism that would extend political engagement to European politics.
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